Why culture matters?
an analysis of complexity, acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in Ghana and Nigeria

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Why Culture Matters? An Analysis of Complexity, Acceptance and Effectiveness of Security Sector Governance in Ghana and Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Security Sector Reform and Governance (SSR/G) processes in West Africa have been ongoing for about two decades now in societies in post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding or statebuilding phases of transition. These security reform interventions have largely followed a pro-Western or liberal peace approach and thus considered as foreign and facilitating neo-imperialist tendencies which does not promote change and transformation within the security and development nexus. It also focuses more on the 'hard' side of security and governance reforms rather than complementing this with the 'soft' aspects reflected mainly in acquiring the right security cultures which entail shared values, norms and customs for the desired transformation needed.

This study, therefore, argues for re-conceptualising the SSR/SSG approach by focusing more on the endogenous security context which explores why culture matters in SSR/SSG and whether acquiring the right security culture, that is shared norms, values and standards for safety and well-being, could minimise the complexity and facilitate the acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in the comparative cases of Ghana and Nigeria.

The methodology for this research was based on the qualitative research method, given the exploratory nature of the study which focuses mainly on human behaviour, shared values, norms and principles with the tendency of bias and subjective interpretation. It adopted the critical theorist approach for the research, while using the grounded theory as a means to establishing the theoretical proposition for the study within the comparative case study strategy.

It concludes that shared norms and values on safety, protection and freedom from fear, influence the acceptance and commitment towards security sector reform and governance efforts, hence imbibing the appropriate security cultural values, norms and practices by both state and sub-

state actor groups, would ensure the needed change and transformation towards successful statebuilding processes in West Africa.

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DEDICATION

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ACRONYMS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ACPP	African Conflict Prevention Pool
APC	All Progressive's Party
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Ghana)
AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council (Nigeria)
AQAP	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASDR	African Security Dialogue and Research
ASSN	African Security Sector Network
AU	African Union
BDAT	British Defence Advisory Team
BICC	Bonn International Centre for Conversion
BMATT	British Military Advisory Training Team
BNI	Bureau of National Investigations of Ghana
CADSP	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CDD	Ghana Centre for Democratic Development
CHRAJ	Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice of Ghana
CHRI	Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPP	Convention People's Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency

DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DIFD	UK Department for International Development
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOSOCC	African Union Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
EU	European Union
FFARN	Forum on Farmer and Herder Relations in Nigeria
GAF	Ghana Armed Forces
GCST	Global Consortium on Security Transformation
GFN	Global Facilitation Network
GLOBE	The Global Leadership and Organisational Behavioural Effectiveness
GPS	Ghana Police Service
GSDRC	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
GTZ/GIZ	German Technical Cooperation Agency
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IFAC	International Federation of Accountants
IMATT	International Military Advisory and Training Team

IMET	International Military and Education Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
ISACA	Information Systems Audit and Control Association
ISIS/L	al-Shaabab in Somalia, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the Levant
ISSAT	International Security Sector Advisory Team
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
MDRI	Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MNCs	Multi-National Corporations
MNJTF	Multi National Joint Task Force
MPRI	Military Professionals Resources Incorporated
MRU	Mano River Union
NAF	Nigeria Armed Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDA	Niger Delta Avengers
NDC	National Democratic Congress Party
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NDPVF	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NDV	Niger Delta Vigilante
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission of Nigeria
NIA	National Intelligence Agency of Nigeria
NIRP	National Institutional Renewal Programme
NLC	National Liberation Council Regime

NDLF	Niger Delta Liberation Front
NPC	National Peace Council
NPF	National Police Force
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRC	National Redemption Council Regime
NSA	National Security Agencies
NSC	National Security Council
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSIWA	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PNC	People's National Convention Party
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PRCN	Provisional Ruling Council of Nigeria
PP	Progress Party
PSCs	Private Security Companies
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SIDA	Swedish Development Agency
SMC	Supreme Military Council Regime (Ghana and Nigeria)
SSD	Security Sector Development
SSG	Security Sector Governance
SSM	Security Sector Management
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSS	State Security Services of Nigeria

SST	Security Sector Transformation
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN DPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UNODC	United Nations on Office on Drug and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WACSOF	West African Civil Society Forum
WANEP	West African Network for Peacebuilding
WANSED	West African Network on Security and Democratic Governance

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Security, peace and development constitute vital concepts that have transcended and straddled both Cold War and Post-Cold War ideologies and conventions. These concepts have assumed critical and useful dimensions in addressing the needs and concerns of both state and non-state, or rather, sub-state actor groups. Though different and varied in their definitions, they are related, interconnected and mutually reinforcing in facilitating the safety and survival of the state and its people. There is, however, the need to preserve and consolidate the existence as well as address the needs of these actors by responding to their common threats.

Interestingly, many states in Africa that are responsible for creating a safe and secure environment for undertaking development activities have not been able to fulfill this obligation. The inability of African states, as sovereign entities, to guarantee security, peace and development within their territorial confines, stems largely from a lack of political will. This is compounded by structural factors such as weakened, dysfunctional and resource-constrained security sector and a governance architecture that is unable to effectively and efficiently respond to threats that undermine the safety and existence of the state and the individual (*AU Common African Defence and Security Policy* - CADSP, and Cawthra 2008).

In designing responses to insecurity through a regime-centred rather than people-centred approach, security institutions in Africa have often become a threat to the very citizens they are supposed to protect. Marginalisation of the populace in decision-making and sharing of the wealth of the state, bad governance practices, conflicts, unconstitutional changes in government and transnational organised criminal activities have further exacerbated this problem. These developments have led to progressive destabilisation and insecurity in these states owing to

dissatisfaction among citizens or resident populations and security forces (Berdal and Malone 2000).

The civil wars experienced particularly in the Mano River Union (MRU) sub-region, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and, to an extent, the destabilisation in Guinea, coupled with calls for transition in dictatorships and authoritarian-led regimes, including Ghana and Nigeria, among others, exemplified the dissent of the governed and the need for change in these countries (Clapham 1998, Reno 7-19, Hoffman 2011 and Collier and Hoeffler 2005). Security forces, mainly the police and the military, were used under dictatorship regimes and in civil wars to brutalise and abuse the populace, thereby wreaking havoc on their lives and properties. In addition, sub-state security forces, including private security companies, liberation armies, guerillas and rebel or mercenary groups, were also used in civil wars across the region in a similar context (Clapham 1998 and *African Security Review* Vol. 17 no. 2).

The violence and abuses meted out on citizens in these countries took place amidst the lack of or questionable good governance practices. Oversight of the security sector by civilian actors, including national legislature and civil society organizations in respective fields, were almost non-existent at the outbreak and/or during the civil wars and brutal dictatorships (IPU and DCAF 2003, and Bryden and Fluri 2003). Thus, issues of security sector reform/management, institutional reforms, and governance of the security sector linked to development issues, among others, became eminent.

In response to these developments, which more or less mirrored the end of the Cold War era and the assumption of post-Cold War dynamics and imperatives, the urgent need for reform in the areas of democratic governance and aligning development programmes towards the needs of the people became a conditionality from external actors or donors who tied the provision of aid to these conditionalities. The issue of security and development also came to the fore, in the

context of a mutually reinforcing dynamics of a secure environment, creating the necessary conditions for pursuing the development agenda, which in turn reinforces and guarantees the state and human security agenda. The call for Security Sector Development (SSD) focused on giving more attention to poverty reduction in a safe and secure environment, rather than emphasis on increased military budget expenditure and promoting regime security issues (Brzoska 2003).

Ensuring a careful balance between state and people's security, thus, became a challenge, necessitating the emphasis on addressing issues of bad governance practices, including corruption, nepotism and clientelism, through the upholding of good governance and democratic principles on issues of freedom of speech, transparency and accountability, human rights and the rule of law, among others (Harbeson and Rothchild 2008). Hence, aligning security/development priorities to the needs of the citizenry and issues of civilian control and oversight of the security sector came to the fore.

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) agenda subsequently emerged in response to some of these dynamics, where states in need of aid for development were required to reduce their military or defence budget expenditures to about 4% of their national budget requirements, and tone down excesses of abuse on their citizens (Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisakin 2008: 9). The SSR concept, subsequently, gained significant attention in the late 1990s, evolving towards ensuring professional, operationally effective and accountable state security agencies, having effective civilian management and oversight bodies. The continuous evolution of the nascent concept, which was quite successfully implemented in South Africa after the end of the Apartheid regime, and its lack of effectiveness in practice, owing to different cultural contexts and characteristics, as well as poor or weak governance practices, led to the call for Security Sector Transformation (SST), particularly within the African setting.

The SST concept is perceived as having the tendency to reinforce the Security Sector Governance (SSG) element of the SSR concept. The SST concept focused more on changing values, norms and imbibing principles within the security culture of state security institutions and agencies that will enhance the effectiveness of the implementation of the SSR concept (Bryden, and Olonisakin 2008 3-29).

This is expected to translate into well-managed, vibrant, effective and efficient security sector, with reorganised or restructured processes and mechanisms, as well as reoriented security actors in the sector. Though these initiatives have specific objectives or set targets, they are basically required, in the context of human security, to work towards ensuring a well-managed and operationally effective security sector which is efficient in identifying threats to the state and the individual, securitising or determining what constitutes these threats, and responding in a timely and appropriate manner to address them.

Ghana and Nigeria were chosen as case study countries to explore how security culture influences the governance of the security sector and the acceptance of security sector reform initiatives. The rationale for the case selection includes the following factors. To begin with, Ghana, a lower middle income country with an estimated population of 29.6 million as of 2018 and a GDP rate of 8.0% (World Bank in Ghana, 25 March 2019), has shown remarkable progress over the past two decades by being among the fastest growing economy in the world in 2011 (*Daily Graphic* cited on myjoyonline.com 2011; Euler Hermes 2011: 3), and also among the top ten fastest growing economies in the world in 2012 with Nigeria and five other African countries (*The Sun* cited on myjoyonline.com 2012). In 2014 the country recorded 2.6% GDP translated into US$48.7 billion (Ghana Statistical Services 2014). Its discovery of oil in 2007 and production in commercial quantities in 2010 facilitated its growth in addition to revenues from its

other commodities, including Gold, Diamond, Cocoa, Bauxite and Manganese, as well as the growth of its service industry (Yennu 2018: 18).

The World Bank indicated its major strides towards democracy in a multi-party system in which its judiciary has demonstrated significant level of independence from the other two branches of government. In addition, it has consistently ranked in the top three countries in Africa for freedom of speech, a strong broadcast media with radio as the medium with the greatest reach (World Bank in Ghana, 25 March 2019). Its economy still remains buoyant despite complaints about lack of social impact from current economic successes recorded and its currency depreciation against the US Dollar, as well as upsurge in crime in recent years across the country.

Nigeria, on the other hand, is also a lower middle income country with a GDP of 1.9% in 2018 and a population of about 197 million. Prior to this, the West Africa hegemon recorded a GDP growth rate of 5.94% which constitutes US$522.64 billion in 2014 (World Bank cited in the Trading Economics 2014; and Nigeria National Bureau Statistics 2014: 4). It is, arguably, the continent's largest economy in competition with South Africa. The country's economy has performed relatively better compared to its past under dictatorship and authoritarian regimes in the 1970s and 1980s, though its economy depends heavily on mineral oil resources. The economy, however, currently faces a "lost decade" without economic reforms through diversification as its economic growth stagnates based on its excessive dependence on oil, constituting 90% of its foreign currency earnings and two-thirds of government income (Soto and Renner at Bloomberg.com, 12 February 2019).

The country, considered as multi-ethnic and culturally diverse society, had six consecutive elections since its return to democracy in 1999 after a long period of military rule as also in the case of Ghana (World Bank in Nigeria, 9 April 2019). However, crime in the country

is on the increase, particularly terrorist activities in its north-eastern parts, making lives of residents difficult. The successes and failures chalked with regard to the macro-economic indicators in these two countries, therefore, present an interesting scenario for lessons to be learned, particularly within the context of peace, security and development.

Secondly, both countries have gone and continue to go through democratic transitions in the same region with similar governance trajectories, characterised by civil war, in the case of Nigeria, past military dictatorships and coups d'état, and religious and ethnic conflicts among others. Nevertheless, they have remained relatively stable in the region for over a decade until recently when Nigeria started experiencing problems with the terrorist group 'Boko Haram'.

Additionally, both countries have some differences, particularly, in their historical backgrounds, size, security threats, and conflict management mechanisms among other things. They have also embarked on SSR processes, but with varying degree of success, and still face challenges of SSG in several respects. For example, through the instrumentality of policy 'think-tanks' and other Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the Government of Ghana attempted a reform of its security sector in the areas of intensifying civil-police and civil-military relations, given negative perceptions generated by the activities of past military regime under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by former President Jerry John Rawlings, through human rights abuses. SSR initiatives were, therefore, organised, including preparatory dialogue sessions for orientation for officials of government, members of the legislature, selected security agencies and members of civil society in the country. Security Sector Management (SSM) programmes were also organised for both civilian and military personnel from the Ministry of Defence. These efforts were complemented by both traditional and modern security mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.

Though some progress have been made in the past decade, owing to stability and upholding good governance practices in the country, comprehensive SSR is yet to be achieved. Also, the knowledge of the concept of SSG is known within limited circles of expertise, anti-change elements, especially within government institutions and security agencies, pose unnecessary interferences to good governance and reform within the sector. There are, however, positive security sector reform lessons to be learned, demonstrated by the peace and stability the country has enjoyed over the past two decades.

In the case of Nigeria, Abiodun (2000) argues that security sector management since Nigeria's independence was tied to the politics of governance and to activities of civil societies, encompassing elements of both strategic and human security, and involves questions of development and conflict management. Abiodun, however, premised the stability of the country on how well the security apparatus was managed, and whether it was up to the task of skillfully addressing the ethnic, social, economic and political tensions in the country. The recent terrorist activities of the 'Boko Haram' – who are against western education and calling for the establishment of the 'Sharia' in Nigeria – have not helped matters either.

A case study of the two countries would, therefore, serve as useful scenarios for testing the performance of SSG agendas in societies in transition towards statebuilding in West Africa.

1.2 Problem Statement

Governance, as mentioned earlier, constitutes a critical component in the general re-organisation of the security sector, either in post-conflict or transitional societies. The term governance here is used to connote structures, processes and mechanisms through which the security sector is subjected to democratic control such that the needs of both the individual and the state are identified and addressed in a peaceful, safe and secure environment which has respect for the rule of law (Bryden and Hänggi 2005). Another interesting definition of enterprise

governance by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) states the notion of a set of responsibilities and practices exercised by a controlling and an executive management body, with the goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring that objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risks or threats are managed properly and verifying that the organization's resources are used responsibly (IFAC 04 in Allen and Mellon 2007: 2).

But as has been rightly identified by Bryden, Ndiaye and Olonisakin (2008: 12) under the challenges of security sector governance in West Africa, security governance as a concept is difficult to implement in practice. Some of the reasons for this situation include years of autocratic rule and its entrenched regime security interests, security sector governance perceived as a condition for donor assistance, the exclusion or marginalisation of sub-state actors in the security governance process, the Anglophone and Francophone linguistic divide, as well as weak institutional mechanisms or arrangements for governance of the sector. Other additional factors include the ignorance about the SSR/G concept and the lack of requisite capacity to implement SSG among others.

Thus, the SSR concept continues to evolve with new challenges. These challenges comprise a lack of in-depth knowledge of how it is accepted or received in countries of implementation. A lack of clearly defined benefits to be derived by both state and sub-state actors through the externally-imposed Western agenda around SSR complicates the interaction between traditional security values and norms which conflict with locally defined, traditional or informal and human security concepts in the African context.

As a result, a more detailed study of the subject matter is required to enhance security sector governance and for that matter SSR processes in West Africa. And in order to ensure the acceptance and effective implementation of the concept, more attention also needs to be given to

the notion of security culture and its impact on SSG, which goes beyond merely exercising oversight functions and ensuring accountability, to embracing the collective definition of security and the SSG concept, securitisation and minimisation of common prioritised threats, understanding security as a service to be delivered to both state and sub-state actors, and which also requires active engagement by actors comprising security providers, managers and recipients in the security sector.

Bryden, Ndiaye and Olonisakin underscored the significance of an attitudinal shift by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in terms of values and norms since the 1990s by insisting on the intrinsic relationship between security and political good governance. This is reflected in the adoption, by ECOWAS, of a number of binding instruments related to peace, security and development that provides an important framework for SSR activities at the national level (Bryden, Ndiaye and Olonisakin 2008: 11). In a similar vein, Bryden and Olonisakin (2010: 3-20) in their work on SST called for a uniquely African dimension to the SSR agenda which could be found in the need to shift radically structural conditions that underpin the governance of the security sector (Bryden and Olonisakin 3-20). This call provides a basis for transformation, through norms and values, within national and regional settings with greater emphasis on actors and institutions.

In doing this, however, the crucial aspects of 'security culture', and its tendency to address issues of complexity, acceptance and effectiveness of security governance processes in West Africa, has largely being left untouched. Security culture is used here to connote shared beliefs, values, norms, practices and principles on prevention, minimisation, management or resolution of threats and fears within a group, community or a country. Allen and Mellon asserted that governance and management of security are most effective when they are systemic, which implies woven into the very culture and fabric of organizational - and by extension state -

behaviours and actions. In this regard, they define culture as the predominant, shared attitudes, values, goals, behaviours and practices that characterize the functioning of a group or organisation, and for that matter a state.

Culture thereby creates and sustains connections among policies, processes, people and performance (Allen and Mellon 2007).

1.3 Aims and Scope of Research

With the emergence of the human security concept, which advocates for a people-centred approach to addressing security needs rather than a regime or state-centred approach, the security concept has broadened in scope and dimension as regards issues being securitised as threats, and by whom (Buzan 1991, Wyn Jones 1999; Booth 2005). Food, environment, health, political, economic and social issues, among others, have come to the fore as issues of concern to the citizens of a country and major stakeholders, comprising both state and sub-state actors including civil society, and these actors are required to play active roles in decision-making, management and oversight processes that seek to respond to concerns or needs expressed in the issues identified. That said, it has been observed that the notion of values and norms, reflected in the security culture of states – which is more geared toward regime security – play dominant roles, and mostly negatively, in security governance in West Africa. In most cases, sub-state security actors are excluded from decision-making processes rather than promoting their welfare and the security interest of the state (OSIWA 6 and IDRC 1-13).

This study, therefore, seeks to explore the role of security culture and its influence on SSG and transformation with respect to three core analytical concepts. These include complexity (institutional and human dynamics and requirements), acceptance (recognition or legitimacy or actors and their roles) and effectiveness (with regard to performance of actors to achieve stated objectives, goals or results). In particular, it will examine how the complementary roles of

indigenous security actors, based on their security culture, can either influence or undermine the promotion of strong, credible and democratic security sector institutions, mechanisms and governance processes towards enhanced SSR/SSG practices in West Africa. It will, therefore, be guided by the following research question: 'How has security culture affected the complexity of, and facilitated the acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in the comparative cases of Ghana and Nigeria?'

In doing this, the study will focus on SSG practices in Ghana and Nigeria respectively, representing transitional societies in West Africa, and unravel the extent to which security culture influences have either facilitated the acceptance and implementation of security sector reform programmes and enhanced governance in the sector or led to resistance or hindrance of same. The relationships and roles of state and sub-state security actors in the security governance process would be looked at, and the extent to which that has translated into the effectiveness of security institutions and agencies on the ground.

The evolution of the SSR concept and programmes which brings out a reconfiguration in addressing security challenges confronting not only the state but sub-state actors within the territorial confines of that state, and implications of securitisation of threats based on both notions of traditional and human security would equally be the focus of this study.

1.4 Overall Objectives of the Study

The SSR concept is increasing in significance on the African continent as a prerequisite for socioeconomic growth and development given the widespread instability and violence across the continent. The West African region, in a similar vein, has engaged the concept at both national and regional levels, albeit with differences in commitment to reform and acceptance of the concept in general. And as governments and peoples in Africa struggle to ensure a good balance between the traditional and human security concepts in the minimisation of threats,

efforts are required to deepen the understanding of these concepts to facilitate its acceptance and application.

The overall objectives of the study are, thus, as follows:

- To explore ways of enhancing SSG for effective SSR processes in transitional societies in West Africa;
- To identify ways of promoting effective and efficient security institutions and agencies in delivering services that meet the needs of the people;
- To promote collective decision-making processes through inclusive identification of threats to state and sub-state actor groups;
- To explain and address the needs of both state and sub-state actors as a conflict prevention measure towards consolidation of peace and security; and
- Contextualise the SSR concept within transitional societies for easy acceptance and application.

1.5 Rationale of the Study

SSG initiatives are still evolving at the conceptual and the implementation levels and, in many instances, the sensitive nature of issues within the sector, which impact on national sovereignty and security of the state and its people, pose great challenges to the acceptance of security sector reform or governance programmes. Hence, the need arises for a more in-depth analysis of the security sector governance concept and related security culture practices of the state and that of its indigenes or traditional authorities, in order to make the concept more acceptable and implementable. This would provide the enabling environment for embarking on development activities that benefit both the state and its people.

Additionally, the success of any given security sector initiative or reform must embrace the ‘governance’ element within the sector, which affords the opportunity for all stakeholders to

collectively identify, securitize and decide appropriate intervention measures and mechanisms for addressing needs and concerns. It also sees this approach as capable of facilitating national ownership and sustainability of security sector programmes.

Finally, maintaining a good balance between state and people-centred approaches to addressing security needs in a country, with recourse to the rule of law, would equally guarantee the minimisation of threats, and ensure freedom from fear and wants.

1.6 Clarification of Concepts

From the sections enumerated above, certain key concepts require consideration and clarification, given their varied interpretations and understanding.

1.6.1 *Security*

Security means different things to different people and actors beyond freedom from fear and want as the concept has shifted focus from the state as the prime or only actor in international relations with strategic interest and legal standing to that of non-state or sub-state actors (Buzan 1991, Booth 2005; and Baldwin 1997: 5-26). This brings to the fore current emphasis on human or people-centred security rather than regime, traditional or state security. This study, therefore, identifies with the human security concept but equally attaches significant level of importance to guaranteeing the security of the state, as that is essential in ensuring the state's judicious use and monopoly over power in order to guarantee its sovereignty and create the appropriate environment for stability, peace and development.

1.6.2 *Security Culture*

Culture basically reflects a way of life of a people and their shared beliefs informed by norms, values, traditions and customs. Culture has been defined as the learned and shared behaviour of a community of interacting human beings (Useem & Useem 1963: 169). It is also viewed as "… consisting primarily of the symbolic, ideational, and intangible aspects of human

societies" (Banks and McGee Banks 2010:8). The issue of culture has increasingly gained significant attention given its centrality to human conduct and behaviour. Culture, however, has both positive and negative attributes and this is further complicated by the issue of relativism.

Notwithstanding, globally accepted principles, norms and practices provide options for change. The idea of change would only take place when problems, usually attributed to negative human behaviours and their shared ways of thinking and acting, are influenced towards a contextual and globally accepted shared positive values, norms or standards in behavioural conduct (Wood 2004; Hills 2012).

Hence in the context of security culture, where a shared sense of safety and protection as well as freedom from fear, threats and wants come to the fore, behaviours of either state or sub-state actors must not only conform to acceptable standards and norms but must equally be contextualised, having endogenous cultural considerations in mind for effectiveness. Security culture, in this regard, is defined as shared beliefs of a group, a community, institutions, organisations or a state among others, that guide efforts towards prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, freedom from threats, and acquisition of basic needs towards existence and survival. Security cultural dynamics, as a result, brings to the fore issues of complexity, acceptance and effectiveness.

This study which focuses mainly on security sector reform, governance and transformation, holds the view that in undertaking successful SSR, such issues about complexity (institutional and human dynamics and requirements), acceptance (recognition or legitimacy or actors and their roles) and effectiveness (with regard to performance of actors to achieve stated objectives, goals or results) must be given significant attention.

1.6.3 *Governance*

Governance in its broadest sense, conceives a polity with structures and mechanisms for its political, security, socio-economic and cultural organisation towards delivering the needs of the people and/or the state. It is also perceived as structures and processes used by social organisations, be it a family, corporate business or an international institution, to steer itself either through centralised control or self-regulation (Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 7; and Rosenau 2000: 181-190). The concept has become contentious over the years given its initial interpretation by mainly state actors on preserving regimes in power rather than satisfying the needs of both the state and its people.

Emphasis however shifted towards broadening the concept to embrace all actors and their practices with notions of inclusivity in decision-making, upholding the rule of law and human rights standards, encouraging transparency and accountability, and engendering equal rights, particularly on the gender front, as well as observing the respect for freedom of speech and expression among others (UNDP 2010 :14). The culture of dictatorships and authoritarianism have in the past made it impossible for the observance of these standards and principles, but for justice, equality, progress and development, these standards or norms and values have become the areas of focus in changing entrenched behaviours towards transformation, growth and development of the state and its people.

1.6.4 *Complexity and Acceptance*

Complexity which focuses on diverse institutional and human dynamics and requirements needs further attention with regard to mapping the actors in the sector and clarification of their roles in an attempt to minimise the complex security terrain and activities required of it. Acceptance requires not only mapping and knowing these actors but getting the appropriate

recognition, legitimacy or authority for collaboration and effective performance, which makes it possible for needs-based responses to security needs.

1.6.5 *SSR/SSG and Related Concepts*

Reforming the security and justice sectors (SSR) have focused mainly on changes designed to allow relevant existing security sector institutions to function better in delivering effective and efficient security services in a country (Wulf 2004; Ball and Brzoska 2002; UNDP Human Development Report 1994: 3, 22-40). This term focused broadly on all actors and institutions in the three branches of government to include the executive, legislature and judiciary, as well as civil society participation. It eventually emerged as the generally-used terminology for other variants which included security sector reorganization, reorientation, restructuring, management and development (*African Union Policy Framework on SSR* 2013: 56; OECD 2007).

These terms are used to reflect desired or designed changes to correct human rights abuses of citizens of a country by civilian and/or military governments through security agencies, as well as the preservation of these governments or regimes in power. The idea was, therefore, to reorganise or restructure the roles, functions and relations of actors and institutions within the security system, reorient the actors towards democratic goals, objectives and expectations in the sector, and build capacities through effectively managing their activities as a way of creating the conducive environment to facilitate stability and development in the country. SSD, as mentioned earlier, essentially focused on giving more attention to poverty reduction in a safe and secure environment, rather than emphasis on increased military budget expenditure and promoting regime security issues (Bendix and Stanley 2008:13; Wulf 2004).

SSG also became essential as management of the actors focused more on operational and tactical levels of engagement rather than the strategic level where civilian institutions or

organisation, including members of the executive, legislature, judiciary and civil society actors needed to exercise control over security agencies, and also engage in collective decision-making to ensure appropriate and enhanced security service delivery to the state and its people through policies and strategies. This entails exercising legitimate political authority by various stakeholders over and application of democratic principles to the security sector (DCAF 2015: 2). SSG, in this sense, in not perceived as an end in itself, but as a means to an end (dos Santos and da Silva2012: 206 -220; and Schroeder *et al* 2014: 214-230).

Beyond the notion of reform and governance came the concept of SST which basically required changes in behaviour and conduct in adopting the right approaches to responding to security threats or needs. The concept of theory of change emphasises the need to effect changes with regard to negative behaviours as the cause of problems in the security sector towards probable or possible positive outcomes. This is premised on the proposition that behaviours are informed by cultural traits which have both positive and negative elements to them (Funnell & Rogers 2011: 149-196; Roduner & Schläppi 2008: 12-16; Ambrose & Roduner 2009:1-4; Earl et al 2001: 1-137). It involves changing negative values, norms and customs, while imbibing or adopting principles within the security culture of state security institutions and agencies that will enhance the effectiveness of the implementation of the SSR concept (Bryden and Olonisakin (2010: 3-20).

1.6.6. *Hybridity*

Hybridity seeks to shift the teleological thinking or approach from western-dominated theories or concepts to focusing more on home-grown or indigenous socio-political formations capable of providing the needs of both the state and its people. It focuses on the strength and resilience of indigenous institutions or "community life of societies" based largely on their cultures in governance rather than emphasis on state weakness or fragility as a basis for

maintenance of peace and sustainable development (Boege et al 2009: 13-21, Ekeh 1975: 91-112). Boege et al argue that

> "[in] hybrid political orders, diverse and competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power coexist, overlap, interact and intertwine, combining elements of introduced Western models of governance and elements stemming from local indigenous traditions of governance and politics, with further influences exerted by the forces of globalization and associated societal fragmentation (in various forms: ethnic, tribal, religious). In this environment, the "state" has no privileged monopolistic position as the only agency providing security, welfare, and representation; it has to share authority, legitimacy, and capacity with other institutions".

While this concept rightly places emphasis on the recognition of both formal and informal actors, and their respective authorities, legitimacies and capacities, it also clearly unveils a gamut of actors, structures, philosophies and logics, power dynamics and varied norms, values, practices and influences (Mac Ginty 2011; Millar 2014; Lawrence 2017). The complexity of such a terrain is therefore not in doubt. This diversity has partly contributed to the resistance to change or challenges faced in the area of SSR/SSG.

Again, the tendency however exists for romanticising the concept of hybridity as traditional institutions are perceived to be resilient, filling gaps left by state institutions, have wide coverage and direct linkage with grassroots, and complement as well as share legitimacy with state institutions (Bagayoko et al 2016:4). Hence in seeking to explore the potentials of how

state and sub-state security systems overlap, inter-relate and inter-penetrate at complex levels, care must also be taken not to overlook the challenges posed by the traditional, informal or indigenous security systems as issues of gerontocracy, authoritarianism, chauvinism and obsolete traditional practices, among others, undermine the rights of citizens in the communities (Bagayoko et al 2016: 7; Meagher 2012: 1073-1101; Logan 2008:1).

In its application, hybridism must be perceived in a contextual sense rather than through a translational approach. This is because it entails different entities, elements or belief systems working together to achieve a particular goal but in a particular context, and in this sense, the African context. This is essential because donor or partner support and assistance is mostly based on conditionalities which include accepting aid or grants inclusive of technical expertise, ideas, norms, principles and values, whether or not applicable or acceptable to the recipient country or state. Hence, 'contextual hybridity or hybridism' is used to qualify hybrid arrangements in the positive sense of facilitating acceptable partnerships, support or intervention in the pan-Africanist or Afrocentric sense, while not necessarily compromising generally acceptable or global standards (Chaana 2002; Podder 2013; Jackson 2018). 'Translational hybridity or hybridism', on the other hand, would refer to super-imposition or reinforcing Eurocentric or imperialist norms or standards that may not be necessarily suitable within the African context (Barrinha & Rosa 2013).

1.7 Theoretical Framework

Perceptions of reality, based on its ontological and epistemological components, form the basis of philosophical assumptions which inform and guide research with regard to probing research problems and finding solutions to them (Lenzer 1998; Guba and Lincoln 1994; Kuhn 1996). This study was, thus, guided by the critical theory and its related ideological positions, taking into consideration its critical, contentious, evolutionary and transformational attributes

which paved way for exploring probable solutions to the research problem, and coming up with a theoretical proposition to guide further research in the field under study (Wyn Jones 1999; Booth 2005, Fierke, 2009). This paradigm "as the basic belief system or worldview", guided the research and investigations carried out, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways" (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 105).

This approach to the research provided the latitude for an exploratory or qualitative study into possible influences of security culture in the governance of the security sector, making it possible to discover, disprove and reinforce new ideas, beliefs or widely held views on the security reform and governance concepts, and its acceptability or otherwise in effectively meeting security needs of the people in the two country case studies of choice, that is Ghana and Nigeria.

The grounded theory approach was then used to establish the theoretical proposition of this research, based on the unpredictable and evolving nature of culture, its dynamics and relations to governance processes in West Africa. Details of the theories employed for investigation and analysis of findings from the field work are elaborated in sections 3.2.1 and 3.8 respectively of the study.

1.8 Research Methodology

This section briefly introduces the research design and methodology discussed in details in Chapter 3 of the study. Crotty (1998) considers a research methodology as a strategy or plan of action that shapes choices and use of particular methods, and in turn links them to desired outcomes, while Kothari (2004: 4) defines it as a way of systematically solving a research problem. It involves systematic steps taken to solve a research problem, based on a defined logic (Saunders et al 2009: 5). It, therefore, defined the approach to the research undertaken in the field, and methods of data collection and analysis, as well as presentation of findings.

The research approach as identified in the previous section was based mainly on qualitative research as it relates essentially to human behaviour and conduct. Qualitative research deals with the world of lived experience where individual belief and action are seen to intersect with culture (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 2). As a multi-method approach to research (Thomas 2003: 1), it combines several research strategies, including case studies, ethnography, phenomenology, grounded theory, biographical, historical and participatory research strategies (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: xii).

The comparative case study strategy was used to gather data in Ghana and Nigeria. The case study strategy involves undertaking "an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon… set within its real-world context – especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" Yin (2009a:18). Both countries were, therefore, visited to find out possible security culture influences on effective SSG. This afforded the opportunity to understand the behavior of actors in the security sector and their approach to security governance, informed by their respective cultures. It also made it possible to make inferences towards a more acceptable and enhanced security governance of the sector.

Interviews in the form of unstructured interviews were undertaken with no logical or structured questions, but were based on initial general questions which served as a starting point for further ones. (Gill et al 2008). These interviews were conducted with relevant government and civil society actors, including security experts and traditional leaders within the epistemic communities of culture, security and governance. The interviews were done together with self-administered questionnaires presented to respondents by the researcher or a person in an official capacity (Burcu 2000: 2). The open-ended questions gave room for respondents to answer questions without any influence from the researcher (Reja et al 2003: 161; Foddy 1993: 127).

Focus Group Discussions were also organised to explore or generate new or a range of ideas on a subject or research area (Simkiss et al 2014: 202-203). In this group, "collective conversations" were held with focus on collective activities (Liamputtong 2011: 3), based on which information was obtained from participants on their beliefs and perception about the research question (Simkiss et al 2014:203; Gill et al 2008: 293). The groups generally comprised an average of six to eight individuals.

The focus group discussions were held mainly with traditional leaders in Ghana who were very much open to this form of discussion in the northern and southern parts of the country in two region capitals, namely Sunyani in the Brong Ahafo Region and Abutia Kloe in the Volta Region, on what constitutes security, governance and probable positive cultural influences to enhance these concepts. This helped gather more detailed information, clarify issues, refine observations made, contrast diverse views, as well as help triangulate research findings.

With regard to data sources, data was gathered from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources were mainly from official documents from government ministries and security agencies, as well as newspaper articles and available journals with first-hand information on the subject. Secondary sources of data came from published or unpublished articles in various books, journals, newspapers, numerous libraries and bookshops in Ghana and Nigeria, and the internet.

This methodology was employed in order to ensure that the right participants in this research were identified, and appropriate research methods were adopted to gather, interpret and analyse data collected towards answering the research question as precisely as possible.

1.9 Organisation of Research

Chapter 1 of this research introduces the study by giving insights into what the study is about, its overall objectives and importance, how it is conducted and how it is organised. It specifically brings into focus attempts at undertaking security sector reform in Africa, its challenges and the

need for transformation in the sector. It establishes the research problem and highlights ways of addressing it by bringing to the fore possible security culture influences or non-influence on SSG in West Africa and how to enhance governance in the sector.

Chapter 2 generally reviews the literature by taking a look at the works involved in the development and evolution of the concept and limitations associated with it in the pursuit of its goals and objectives in the broader context of statebuilding across the globe and, particularly, in Africa. While doing this, it clarifies the relationships between the three major concepts of security, governance and culture, and highlights the important attributes of security culture and its possible influences on SSG towards the transformation of the security sector. This establishes the conceptual framework for the research and provides the key research question and enabling objectives for the study.

Chapter 3 formulates the research design and methodology by specifically establishing the philosophical basis for the research, the research approach and strategy, as well as methods for data collection, analysis and triangulation of findings. It gives emphasis to the qualitative approach and case study strategy in undertaking the research.

Chapter 4 captures the evolution of security culture in West Africa from the pre-colonial to colonial and post-colonial times, and establishes security culture influences from the external/formal and indigenous/informal on governance of the security sector and statebuilding processes in West Africa. It looks specifically at the challenges, progress and prospects in this direction as a prelude to specifically exploring developments within the case study countries of Ghana and Nigeria.

Chapters 5 and 6 then focuses on findings and initial analysis of data gathered from the field research in both countries of Ghana and Nigeria by looking at the conceptions and perceptions about security culture and SSG, early attempts at and formalisation of SSR/SSG,

responses to security threats and challenges, and options for enhancing governance of the sector to meet security needs of the state and the people.

Chapter 7 undertakes the comparative analysis of both studies under issues of complexity and acceptance by looking at ways in which security culture influences facilitate the understanding and willingness to accept the SSR/SSG concept, and how to derive its maximum impact based on identified intervening factors or ideals. It also explored relationships between and among the actors at the horizontal, vertical and other levels, while drawing similarities and differences with regard to best practices towards effective governance of the sector. The analysis and inferences laid the basis for triangulation of the research which further informed the theoretical proposition. The chapter then concludes the study by summarising the research report on findings and makes recommendations towards addressing persistent security challenges in both countries, as well as providing options for further academic research, policy support and development.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

Countries in transition or in the post-conflict phase of recovery often undertake a range of institutional reforms, such as SSR, to restructure, reorganize and streamline organisational and institutional structures and processes for quality service delivery.

The concept in a broader sense is defined as:

> …another term used to describe the transformation of the 'security system' – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework (OECD DAC Guidelines and Reference Series 2005: 20).

SSR efforts attempt to reorient security actors in their behaviour and attitude based on standard principles and guidelines. In all these efforts, regulation, oversight and accountability are important in achieving stated goals and set objectives, and relate closely to issues of governance. Governance of the security sector provides the avenue for regulation, oversight, transparency and accountability, as well as decision-making towards meeting security needs of the state and its people. Doing this effectively would require paying close attention to the actors, both state and sub-state actors, involved in the security governance process, and understanding their varied security culture backgrounds, and its possible influences on making SSG more effective. A good

comprehension of cultures could, equally, facilitate a transformation of complex, technical and limited SSR processes that feed much more into broader statebuilding goals.

Culture, as is well known, evolves over time (Gupta et al 2002: 16), and in order to adequately explore cultural influences on security decision-making or the governance of the security sector, there must be a good comprehension of the security cultural landscape through gaining an in-depth knowledge of general cultural traits and dynamics (Gupta et al 2002: 16-27). Culture plays an important role in national and international politics as well as in national strategic and human security considerations. It facilitates the adoption of acceptable cultural practices and approaches in addressing future security concerns. Therefore, inquiring into *whether* and *why* culture matters in understanding, accepting and making the concept of security sector governance more effective can serve as an added opportunity to address the softer issues of SSR which are often overlooked or relegated in current reform efforts (Murray 2009: 204205).

In this thesis, possible ways of engendering an appropriate mix of indigenous and acquired security cultures in security sector governance is explored using the case studies of Ghana and Nigeria, and by extension the ECOWAS region. The need for the transformation of a complex security sector, particularly in transitional or new democracies in Africa that are rooted in an established security culture of authoritarian rule, common to the region under study, would require a radical shift in structural conditions which make security governance largely irrelevant in some African societies (Nathan, 2004: 2; Bryden and Olonisakin 2010: 4).

In doing this effectively, the thesis aligns with the social democracy ideology which depicts a governance system in which power resides in the people in the control of the economy and government. There is also freedom, equality and inclusivity, and no one dominates. Democratic principles are equally extended from the political to the economic and social realms (Przeworski 1985: 7). This ideology embraces both socialist and capitalist ideals to the extent that

the welfare of citizens, with regard to addressing inequalities and ensuring universal basic rights, among others, are promoted as a means of legitimising governance in democracies. In essence, positive social conditions underpin the legitimacy of democracies in which strong institutions are complemented by civic participation and accountability.

The two extremes of socialism and capitalism are thus nuanced by accommodating social and liberal ideals in a progressive manner towards development, with the status or welfare of citizens in mind. Social democracy, thus, provides a hybrid context for tapping positive values of both ideological systems in which political, security and socio-economic indicators, among others, must reflect social impact towards sustaining legitimacy, efficacy and stability of a state (Meyer & Hinchman 2007: 1-230;).

The aim of this literature review is to, first and foremost, depict works undertaken in the area of SSR/SSG and security culture, assess whether they have contributed to the change or transformation being pursued through SSR/SSG goals and objectives, and identify existing gaps to be filled. Based on this, the thesis explored areas for the needed change and transformation thereby moving a struggling and almost stagnant SSR agenda closer towards its objectives. This helped to frame an appropriate research question and specific objectives to guide the proposed research towards making an original contribution to knowledge in the selected field of study. It focused on SSG in transitional societies that are post-authoritarian in nature, and working towards embracing and consolidating democratic tenets.

The chapter is organised as follows. It begins by exploring issues of statebuilding, security and governance by looking at the inter-connectedness of these concepts and their mutually reinforcing nature. The second aspect focuses on the different types of external actors, their roles and inputs in building security of the state and its people in societies undergoing military or security-related statebuilding interventions. SSR and SSG concepts are then

subsequently reviewed within the European and African context by exploring the range of activities undertaken in the field of security by actors and the impact of these activities on the transformation of the security sector. Some guiding principles are then considered as standards and the basis for influencing behavioural changes and attitudes which can make security sector governance more effective.

The fourth section which focuses on addressing limitations of earlier works on SSR/SSG, reviews literature on security culture and its transformative role in the security sector based on probable influences on governance of the security sector. It assess the extent and impact of these works on implementation of SSR/SSG, while demonstrating the dearth of literature and its limited scope of application within the western world and in Africa, and thus creating the option to probe the subject further. Based on these findings, it develops an original conceptual framework to guide this research where the notion of complexity, encapsulated in the SSR/SSG concepts, the actors, and the nature of activities to be undertaken within the security sector, is highlighted, and possible avenues explored to facilitate the acceptance and effectiveness of SSG through probable influences of security culture. This framework provides a conceptual model or guide for undertaking the research in the West African region by exploring possible ways of enhancing SSG. Finally, the key research question is derived from the above review and is supported by enabling objectives for undertaking the research in the final part.

2.2 Statebuilding, Security and Governance

A state is perceived as a person of international law, having a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. As the sole person or legal entity under international law, states are considered as sovereign and equal in the pursuit of their national interest or the conduct of international relations (Montevideo Convention 1933: 3-4). These characteristics are equally reflected in the Westphalian construct

of a state in which the principles of sovereignty, self-determination, legal equality and non-intervention apply in the conduct of State relations.

Notwithstanding, recent developments in the international system, particularly after the end of the Cold War, have questioned the status and rights of states as sole legal persons, entities or actors with sovereign powers and monopoly over the use of force within and outside of their territorial confines (Bellal et al 2011; 47-79; Brooks 2005: 675; Rubinton 1992: 475-494). Some of these developments include the outbreak of intra-state conflicts and terrorism – waged by sub-state actors against the state; issues of human rights and human security, environmental concerns; and an evolving globalised world among other things. These developments, in turn, have raised questions as to what an ideal form of state is or should be, particularly in the context of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding processes, as well as the need for reform in authoritarian states or transitional societies, or even the so-called stable democracies (Fukuyama 2004: 17-31; Richmond 2013: 299-315; Podder 2014: 1616 -1617; and Jackson 2009).

2.2.1 *Statebuilding*

Statebuilding in the post-Cold War era has been central in efforts to problematise or securitise issues and find solutions to them. Statebuilding, for instance, remains a major focus in attempts at addressing threats posed by weak states, including issues of terrorism, drug trafficking, crime and international criminal networks, and refugees (Chandler 2010: 4). In a similar vein, solutions to problems of insecurity, poverty and the general lack of progress are pursued through statebuilding processes (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 4 cited in Chandler 2010: 5).

Statebuilding in general, entails the creation of new governmental institutions while strengthening the existing ones (Fukuyama 2004: 17). Also, von Bogdandy *et al* (2005: 583) considers statebuilding as "the establishment, re-establishment, and strengthening of public structures in a given territory capable of delivering public goods". It could also be conceived as

"overcoming institutional blockages, or changing the 'rules of the game', through turning bad governance into good governance" (Chandler 2010: 6). From a home-grown, national and whole-of-government approach, statebuilding is also perceived as "an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations" (OECD 2008d cited in OECD 2011: 20). Other factors are also brought to bear in statebuilding processes as emphasis is placed on the need for improved living conditions, structural reforms and the integration of political systems (Hippler 2005 cited in Jackson 2009: 3).

The term presupposes a weakened or a failed state that requires rebuilding through strengthened institutions and structures (Fukuyama 2004: 17-31; von Bogdandy *et al* 2005: 581 586). Commonly identified indicators for state weakness which leads to state failure include "disharmony between communities, inability to control borders and the entirety of the territory, a growth of criminal violence, corrupt institutions, and a decaying infrastructure" (von Bogdandy *et al* 2005: 581). The idea of limiting or cutting back state intervention through the 'Washington Consensus' approach is also seen to have contributed to weakened states, especially in developing countries across the world, owing to weakened state capacity and institutions to provide public goods and services (Fukuyama 2004: 20).

Hence in rebuilding, emphasis is placed on liberal tendencies in which limited state intervention is proposed, complemented by strong and effective institutions (Fukuyama 2004: 23), state monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and a legitimate government recognised by the people in a democratic dispensation (von Bogdandy *et al* 2005: 584).

In the field of security, statebuilding activities are undertaken through the establishment of security sectors in accordance with democratic norms, good governance, and the call for civilian control of the sector, accountability, transparency and observance of the rule of law, (Schroeder et al 2013: 382). What is however essential in statebuilding processes, and which is

often overlooked, is the "cultural change in terms of how people relate to that state as well as how people conduct everyday business" (Jackson 2009: 4).

Institutions and legitimacy of central authorities, therefore, play major roles in building a state as it forms a critical link between statebuilding and nation-building, and its success is mainly defined by external intervention and its possible impact on socio-political cohesion. Local ownership, recognition and perceptions, informed by cultural norms, values and practices remain vital to the process (Lemay-Hébert 2009: 21-45). The ideals or 'procedural benchmarks' of transparency, accountability, democracy, good governance and the rule of law, among others, is generally believed to follow the western historical model that provides core functions for addressing challenges in weak and fragile states (Podder 2014: 1616; Richmond 2013:300).

External intervention in contemporary times is however "entirely antithetical to indigenous and traditional practices, [with critics] regarding them as unaccountable, opaque and contradictory to the 'enlightened' intentions of liberal peace and internationally sponsored post-war reconstruction efforts" (see Fanthorpe 2005: 27-49 cited in Mac Ginty2008: 139). While the fact remains that the temptation exists to romanticise 'indigenous' and 'traditional' peace-making, peacebuilding or statebuilding processes, this approach has offered credible and sustainable solutions to problems in post-conflict and transitional societies (Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163).

Liberal peace is defined by Mac Ginty (2008: 143) as "the concept, condition, and practice whereby leading states, international organisations and international financial institutions promote their version of peace through peace support interventions, control of international financial architecture, support for state sovereignty and the international *status quo*". This concept also referred to as 'Western peace' is largely perceived as facilitating 'neo-

imperialist tendencies', thereby minimising the space or opportunity for traditional and indigenous approaches to peacebuilding or statebuilding (Mac Ginty 2008: 140).

The tendency of equating Western societies with the ideal type of a society, and by extension the ideal form of a state, has undermined and denied developing countries, or the so-called third-world countries, the opportunity of adopting progressive indigenous cultural and ethnic norms, values and traditions towards statebuilding, security and governance (Ake 2012: 1-3).

The practice of transferring resources, people, technology and strong institutions to developing countries has remained the preoccupation of some scholars and development practitioners, to the detriment of encouraging or promoting the adoption and improvement of indigenous and cultural-specific forms of such ideals for growth and development (Fukuyama 2004: 17). This practice has raised concerns over the role of external actors in statebuilding (Scott 2007: 6). Fundamental questions have been raised on whether the values and institutions of the liberal West are indeed universal, given the difficulty of achieving these goals in many societies – mainly in third-world countries, and the negative impact of not growing these societies based on indigenous, home-grown values or cultures (Ake 2012: 3).

These practices promote the 'one size fits all' approach to issues of statebuilding, security, and governance among others, leading to complications and resentment, given the imposition of complex and, sometimes, different Western concepts on the so-called developing or less developed countries. Developing or less developed countries are used here to refer to "the lowest stages in the developmental criterion" Ake (2012: 2), or a country in which the population lives on far less income than the population in industrialised countries (World Bank 2012). As it stands, the conflict spectrum and trajectory of peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, as well as statebuilding processes, have largely been informed

by Western theories and donor interventions based on "[a] distinctive feature of Western social science in its classical [sense]…[and] this tendency to equate the society that ought to be with the one that actually exists" (Ake 2012: 3).

Rather than perceive the so-called developed countries based on Western state models as ideal states or societies that are to be emulated by developing countries in achieving conflict prevention, security, development and good governance, emphasis must begin to shift more towards governance models and systems within the endogenous context, drawing on the progressive attributes of social order and resilience within communities, and based on complementary institutions on the ground (Boege et al 2009: 14). Adopting this approach could create possible avenues to begin to set realistic attainable goals for so-called 'weak' or 'fragile' states that might require adopting sustainable indigenous measures recognised and accepted by citizens in building a resilient state or society (OECD 2011: 21; and Lemay-Hébert and Mathieu 2014: 232-251).

Indeed, state fragility remains a contested concept with varied definitions. However, the major attributes characterising a fragile state include state collapse or state failure, which connotes the inability of a state to perform its basic function in the areas of territorial integrity, monopoly over the use of force, and development functions among other things (UNECA Report 2012). These states are, therefore, generally perceived as threats to its neighbours and the wider international community as it has development and security challenges, and as a result creating the avenue for development policies and development assistance from donor countries and multilateral donor organisations (Boege 2009: 13).

This state of affairs in post-conflict societies is not much different from what pertains in transitional societies and stable democracies, except for the fact that it is much easier to influence post-conflict countries into accepting reforms and reconstruction activities compared with the

transitional societies holding on to relics of colonial dynamics and traits, where issues of power, regime security and authoritarian rule prevail and take priority over human security concerns. In drawing lessons for the future, however, approaches to statebuilding, security and governance require a rethink, and the need to adopt and mainstream transformative approaches in which hybrid forms of progressive traditional and modern practices would inform theories and policies (Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163; and Podder 2013: 353-380).

2.2.2. *Security*

Security has evolved in recent times from its traditional, technical sense of focusing mainly on the needs of the state – termed as "traditional or regime security" – to the needs of the people within the state, but more importantly ensuring a more balanced and nuanced approach to meeting the needs of both the state and its people (Buzan 1991, Booth 1999). Kofi Annan (2000) defined security from the human security perspective as "Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment". These freedoms are construed as the inter-related building blocks of human and national security. This definition is of prime importance, given the tendency of limiting the capacity of or rolling back the state as part of donor conditions for reform and assistance, as reflected in the "Washington Consensus" (Fukuyama 2004: 20; Williamson 1994: 26-27).

Security of the state and the human being is, therefore, of prime importance, and broadened to cover not only the absence of violence, but issues of human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and making opportunities and choices available for the individual to fulfill his or her potential (UNDP Human Development Report 1994: 3, 22-40; Annan 2000; and Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).

The major policy requirement by donor countries for limiting state intervention in the economy and cutting down defence budgets and military expenditure of authoritarian states in the

late 1980s and early years of the post-Cold War era, based on liberal democratic or capitalist ideals, eventually weakened States' capacity to maintain monopoly over the use of force, maintain sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its regulatory powers in a liberalised economy (see Omitoogun 2003; 126; and Omitoogun and Hutchful 2006: 1-9).

Thus, despite efforts to enforce a minimalist state, liberalise economies of developing countries, promote human rights and human security among other things, these measures proved rather difficult for these states that lacked the institutional capacity and the wherewithal to tread the path of developed countries. The result, therefore, has been the emergence of weak, fragile, patrimonial, shadow or collapsed states and warlord economies, threatened by intra-state conflicts, and worsened by the emergence of acts of terrorism, transnational crime, piracy and other societal ills (Scott 2007: 10). Issues of corruption, neo-patrimonial relations, nepotism and the general lack of good democratic governance worsened the already precarious situation.

Hence the necessity for revisiting the predominant notion of a minimalist state, and reinforcing the need for a more balanced approach, within the social democracy context, to state and human security based on the principles of democratic governance, the rule of law, accountability, respect for human rights and building democratic institutions of state to implement policy decisions that favour the needs of state and sub-state actors (Large and Sisk: 1-211).

Current security threats to peace, stability and development including, conflicts, terrorism, transnational crimes and environmental degradation, have necessitated the need for reforms in both post-conflict and transitional societies to effectively address challenges posed by these threats. Broader reform approaches are, however, required given the multi-faceted nature of threats to both the state and its people. Hence the need to link SSR efforts to statebuilding goals and objectives, which presents the opportunity to explore a much more comprehensive way of

addressing security issues from a broader perspective, rather than a limited, technical and narrow approach to SSR (Jackson 2009: 1).

This approach feeds into the human security debate that encompasses a broad range of issues, but with the emphasis on accommodating the interest of the individual or people in addition to that of the state. SSR contributes to statebuilding by building the integrity of the security system, establish or promote its legitimacy, and promote the governance of the sector through citizen participation, in order to transform the sector towards respecting the security needs of both the state and its people (Weigand 2013: 18; Patel 2010). In ensuring this is done, governance serves as the critical element in providing guidance and direction through policies informed by the contribution of all stakeholders, including both state and sub-state actors. Hence, the need to revisit the critical element of SSG in an attempt to facilitate SSR efforts.

2.2.3 *Governance*

Governance refers mainly to the structures and processes put in place to enable a set of public and private actors coordinate their different needs and interests by way of making and implementing binding policies (Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 7; and Krahmann 2003). It could also be perceived as structures and processes used by social organisations, be it a family, corporate business or an international institution, to steer itself either through centralised control or self-regulation (Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 7; and Rosenau 2000: 181 - 190). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) perceived governance mainly through the economic, political and administrative lens, in which authority is exercised at all levels, including security, in managing a country's affairs (UNDP 1997).

The UN, thus, adopted a holistic approach to governance which encapsulates issues of human security. Over a decade after, and through years of practice, the UNDP has given more emphasis to not only governance but good governance practices. This is reflected in its definition

to comprise the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which power is exercised, decisions made on issues of public concern, and citizens articulation of their interests, exercise of legal rights, meeting of obligations, and their ability to mediate their differences (UNDP 2010 :14).

The efficiency and effectiveness of institutions and the rule of law is emphasised in this regard towards achieving what has been termed over the years as 'good governance'. On the side of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), its approach to good governance places more emphasis on the prevention of corruption and putting in measures to ensure transparency and accountability in public expenditure in an attempt to implement national policies.

From the African governance perspective, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation considers governance as public goods and services that every citizen is entitled to from the state, and the state having a responsibility to deliver these goods (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2015). The elements of governance comprise four major categories: safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development. The first category on safety and rule of law, which remains very relevant to this study, is sub-divided into rule of law, accountability, personal safety and national security. The uniqueness of this definition lies in its emphasis of security as a service to be demanded by citizens from government, and the responsibility of government to provide this service. This equally provides avenues for partnership in the demand and supply of security as a public service.

Prior to all these 'western' definitions, traditional or indigenous systems of governance existed, with similar governance structures, mechanisms and customary or by-laws that guided human relations and day-to-day activities in society. Differences however observed between the indigenous and the modern governance systems are that while the modern forms of government

opted for common standards in a globalised world, that of the indigenous system was more localised and only expanded where there were issues of commonality (Hlawnching 2006: 4). Notwithstanding, the indigenous system preferred a participatory and inclusive decision-making process based on consensus-building.

The goal here is to create a platform where the state engenders contributions from its stakeholders, including its resident population and partners, towards identifying and addressing security needs and threats. The state or government and international partners' respect for and recognition of different actors involved in the security governance process, especially civil society, would be essential in enhancing security governance efforts. It would also promote or encourage an integration of both home-grown solutions and progressive partner proposals and support in efforts to address security needs, challenges and threats (UN SSR/ORL/DPKO 2012: 1-52). This, in turn, could provide the pedestal for imbibing the principles of national leadership and local ownership of security sector reform processes towards effective implementation.

If this approach to governance is adopted, the probability exists for minimising the complexity of externally imposed policies and programmes, through the adoption and implementation of hybrid traditional and modern systems of security and governance. The acceptance of security sector reform might then become easier, thereby enhancing the process. SSG in this sense should not, however, be perceived as an end in itself, but as a means to an end (dos Santos and da Silva2012: 206 -220; and Schroeder *et al* 2014: 214-230).

2.2.4 *The Need for Change and Transformation of the Security Sector*

Change and transformation of the security sector has occupied current SSR and SSG debates, but a focus on the how has either been limited or lacking in the literature. The attainment of this goal would require a reconsideration of the softer issues of culture, specifically security culture including values, norms or standards and customs, and its probable influences on the

governance of the security sector. This has become necessary in the quest for building endogenous capacities, local ownership and contextualising security sector reform efforts, in the quest to reduce its complexity, encourage its acceptability and address both state and human security needs in future SSR programmes. Change is linked to human behaviour or attitudes which contribute to management, oversight and use of resources to address security threats to the state and the people, hence the need to consider actors and troubleshoot their roles towards effective security sector reform, governance and statebuilding.

2.3 External Actors and their Roles in Building State Security

2.3.1 *Contending Ideologies for Security and Development of the State in the Cold War Era*

An ideal state, otherwise known as *telos,* is that state which is free from want and fear, and which provides or creates the environment for meeting the needs of its people, (Ake 2012: 3). Eurocentric teleologism or teleological thinking perceives society as moving through stages of development; that is from a less desirable state to a more desirable one (Ake 2012: 1).

Interestingly, however, all if not most of the states in the international system had two major contending ideologies of communism and capitalism, during the Cold War period, to guide their development trajectory towards an ideal state. These contending ideologies had major impact on developing countries as they identified with either the 'left' as in communism or the 'right' as in capitalism, and even the non-aligned in the 'middle' in their attempt to become developed countries.

These relations facilitated imperialism and colonialism in which building a state was modeled mainly on Western ideals and standards rather than contextualising the growth process of developing countries, based on their indigenous exigencies, including cultural norms and values. Hence, Western norms and values were more or less imposed on colonised states and,

thus, became the standard for measuring themselves on the development criterion (Lemay Hebert 2009: 21-45).

These ideals, though positive in some respect, were foreign and difficult to accept. Again, the neo-patrimonial kind of relations made possible issues of patronage through clientelism, nepotism and corruption among others (Erdman and Engel 2006; Scott 2007: 5; and OECD 2009: 6-31). The imperialist and extremis nature of these contending ideologies thus requires adopting not only workable but contextual or relevant ideologies to guide governance and development policies towards safety and survival of state and sub-state actors. This informs the leaning towards the social democracy model or ideology for people participation and accountability in ensuring local ownership and local content of policies and programmes.

2.3.2. *Post-Cold War Realities and the Need for Security and Governance Reforms and Recovery*

The Cold War realities, including its systemic imperatives, exposed all the suppressed flaws under colonialism in the post-Cold War era, captured sometimes as bad governance practices (see Zack-Williams et al 2002; and Mohan and Zack-Williams 2004). New challenges emerged in the international system, the major one being threat to international peace and security, including violent intra-state conflicts (Chandler and Sisk 2013: xix). A new era of reforms emerged in the 1990s, aimed at reducing too much concentration of power in the state, and empowering citizens to contribute towards addressing their individual and collective needs within the state.

Hence issues of human security, democracy, good governance, economic and human development, as well as human rights and the rule of law, became more reinforced. This created the needed space for ensuring that the needs of both the state and sub-state actor groups are sufficiently addressed (OECD 2008: 15). Issues of neo-colonialism, racism, apartheid and

intrastate conflicts became matters of great concern in Africa and elsewhere, while Central and Eastern European countries that separated from the Soviet bloc sought for post-Cold War reconstruction and recovery.

The authoritarian nature of the state within the socialist context, characterised by military dictatorships and one-party rule and its concurrent abuse of power, mainly through its security institutions like the police, the military and intelligence agencies, led to major discussions within international community, mainly among donors and development actors, on how to address these challenges amidst evolving strategic and critical security studies debate for a shift of emphasis from regime security to that of human security. Issues of security, democracy and development were prominent around this time (Bryden et al 2008: 3; Booth 1999; Buzan: 1991).

2.3.3 *Missed Opportunities for Contextual Security Sector Reforms and Change*

Rebuilding the state in the post-Cold War era provided the appropriate opportunity to get things right, but rather, neocolonialism preserved the old order. The opportunity for developing countries to undergo self-assessment and self-realisation, and adopt hybrid forms of indigenous traditional and modern values in their growth process was largely missed.

About a decade ago, both the European Commission and the Council came to the agreement of avoiding a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to governance reforms in developing countries, but to rather adopt 'conventional tools' for governance reforms where 'effective partnerships' are anticipated, and targeted approaches in post-conflict situations or where 'difficult partnerships' were anticipated (European Commission 2003: 3 cited in Hout 2013: 3).

In addition to this was the adoption of an 'incentive-based approach' in its relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries (European Commission 2006b: 1 cited in Hout 2013: 3-4).

In all these approaches, though good governance is adopted as an ideal and universal principle in governing a state, based on different or specific needs of developing countries, these countries are not necessarily consulted and given the opportunity to contribute to how a 'template' could effectively address their needs in their reform efforts. Rather, partnerships and relations in reforms, even in the area of security and governance, are based on introducing templates to suit a particular context, based on conditionalities or incentives. SSR is, therefore, forced on states by external actors in either rebuilding war-torn societies or as a basis for fiscal reform or both (Hutchful and Fayemi 2006). It is in this general context that SSR and SSG programmes were undertaken through external actor partnerships in post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, peacebuilding or statebuilding contexts.

2.3.4 *Evolution and Coverage of the SSR Concept*

The origin of security sector reform has not been specifically identified from a particular source, but has remained contested among various schools of thought. SSR, for instance, is perceived to have emerged in Europe and as such "SSR is European" (Albrecht et al 2010: 75). SSR is, however, generally accepted to have emerged in the early 1990s in response to demands within the development or donor community for developing countries and, more specifically, authoritarian states to embrace democratic, as well as principles of, good governance and economic development as a basis for accessing development assistance.

The practice and development of the concept have evolved over the years from defence reviews to post-Cold War reconstruction activities and civil-military relations programmes in Africa, and Eastern and Central Europe among others. SSR could, therefore, be perceived as an attempt to codify previous attempts at reforming or restructuring the security sector. This also reinforces the perception of undertaking SSR programmes in piecemeal. The call for reforms equally straddled the political and development nexus, as all need to be present to effectively

address security concerns of both the state and its citizens in the context of human security. SSR, in a developmental context, is an externally or donor-driven process which may be used as an incentive or political condition for the provision of development assistance (Hänggi 2004: 6).

Initial efforts at operationalising the concept in both transitional societies and post-conflict countries were technical in nature, limited in scope and targeted specifically at boosting the economy, while cutting down on military expenditure. In transitional societies, SSR programmes focused mainly on defence reviews and reform of security institutions and agencies, and the democratic control of armed forces, which eventually culminated in the bid to improve civil-military relations. Security institutions, including defence, police and, to some extent, intelligence agencies, were the focus of these reform efforts in Africa, particularly South Africa (Williams 2003: 206-222), and to an extent Ghana (Hutchful 1997). Major concerns of Western donors in the Euro-Atlantic region were on addressing issues of civil-military relations, and the democratic control of armed forces in post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe (Born *et al* 2002).

The concept of civil-military relations "encompass the entire spectrum of relations among government, society and the armed forces" (Mychajlyszyn and Von Riekhoff 2004: 3). The concept entails the de-politicisation of the military, and the subordination of the military to legitimate civilian authority, representing the expressed will of the people (Mychajlyszyn and Von Riekhoff 2004: 3). Under this concept, unconstitutional changes in government is frowned upon, as coups d'état are seen as destabilising, and truncates the process of good democratic governance. The civilians also have a responsibility to desist from influencing or involving their military counterparts in an attempt to resolve their political disputes (Mychajlyszyn and Von Riekhoff 2004; Schmitter 1996: xii).

The general approach to SSR in the Euro-Atlantic region, therefore, followed the policy transfer mechanism in which the international community or donors defined a set of characteristics and standards for what constitutes the democratic control of armed forces, as well as a clear idea of what constitutes effective security sector reform (Forster 2002: 15-19). All these reform efforts contributed in diverse ways to restructuring the security sector of these Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries.

In the post-conflict context, the brutal civil wars that plagued the Mano River Union sub-region and, indeed, the region and continent at large (Clapham 1998), reinforced the need to ensure stability and provide a secure and safe environment for political, economic and social development. Provisions were, therefore, made for SSR in peace agreements through the instrumentality of donors and guarantors of these peace accords (Hutchful 2009).

The SSR provisions, more or less, served as a pre-condition for ensuring stability in the post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding context. The provisions entailed a restructuring of the security sector in order to avoid past mistakes through the implementation of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), mine control and control of small arms and light weapons. Other provisions also focused on the disbanding, restructuring and the establishment of new security forces and services, including the police, the military and other paramilitary security agencies. Transitional justice issues relating to Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) processes also became issues of concern, necessitating the reconstruction or re-organisation of the security sector (Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 12-16).

Early attempts at SSR, particularly in transitional societies, neglected the broader issues of democratic oversight and accountability, but SSG gained more significance during the rebuilding war-torn societies (Ball 2001). The SSG concept focused mainly on partnerships between and among identified national actors within the Executive, Legislature, Judiciary and

Civil Society, and international counterparts in ensuring appropriate security service delivery and accountability, geared mainly towards minimising human rights abuses, and creating a safe and secure environment for the citizens. (Krahmann2003: 5-26).

The SSR agenda in post-authoritarian regimes or post-conflict settings require a basic re-organisation, restructuring or transformation of security institutions, processes and oversight mechanisms within a democratic, accountable and responsive context for an effective and efficient service delivery. The governance element of SSR is essential in ensuring that the right issues of security concern, related to both the state and sub-state actors, are identified and collectively securitised, with adequate participation of security referents, towards addressing identified security threats. Additionally, the activities of the sector must be subjected to closer scrutiny, given the legitimate monopoly and control over the use of force by state and its security institutions and agencies. This is necessary to avoid excesses and abuse of force, and to also ensure that adequate resources and welfare of legitimate security actors in the field are guaranteed towards effective performance and delivery.

2.3.5 *External Actor Partnerships in Security Governance*

Governance, like security, could be applied to various contexts and issue areas. The concept has been applied to different levels or geographic spaces, to different types of constellations of actors (corporate governance, private governance, multi-level governance), and to normative concepts (good governance). It has also been used to analyse different issue areas such as economic, environmental, health, human rights, as well as security governance (Bryden and Hänggi 2005).

In a similar context, the concept also has both horizontal and vertical dimensions with regard to security referents and processes (Karns and Mingst 2005:15-20, 211-248 cited in Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 7). The horizontal dimension refers to state relations with multiplicity

of sub-state actors, such as international organisations and private actors, ranging from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to multinational corporations (MNCs), to epistemic communities and even armed groups. On the other hand, the vertical dimensions signal the growing interaction of these actors at various territorial levels – sub-national, national and international levels.

Figure 2.1

Levels of Relationship or Interaction of Security Actors in Governance of the Security Sector



Source: Author, 2019

This classification provides an ideal context for the practice of SSG, given the multiplicity of actors at various levels, and with different needs, roles and responsibilities. Thus, security governance provides an analytical perspective which helps to capture complex governing mechanisms in a given issue-area characterised by a constellation of different types of actors operating at different levels of interaction (Bryden and Hänggi 2005: 9).

2.3.6 *The Missing Element of Security Culture Influences in the Transformation of the Security Sector*

In a nutshell, while SSR provides the avenue for reform and transformation of the security sector, with specific emphasis on restructuring the security institutions to perform and deliver effectively, SSG lays emphasis on the provision of oversight and demanding transparency and accountability from these security institutions and agencies by civilian authorities, including the national legislature, the judiciary and civil society organisations.

So the role of external actors in the SSR and SSG processes are essential for rendering support, technical advice and guidance to developing countries based on best practices of the SSR and SSG concepts but, in doing this, the key principles of SSR which equally apply to SSG must guide such policy decisions. Several institutions or organisations have identified standard principles in undertaking SSR, including the OECD (DAC Handbook on SSR 2007), the United Nations (UN Secretary-General's Report 2008), and the African Union (AU Policy Framework on SSR 2008).

That of the African Union highlights specific principles that capture the values and norms, as well as reflect the traditions of the peoples of the African continent. Some of these principles include African solidarity; SSR and regional integration; national vision and parameters for external support for SSR; context-specific SSR; and the engagement of informal and customary security providers and traditional justice actors. These complement the generally accepted principles of national ownership, national responsibility and national commitment, SSR as part of broader democratization and reform process, good governance, gender, and coordination of SSR assistance among others (AU Policy Framework on SSR 2013: 16a - j).

These principles demand specific roles and responsibilities from national and external actors in their partnership of undertaking SSR and SSG. Emphasis is, however, placed on

external actors supporting a nationally-defined vision or support the development of such a vision. This, in addition to security culture considerations, has remained the missing element in the SSR and SSG efforts to fix the security sector. 'Soft' reforms requiring behavioural or attitudinal changes based on observing values, norms and principles would require a consideration of security culture influences in the change and transformation of the security sector. This issue has received limited or rather no attention all for which this thesis seeks to address.

Given that this thesis focuses on the SSG in transitional societies from authoritarian to democratic rule, using Ghana and Nigeria as case studies, the call for adopting a broader approach to SSG becomes vital and timely if any major impact is to be felt in the transformation of the security sector and other relevant or complementary sectors related to governance and development of these countries. It, therefore, becomes necessary to mainstream SSG processes into the statebuilding process that affords the whole-of-government approach in addressing specific human security needs in a country. This approach becomes even more pertinent in states considered as 'weak' or 'fragile' and threatened by conflict as a result of bad governance practices, and which requires some level of resilience to ensure stability and peace.

2.4 Security Culture and SSG: An Analytical Framework on Complexity, Acceptance and Effectiveness

Cultural norms and values are brought to bear in the performance of roles, functions or responsibilities of the numerous actors in the SSG process. The fusion of different cultures of security actors, both external and internal and even among the core security sector actors and their counterparts in the civilian management and oversight bodies, could influence the acceptance of and practice within SSG processes and its effectiveness, particularly in the area of change management and transformation of the sector.

In effect, understanding the impact of culture, be it political, security, strategic or others, which relates to the shared values, norms, behaviour and practices that influence policy decision-making and practices in the governance of the security sector, could play a major role in leadership, local ownership and sustainability of SSR programmes in a country. Bryden and Olonisakin (2010: 6) argue that "[a] central plank of the transformation discourse is the need to alter the culture and character of security actors". This section is, therefore, devoted to a closer scrutiny of the subject.

2.4.1 *What is Culture and Security Culture?*

Culture informs and permeates all facets of human faculties and activities. It also distinguishes identities thereby highlighting similarities or differences. It offers opportunities for diversity but also creates the possibilities for conflict, chaos, wars and disagreements. Huntington (1993: 22-49; Huntington 1996) in looking at clash of civilisation and the remaking of a new world order minced no words in hypothesising that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world order would be culture rather than ideological or economic factors.

So culture does play a role or count in making a difference and, as a result, requires managing differences based on cultural sensitivity and cultural awareness (Harrison and Huntington 2000; Moran et al 2007). This is of much significance given that culture, which informs behavioural practices, is relative and, thus, necessitates one being more tentative and less absolute if one is to guarantee positive human interactions. Culture, therefore, matters (Harrison and Huntington 2001). This thesis, thus, seeks to delve a bit deeper to establish why culture matters in security sector reform and governance, taking into consideration issues of complexity, acceptance and effectiveness.

Culture has been defined in several ways and, depending on issues under consideration, operational definitions are applied in the discourse towards achieving specific goals and

objectives. For instance, culture has been defined as the learned and shared behaviour of a community of interacting human beings (Useem & Useem 1963: 169). Others have also defined culture as the shared patterns of behaviours and interactions, cognitive constructs, and affective understanding that are learned through a process of socialisation (Centre for Advance Research and Language Acquisition 2014). These shared patterns identify the members of a cultural group while also distinguishing those of another group.

While these definitions focus on shared patterns of behaviour and cognitive construct, as well as drawing distinctions among different cultures, Banks and McGee Banks (2010:8) also viewed culture as "… consisting primarily of the symbolic, ideational, and intangible aspects of human societies". Culture, in this sense, goes beyond the artifacts, tools, or other tangible cultural elements. The emphasis lies on how members of a group interpret, use, and perceive these artifacts and other intangible elements. Values, symbols, interpretations, and perspectives are, therefore, the elements that distinguish a particular group from another in modernised societies, and not necessarily the material objects and other tangible aspects of human societies (Kuper 1999 cited in Banks and McGee Banks 2010:8). People within a culture usually interpret the meaning of symbols, artifacts, and behaviours in the same or in similar ways (Banks, Banks and McGee 2010: 8). This underscores the "soft" part of culture, which is more or less invisible, but which influences behavioural patterns or the way of life of a group of people (Murray 2009).

In the peace and conflict transformation context, culture could also be construed as the shared knowledge and schemes created by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing and responding to the social realities around them (Lederach 1995: 9). This reinforces the flexible and adaptable nature of culture towards existing behavioural patterns, trends and challenges. The interplay of realism, culture and grand strategy, and its influence on power, equally presents a contextual definition of culture viewed as any set of interlocking beliefs and

assumptions that are held collectively, by a given group, and passed on through socialization (Dueck 2005: 200). But for the purpose of this study, however, and in the context of the evolution of cultures and the need for reform, re-organisation or transformation, an operational definition of culture would be adopted based on the various definitions reviewed above.

Deriving from the above definitions, culture is perceived as or expressed through the centrality of shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, values, principles and symbols of an institution, group, or community, which is learned, inherited or acquired through a process of socialisation (including security, political and economic interactions, among others) towards one's existence. Based on the above definition of culture, security culture is defined as shared beliefs of a group, a community, institutions, organisations or a state among others, that guide efforts towards prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, freedom from threats, and acquisition of basic needs towards existence and survival. Thus, in the study and analysis of the influences and impact of security culture on security sector governance, the central theme that emerges reflects the defining roles of belief or belief systems and their influence on behaviour which guarantees safety, survival and existence.

2.4.2 *The SSR/SSG 'Hiccups' and the Transformative Role of Security Culture*

The literature is replete with notions of security culture and its impact on territorial integrity, security referents, organisations, how issues are securitised or not securitised, and responses to threats among other things. This is however not the case in the area of security sector reform and security sector governance processes. The realist and the idealist ideologies have largely informed security cultures in international relations either in the pursuit of war or peace respectively, and either as a means to an end or an end in itself (Waltz 2001; Keohane 1984; Nye 2020). Causes of insecurity and threats have been explored, ranging from man and the state as agents of this insecurity to society and the state system, while these same referents have

also remained targets in the midst of conflicts and symmetrical or asymmetrical wars either on the domestic or international fronts (Waltz 2001; Kirchner & Sperling 2010). With the expansion of security agendas and re-conceptualisation of security, guaranteeing the security needs of states and peoples have become paramount as a basis for peace and stability. Hence the beliefs and practices of these security referents have a major role to play in collectively achieving this objective.

This will require changes and transformation mainly through security culture influences on effective security sector governance from endogenous (Afrocentric) and exogenous (Eurocentric) angles, and beyond the Eurocentric Westphalia and post-Westphalian systems (Kirchner & Sperling 2010). Reason being that the definition and securitisation of issues differ in geo-political and geo-strategic contexts and undertaking security sector reforms would require effective and suitable security sector governance that can only be made possible through minimising the complexity of the SSR/SSG concept in order to facilitate its acceptance and effective implementation within the African context.

This becomes necessary as the modern and traditional systems or institutions run parallel to each other in Africa with a conglomeration of actors with different belief systems, hence requiring a contextual hybrid approach to securitising and responding to issues rather than a translational hybrid approach. This means SSR/SSG must be implemented by having in mind and reinforcing a positive or acceptable endogenous cultural norms and values, as well as its already existing security systems, juxtaposed those of the formal or modern ones rather than superimposing western views and concepts in oblivion to the traditional ones as is usually the practice (Donais 2008: 1-275).

Security culture as a variable for transformation or change is generally dependent on reviewing and discarding wrong beliefs, behaviour or practices of individuals, groups or states

and taking on or adapting new positive ones as a way of facilitating good policies and inclusive decision-making and management with the view to delivering required security good or need. This is largely reflexive in nature as people's beliefs or practices impact society and vice versa, just as that of states impact supranational bodies or organisations and vice-versa (Waltz 2001: 3-6; Williams; Barrinha and Rosa 2013: 101-115).

The complexity of security culture dynamics, including security culture differences and sub-cultures, require a good or at least fairly minimal understanding of security concepts, discourses and practices by security actors or stakeholders in a relative context, be it at the national or regional levels, for desired impact. Security culture also manifests in specific norms and practices based on ideas informing shared beliefs on issues of safety and survival which is, in turn, expressed in shared discourses and subsequently in habitual practices (Williams and Haacke 2008: 129; Neumann and Heikka 2005: 5-23). Indeed, these ideas, norms, values and principles are reflected in legal instruments and policies of regional and continental organisations like the ECOWAS and the European Union. They usually reflect a mix of strategic and human security concerns in contemporary times, though with increasing emphasis on the latter.

The ideas, norms and principles that constitute the embryonic security culture of ECOWAS, for instance, have evolved historically from colonial to post-colonial, as well as from strategic or traditional security concerns to embrace human security in which the economic, social development and the security of peoples and states are inextricably linked (Jaye 2008: 151-168). This assertion is reinforced in the 2008 *ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework* (ECPF) which calls for the transformation of the regional body from an 'ECOWAS of States' to an 'ECOWAS of Peoples', seeking to resolve the tensions between sovereignty and supra-nationality, and between regime security and human security, but eventually resolved

progressively in favour of both supra-nationality and human security respectively (*ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework* 2008: 9).

The *ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance* adopted in Dakar, Senegal, on 4th June, 2016 does not only anchor its SSR&G efforts on its regional shared cultures, values and national ownership indicated in its preamble, but equally considered the lack of the culture of governance as part of many challenges faced by the security sector in West Africa. It rightly recognizes democratic governance and human security as being at the core of ECOWAS's community strategy for the provision of security as a public good, as an essential service, and a vital component for achieving sustainable development. The regional body is also not oblivious of the fact that profound changes are required in adopting a new security approach, which does not only combine both Westphalia and post-Westphalia approaches to SSR&G but endogenous or informal security norms and values, in order to achieve successful democratic governance and security sector reforms at national and regional levels (Falk 2002: 311-352; Kreuder-Sonnen & Zangl 2015: 568-594).

This approach to security culture provides options for revisiting obsolete, dated or unacceptable beliefs and practices in order to undertake reforms, change or transformation. Similarly, distinct security cultures at the regional level would influence behavioural patterns through different interpretations of international norms. Regional security institutions may, therefore, interpret humanitarian challenges, for example, differently and adopt different interventions measures to these challenges (Acharya 2004; and Ladnier 2003 cited in Williams and Haacke 2008: 129).

In the European Union context, Barrinha and Rosa (2013) revisited security and strategic culture by generally acknowledging the diarchy of its strategic and critical security studies approach. This Western approach placed more emphasis on the post-positivist and reflexivist

approaches to security. This presents an interesting perspective of European security culture in terms of its conceptualisation and operationalisation, except for its translational attributes rather than the recent ideational construction or approach, which may be suitable within European context other than elsewhere. As a result, the need for consolidating the European security culture debate within a reflexivist, discursive approach to the study of security became more prominent (Barrinha and Rosa 2013: 101-115; Keohane 1988: 381-386; Williams 2007; Bickerton, Irondelle, and Menon 2011:49(1), 1–21; and Merlingen 2011:49(1), 149–169). A classic example is demonstrated in the case study of Portugal as an important smaller member state of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), adopting EU's regional security policies in addressing security issues at the national level, thereby consolidation European security culture.

This approach deepens the understanding of security-related concepts, discourses and practices, mainly at the national and regional levels, by drawing heavily on the impact of regional security institutions, as regards their security culture, on that of the strategic culture of member states and vice-versa, through the reflexivist's perspective using the translation approach.

From the above scenario, it could be argued that critical security studies have influenced or contributed to the development of a critical approach to the study of European security (see Krause and Williams 1997: 10-11), while the use of translation and discourse have equally buttressed the reflexivist's approach to European security culture. This notwithstanding, substantial grounds are left to be covered with regard to the concept of security culture and governance. The focus has been mainly on issues of security culture and its interpretation between regional/security organisations, i.e. EU and NATO, and member states such as Portugal, on issues of security-related concepts and the roles of these institutions in international security. The focus on issues of security sector governance and the role of culture in ensuring its effectiveness is, thus, limited.

Kirchner and Sperling (2010) partly admitted this by underscoring the relatively unexplored and underdeveloped conceptual and empirical linkage between national security culture and the preferred form of security governance. And in looking at this linkage, he arrived at four categories of security governance on which national security culture has an impact. They include assurance (which relates to intervention in post-conflict); prevention (pre-conflict intervention); protection (ensuring internal security); and compellence (military intervention) at the domestic level. On the external front, he looks at barriers and opportunities for collective action among major powers in the protection of global and regional security governance among 10 major powerful states within Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific (Kirchner and Sperling 2010: 1).

From the above examples cited of ECOWAS and the EU, it becomes quite evident that security cultures have influences on securitisation of issues and policy-decision making. The context and approaches are, however, quite different and varied. ECOWAS draws quite heavily on ideation and discursive approaches in its security culture at the regional level, while issues of policy transfer, translation and reflexive approaches to security issues in member states does not necessarily seem a priority as compared to the European case; hence its emphasis on regional integration. Additionally, ECOWAS's regional norms, values and standards do influence member states' behavioral patterns in terms of responses to security challenges in the region, say on principles of non-indifference or zero tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government, and, thus, have a tendency to influence and transform regional security approaches in terms of strategic and human security amidst regional security complexes.

Options, thus, exist in adopting hybrid security cultures suitable to a specific context, in an attempt to transform and promote progressive changes in the two regions and within its member states. In doing this, however, indigenous cultural traits must not be glossed over for a

supposedly ideal or superimposed exogenous security cultures. The thesis, in seeking to achieve a greater impact of SSR and SSG on security needs of both the states and its people, would therefore align its priorities to a critical security approach in which positive hybrid forms of informal and formal security cultures must be adapted to achieve desired goals and objectives. This deviates from the largely dominant Westphalia and post-Westphalia security approaches which straddle both state and human security approaches to meeting security needs, but with greater emphasis on liberal peace approaches rather than a contextual hybridity approach to issues. This contextual hybridism is necessary for resilience and sustainability of inclusive security agendas and longer term growth and development prospects.

2.4.3 *Probable Influences of Security Culture on Governance of the Security Sector*

To ensure or effect change and transformation through cultural influences within the security sector, beliefs, norms and values of a people, group or community, must be subjected to a closer scrutiny in order to achieve the expected change or transformation. In the context of broadening and deepening the debate on critical security studies, where post-positivist and reflexivist ideologies reinforce the notion of idealism, democratic norms and values find expression in issues of human security rather than those of traditional or regime security. Hence, cultural influences and the need for cultural change within the broad field of security governance is expressed through the enhancement of democratic values within, across and outside of the state sphere, rather than limiting the discourse to an institutional context (Wood 2004:31–48).

Wood (2004) highlights possibilities of effecting changes in the governance of security, using policing reform as a good example. She saw policing as creating an enabling environment for taking on sensibilities of other nodes (actors and processes) to maintain or improve their positions in the security field, through cultural transformation at the "field" (structures) or “habitus” (practical disposition). This ideal is perceived in the context of balancing the "defining

capacity to exercise coercion" with service-oriented or community policing (Wood 2004: 31; also see Brodgen and Shearing 1993; Shearing 1995; Janet Chan 2001; and Bourdieu &Wacquant1992). By inference, other actors could draw parallels, given the transformative element of culture in making governance more acceptable and effective. But that said, "shifting from state-centred to a plural or nodal conception of governance" cannot be over-emphasised, as well as the need to “pay more attention to the opportunities for transformation within the broader field of security governance" (Wood 2004: 32), which this research seeks to accomplish.

In similar instances, possibilities exist for imbibing a globalised security culture through the hybrid model (Hills 2012). This may occur on the international stage, specifically through policing at the international stage, based mainly on the practices of the United Nations Police (UNPOL) in a post-conflict peacebuilding context. An instructive case focuses on the practices of the Nigerian police in UNPOL missions *vis-a-vis* its internal policing practices. The findings in this research revealed instances in which elite decision makers construct, exercise, and validate adaptive forms of security knowledge best described as hybrid (Hills 2012: 92).

A globalising security culture in the field of policing are learnt through democratic policing norms and practices, both taught and acquired through pre-deployment training and experiences gained in field missions. The globalising security culture is, nevertheless, considered as being "outweighed by domestic concerns" in the case of Nigeria (Hill 2012: 91). It is, therefore, obvious that public police around the world share certain occupational commonalities, but this does not necessarily represent a globalising security culture (Hills 2012: 91-106). This interesting study, thus, provides a hybrid system of security culture in which the globalising security culture is construed as being "accommodated" or "manipulated" to suit specific goals and objectives within a specific space which is the international scene. These ‘democratic’ policing values and norms are, however, relegated to the background within the domestic setting

where a more brutal and aggressive policing is adopted to contain internal crimes and civil disturbances. As Hills so aptly concluded: "... although certain international norms appear to modify police behavior through temporary and localised processes of socialisation, they do so for instrumental, rather than intrinsic reasons" (Hill 2012: 93).

It presents an interesting parallel for this thesis, given the hybrid nature of cultures, its accommodation or acceptance within specific contexts, and adaptation or, rather, manipulation to suit specific ends (Boege *et al* 2009: 13-21; and Mac Ginty 2008: 139-159). Hence, the need to explore the specific role of culture, and, for that matter, security culture, whether acquired or indigenous, in ensuring its acceptance and adaptation, in case of external cultural practices, towards effective security governance practices in West Africa. The thesis would advocate more for "intrinsic" cultural-related practices that effectively combine relevant African traditional security cultural practices with that of the Western-acquired or accommodated ones, rather than the "cosmetic" or "instrumental" security culture-related practices in order to enhance transformation in security governance practices in West Africa and elsewhere.

The case of non-state policing comes to mind, where the state's capacity to provide efficient and effective policing, particularly in Africa, is severely constrained by low police to civilian ratios (Harrendorf et al 2000: 115), lack of adequate resources, and negative behavioural patterns or tendencies. The international statistics on crime and justice indicates that Africa, together with Canada, the USA, South Asia and Oceania, is among the regions with lower levels of police personnel. Africa specifically has 200 police officers to a population of 100,000 (Harrendorf et al 2000: 115).

In addition, policing is seen to be undergoing rapid change in the face of democratisation, the commercialisation of security, and conflicts that disrupt policing services among others (Baker 2010). This inability of the police to perform adequate protection has reinforced the need

for a complementary but regulated non-state policing that includes private security companies and community collectives, providing everyday policing at the local/community level (Baker 2010: 27-32). The community collectives, in these partnership roles, bring their knowledge of the environment and cultural tendencies to bear on community policing in the localities towards social protection.

The ongoing reforms in Afghanistan which focuses on various security actors, including the Afghan national army and police, the judiciary, prisons, the security intelligence elements, as well as the performance of the civilian oversight mechanisms in the SSR process, also presents an interesting dimension to SSR efforts. Of particular interest is the overview of the post-Taliban status of the security sector in Afghanistan, the skewed or uneven international funding leading to uneven reforms, and the limited impact of Western security models on the whole security sector reform effort Murray (2009: 187-208; also see Sedra 2007: 7-12, 15-21).

SSR in Afghanistan has been slow and unsteady, fraught with obstacles based on the superimposition of new ideas on what is still a tribal society in which local social structures, customs and loyalties are stronger than national laws and institutions. Additionally, security governance practices and the development of governance mechanisms have not been consistent or effective, while democratic principles have also not taken root as expected (Murray 2009: 188; Ayub *et al* 2009; and Sedra 2013: 371-387).

These shortfalls could have been avoided if donors were to take into consideration the historical, cultural and religious context of South Asia, and draw on reform models from this region (Murray 2009), as well as contextualise hybrid models that would at least complement formal or state democratic institutions, and avoid 'spoiler' behaviour or activity (Bose and Motwani 2014: 416). 'Software' changes in culture, values and behaviour, as well as the respect of democratic principles, would have gradually emerged, compared to 'hardware' changes based

on Western security models of reform, including re-equipping, rebuilding and training (Murray 2009:187-188; and Sedra 2013: 371-374). This could have, ultimately, proved more effective for the future of Afghan security sector reform than what the present reform phase allows (Murray 2009: 187). Thus, Murray (2009:193) holds the opinion that "the courage of Afghan soldiers is not in question, but their support for an abstract notion of 'national government' may still prove to be weaker than their loyalty to tribe and village, once international support is withdrawn".

The neglect of the civilian and independent oversight of the security sector institutions have equally created a serious gap in the reform effort, as a multiplicity of oversight mechanisms was considered as more likely to ensure transparency of the sector than internal scrutiny or by an external agency (Murray 2009: 204; Mac Ginty 2010: 577-598).

In as much as Murray characterised the SSR process in Afghanistan as mechanistic, technical and lacking vision, and calls for complementary changes in culture and values, as well as in the attitudes and behaviour of institutions and their personnel, she also acknowledged that this 'software' reform would require more imagination, patience and sensitivity. In addition, behavioural and attitudinal changes are "less tangible and harder to achieve", and ignoring them in essence create the wrong impression to the international community that SSR has been completed, without pursuing the reform to its optimal conclusion (Murray 2009: 204- 205).

In this regard, therefore, the regionalisation of SSR approaches is considered as crucial in facilitating the sustainability of SSR in Afghanistan, as well as acquiring an indigenous and South Asian character, since "Western principles adopted for their value and universality would likely attain more legitimacy in Afghanistan if they were seen as reflecting South Asian values too" (Murray 2009 ; 206).

This approach to SSR and its crucial element of SSG remains instructive in many respects to this thesis, given the emphasis on complementarities between 'hardware' and 'software'

changes in SSR/SSG processes. What remains to be done, nonetheless, is to interrogate the 'software' aspects of behavioural and attitudinal changes which are less tangible and difficult to achieve. This 'software' reform would require more imagination, patience and sensitivity (Murray 2009: 205). Cognisance would equally be taken of dilemmas posed by negative or obsolete traditional customary practices, including clientelism, corruption, human rights abuses and social exclusion, in attempts at incorporating customary and traditional forms of authority into security governance and statebuilding reforms (Podder 2014: 1627).

2.5 The Conceptual Framework

2.5.1 *Security Culture and the Notion of Complexity, Acceptance and Effectiveness in Security Governance*

In undertaking reforms within the security sector that seeks to protect the state and its people from fear and want, three major issues arise for consideration. The first relates to understanding the security sector or system itself and how it functions in addressing identified security concerns. An idea or knowledge of what exits then facilitates identifying bottlenecks that ought to be addressed to enable the system function effectively. This will entail identifying components of the entire security system and how these components ought to work together to efficiently and effectively deliver security needs of the state and its people (Stroh 2015: 1-91). The components in this case would mainly comprise the structure or institutions, the actors and the processes that facilitate the functioning of the system.

The second issue worth considering would be the management of activities within the sector and oversight roles to ensure that components within the security system function adequately. This issue relates mainly to the relevant actors in the system, their respective cultures and interests, and the platform of interaction needed to manage, coordinate and make decisions in a comprehensive and coherent manner. Here, the softer issues of security culture and its possible influences on making the right policy decisions acceptable to most if not all in meeting identified

security needs is of essence. This aspect of reform, as pointed out earlier, is difficult to achieve and often ignored or neglected, as it relates to different values, norms and principles already acquired and difficult to change where the need arises.

The third but not least of considerations is how all these efforts fit into the larger statebuilding process in which weak or fragile states require reforms that builds resilience through leadership, ownership and sustainable development programmes. In this third element leadership remains crucial to the success of SSG, as the lack of political will could stifle efforts in this regard. The Global Leadership and Organisational Behavioural Effectiveness (GLOBE) Study of 62 societies on the issue of culture, leadership, and organisations demonstrates possible cultural influences in enhancing SSG processes (House *et al* 2004). Indeed, cultural differences exhibit complexities of relations between individuals or groups, as the higher the differences, the more complex the relationship. Cultural similarities, however, help understand the evolutionary process of cultural development.

Cultural clusters equally provide useful ways of exploring cultural similarities (House *et al* 2002: 1). In the GLOBE Study, the examination of national cultures are based on the following factors: a) performance orientation; future orientation; assertiveness, power distance; humane orientation; institutional collectivism; in-group collectivism; uncertainty avoidance; and gender egalitarianism (House *et al* 2002: 3). The impact of culture on leadership styles have not been disputed, as has been acknowledged in several researches undertaken, leading to the notion that cultural traditions, values, ideologies and norms create as much or even more differences between societies, compared to structural factors (House, *et al* 2002: 3; Lammers and Hickson, 1979: 10).

The central theoretical proposition of the GLOBE Study states that "attributes and entities that distinguish a given culture from other cultures are predictive of the practices of organisations

and leader attributes and behaviours that are most frequently enacted, acceptable, and effective in that culture" (House 2002:8). Societal cultural values and practices affect what leaders do (House 2002: 8; House *et al* 1997: 535 – 625), while leadership, in turn, affects organisational form, culture and practices (House, *et al* 2002:8; Bass 1985; Schein 1992; and Yukl 1994). On the other hand, organisational culture and practices are found to equally affect what leaders do by altering their behaviours and leadership styles (House *et al* 2002: 8; Schein 1992; Trice and Beyer 1984; and Lombardo 1983).

These mutually reinforcing relationships present the dynamics or possibilities of influencing changes in leadership styles and group or organisational behaviours based on nationally accepted social norms, values and traditions. The GLOBE study, therefore, presents the options of exploring further, possible means of cultural influences on behavioural and attitudinal changes, generally acceptable in society, and serving as a means of improving effective governance in various sectors of the economy of a country. Of particular importance to this study, however, is coming up with a theoretical proposition on appropriate culture and leadership dynamics capable of changing or transforming security sector governance in the countries under consideration and beyond towards meeting the security needs of the state and its people.

In all these discussions, however, it is pertinent to reinforce the fact that security reform efforts towards peacebuilding and statebuilding goals must take cognisance of people's cultural heritage, particularly at the grassroots, as this provide a credible foundation for equitable and sustainable peace and development. Cultural heritage in this regard must reflect cultural strengths that help guarantee a freedom from fear and want, and that facilitate desired changes in social and economic conditions (Kleymeyer 1994).

The scenario above reflects a complex security sector or system, derived from an SSR concept perceived to be foreign and imposed, and requiring an interaction of numerous security actors, with civilian and military backgrounds, and with different security cultures. This security system is confronted with security and governance challenges which necessitate a transformation within the sector, particularly in transitional or new democracies, based on established security cultures under authoritarian rule (Nathan 2004: 2), and the probable need to adopt hybrid or diverse security cultures under democratic dispensation to address human security concerns. This complex security system also has multiple security actors who perform different roles and functions, and might require 'software' changes to unproductive and entrenched behaviour, attitudes, norms, values and principles, in order to complement that of the 'hardware' changes related to institutions, capacity-building and resources for enhanced and effective security service delivery.

Table 2.1

Classification of Security Sector Actors

Security Sector and Actors	
Core Security Actors	Armed Forces, Police Service, Gendarmeries, Paramilitary Forces, Presidential Guards, Customs Authorities, and reserve or local security units (including Civil Defence Forces, National Guards and Militias)
Management and Oversight Bodies	The Executive, National Security Advisory Bodies, Legislative and Legislative Select Committees, Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Customary and Traditional Authorities, Financial Management Bodies (Finance Ministries, Budget Officers, Financial Audit and Planning Units), and Civil Society Organisations (Civilian Review Boards and Public Complaints Commissions)
Justice and Rule of Law	Judiciary and Justice Ministries, Prisons, Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Services, Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsmen, and Customary and Traditional Justice Systems
Non-Statutory Security Forces	Liberation Armies, Guerrilla armies, Private Security Companies, Political Party Militias
External Security Actors	Development Partners - DFID, SIDA, CIDA, USAID, UNDP Regional Bodies - Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African Union, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), WACSOF, ECOSOCC, ASSN, WANEP etc. Global - United Nations, Global Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST)

Source: Adapted from OECD DAC Handbook, 2007 p.22, and author's own research.

Table 2.1 above classifies security actors that have a stake in the security and justice sector. These actors include all the institutions, groups, organisations and individuals playing diverse roles in the provision of security and justice or undermining same. It is pertinent, from the numerous security actors identified above, to define some essential elements in the governance of the sector. These include 'who' (security referents/actors), 'what' (roles and responsibilities), 'how' (processes involved in effective delivery of security services) and

'means' (expertise, capacity and resources). Of equal importance are the different cultural traits of these actors, and how that impacts on their collaboration towards the management, oversight, and control of the sector, as well as ensuring an efficient and effective delivery of balanced security needs of both state and sub-state actors.

Thus, a right or optimal mix within this security system with different components is required to facilitate the transformation of the system into a coherent and acceptable whole. Security culture, therefore, remains essential in facilitating the process of SSG, particularly as the various components – representing the actors, the institutions and processes – must function adequately in order to ensure the success of the whole security system.

Culture becomes relevant in explaining and understanding the complexity of the security sector and, thus, requires cultural awareness to facilitate the acceptance of a hybrid security system, and the effectiveness of security governance as a means to addressing security threats, and meeting security needs of the state and its people. Hybridity in this case refers to a "dialectic co-existence of forms of socio-political organisation that have their roots in both non-state indigenous societal structures and introduced state structures" (Boege et al 2009: 17). Hybridity is also used cautiously; not as another catch-word to subsume realistic indigenous programmes under prescriptive western models which become more 'instrumental' rather than 'intrinsic' and thus lacking value and essence.

Figure 2.2

Diagram Depicting the Conceptual Framework of the Security Sector and Governance and the Context for Change



Source: Author, 2019

Figure 2.1 illustrates a complex security system, comprising multiple state and sub-state security actors with different cultures, roles and responsibilities, including security sector management, oversight and delivery of services.

In the area of security sector governance, there are both horizontal and vertical levels of governance structures at national and international levels which provide the platform for these security actors to possibly interact and align their interests towards a properly managed, controlled and effective security sector.

The task in this complex security terrain, therefore, is to explore the possible ways and means of reinforcing, realigning, streamlining, and adopting security cultures through creating the necessary cultural awareness, and circumventing the challenges of hybridity as means of

effecting change and transformation within the sector. This becomes necessary as cultural differences have the tendency to maximise complexity of security sector governance, while cultural similarities could minimise same. This approach could eventually lead to an acceptance of the SSG concept, based on recognition of indigenous traditions, values and practices, towards broader statebuilding goals in transitional societies or established democracies.

2.5.2 *Region in Focus - Enhancing Security Sector Governance in West Africa*

The West African region has gone through numerous security challenges during and after the end of the Cold War. The region had to contend with the outbreak of numerous coups d'état, intra-state conflicts, bad governance practices which undermined democratic governance in respective member states, transnational crime – including the trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW), drugs and human beings – and terrorism among others (for more details, see Beckitt and Bakrania 2010: 2; UNODC 2013). These security challenges have undermined both national and human security, predisposing ECOWAS Member States to fragility, abuse of human rights, death and displacement of huge populations. With these developments, Bryden *et al* (2008: 14) argue that

> [t]here is clearly a case to be made for a transformation of the way security sector is governed in West Africa. States are in various stages of transition and while some have opportunities for a process of reform others provide little or no room for such development.

The call from donors and other international partners for the practice of democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, transparency and accountability and the respect for the rule of law, among other tenets, have over the past two decades created awareness in the region, leading to the intensification of efforts to uphold such principles. The increasing recognition of the individual and his or her need as against emphasis on the state has equally engendered a

vociferous civil society that demands the respect of such ideals by regimes in power in the current democratic dispensation.

The regional body, ECOWAS, has also made efforts in drafting numerous policy documents and legal frameworks to regulate activities of member states and their responsibility towards their citizens in governance and security of the region, as well as maintain a peaceful region. Some of these documents include the 1999 ECOWAS *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace and Security*; the 2001 *Protocol A/SPI/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security;* the 2008 *ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework* (ECPF)*;* and the 2016 *ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance*.

The ECPF, for instance, underscores the need to guarantee human security which, it anticipates, would create the necessary conditions to eliminate pervasive threats to people's and individual rights, their livelihoods, safety, and life. The protection of human and democratic rights, as well as the promotion of human development meant to ensure freedom from fear and want is equally highlighted. Also, as part of it strategic vision, ECOWAS member states bear the primary responsibility of transforming the region from an 'ECOWAS of States' into an 'ECOWAS of the Peoples'.

Structures have also been created to facilitate democratic governance in the region. Some of these include an ECOWAS Parliament, an ECOWAS Court and a West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF). These structures together with the organizational set up of ECOWAS, including its Mediation and Security Council, its Council of Elders and an ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), present an appropriate framework and platform to institutionalise security governance in the region. Obviously, the regional body is making significant progress, but a lot

more remains to be done in respective member states to complement regional efforts in this direction, if democracy, peace and sustainable development are to be achieved.

Some key considerations must be made in enhancing SSG in West Africa. These include translating the emphasis on an 'ECOWAS of the Peoples' into specific roles to be played by sub-state actors in SSG processes in the region, based on their expertise, culture and custom; mainstreaming gender roles in SSG; ensuring democratic control and accountability in the region, which could lead to the building of trust among government institutions, security services and citizens; and encouraging equal partnerships between governments and external actors based on the recognition of the leadership, national vision, ownership and participation of local actors in the process (ASSN/DCAF Workshop Report 2010: 5-6). As is well acknowledged "[an imposition of] reform models can never lead to effective and lasting results; that a participatory process requires dialogue; and that local ownership is the foundation of any possible progress in SSR" (ASSN/DCAF Workshop Report 2010: 5-6).

From the above, it can be deduced that the recognition of diverse histories and experiences within the region, coupled with regional values, norms or standards would be crucial in institutionalising security sector governance practices in the ECOWAS region.

2.6 Key Research Question

The three major types of research questions usually addressed in the field of social science include the descriptive; exploratory; and evaluation questions (Shavelson and Townes 2002: 99-106; Yin 2012: 4-5). Descriptive questions focus on what is happening or has happened, while that of the exploratory looks more at the how or the why something happened or is happening with little control over events but possibilities of facilitating change or transformation. That of evaluation considers the how and the why in assessing a given situation.

A review of the literature above indicates the evolving nature of culture, or more specifically security culture, as it gains ground in the whole strategic and critical security debate. The emphasis, however, is to focus more on positive or progressive endogenous security culture which is complementary to the acceptable formal and globalised security cultures, with the tendency to transform and bring positive changes in security sector reform and governance initiatives. Calls for such changes in the security sector have been made in the context of respect for democratic principles and changes in behaviour and attitude, based on a careful balance between formal and informal models of reform.

More importantly, major gaps exist and require an inquiry to unravel the role of culture and its probable transformative elements in bringing about changes in the governance of the security sector. Various issues come to the fore in this direction. Key among these issues is facilitating complementary changes in the culture and values as well as attitudes and behaviour of security personnel, and the institutions and agencies they work for (Murray 2009: 204-205).

Essentially, understanding security culture and cultural changes as a whole within the broad field of security governance becomes pertinent, while finding possible ways of enhancing democratic values within, across and outside of the state sphere, rather than limiting the discourse to an institutional context (Wood 2004: 31 – 48). For these changes to be effective, they would also require to be more 'intrinsic' rather than 'instrumental' (Hill 2012: 93).

This major void or a lacuna in the literature requires more detailed analysis, hence an exploratory research question guided the thesis as follows: 'How has security culture affected the complexity of, and facilitated the acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in the comparative cases of Ghana and Nigeria?'

It is expected that this research question will guide the study towards making useful findings that goes to either reinforce the research objectives or bring up different results for further research in future.

2.7 Enabling Objectives

The central theme of this research, as mentioned earlier, is to explore progressive endogenous and exogenous security cultural influences on the effective governance of the security sector in West Africa, taking a look at the comparative case studies of Ghana and Nigeria. The objective for undertaking this research is to generally enhance SSG in West Africa. This would only happen if the SSG concept is well understood by all stakeholders, and indigenous cultural norms, values and practices accommodated in the SSR process. The enabling objectives of this research are therefore:

(a) To promote the recognition, appreciation and respect for the cultural context based on existing norms and values, as these have the tendency to facilitate the acceptance and commitment towards a sustainable democratic governance of the security sector;

(b) To establish the interconnectedness and clarify the dynamics between the major concepts of culture, security and governance, and possibly contextualise the interplay of these concepts in security reform efforts towards eventual resilience and sustainability in the statebuilding process;

(c) To highlight both appropriate and inappropriate security cultural practices that either undermine or promote good governance practices in undertaking SSG in societies in transition;

(d) To enhance, if possible, an appropriate or balanced hybridism in indigenous and formal security cultural practices by both state and sub-state actors in the

reorientation and transformation of security sectors of societies in transition in West Africa and at large; and

(e) To encourage dialogue among local/national actors and partners in undertaking SSR and SSG as a way of promoting synergy, and enhancing coordination and coherence between indigenous forms of security cultural practices and the modern liberal peace approach.

The above-mentioned objectives are informed by several reasons. First, is the lack of recognition and appreciation of the context within which security sector governance practices should take place. Stereotypes are brought to bear or imposed, especially by donors, expecting all actors to fall in line in the implementation of SSR or SSG in all contexts. In addition, it is also generally assumed that foreign or externally imposed cultural norms and values are generally known and ideal, and must or should, therefore, be accepted and practiced. More importantly, the questionable notion that proposed conditionalities, in whichever form, would compel the imbibing of external or foreign values have proved otherwise. These objectives also reflect a complex and multivariate system with multiple and intervening factors, that could directly or indirectly influence each other in ensuring an appropriate hybrid or cultural-mix to enhance security sector governance in Ghana and Nigeria. Fulfilling these objectives would also require a consideration of possible factors capable of undermining the said objectives.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Research design is intended to provide an appropriate framework for undertaking research through the adoption of the right research methodology, the collection and analysis of relevant data of the study, as well as cater for limitations and constraints (Saunders et al 1997:72; 2007). In doing this, however, this research design would "deal with a logical problem and not a logistical problem" (Yin 1989: 29).

In line with the above, this chapter focused on three major issue areas: the philosophical underpinnings of this research; the research approach to data collection; and the method of analysis and presentation of findings. This approach was adopted in order to ensure that the right participants in this research were identified, and appropriate research methods adopted to gather, interpret and analyse data collected towards answering the research question as precisely as possible.

In fulfilling this objective, the critical theory was adopted to answer the research question "*to what extent could security culture minimise the complexity and facilitate the acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in the comparative cases of both Ghana and Nigeria?*" It provided the general framework to guide the research in an attempt to understand, explain, analyse and make inferences based on findings. This was complemented by the use of the case study approach to observation and data collection. The research strategy employed was based on the qualitative method for data collection and analysis. These were facilitated by the use of semi-structured/one-on-one interviews, open-ended questionnaires, focused group discussions and desk-based research. A combination of hermeneutics, translation, ideation and reflexivist's

techniques was then employed for interpretation and analysis of data, in the context of actor/institution dynamics, towards findings and drawing conclusions. The grounded theory approach was finally used to establish the theoretical proposition of this research, based on the unpredictable and evolving nature of culture, its dynamics and relation to governance processes in West Africa.

3.2 Philosophy and Approaches to Research

Human beings perceive reality through a cultural force-field, which makes this cultural force-field evolutionary in nature rather than static, and thus presents the likelihood for a "paradigm shift" (Kuhn 1962/70a). Paradigms are generally perceived as models or patterns (Göktürk 2011). They are "universally recognised scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners" (Kuhn 1996:10). Paradigms are "novel" in nature and could be controversial, given its subjective nature, and depending on the schools of thought and the latitude it offers to extend its boundaries (Kuhn 1962/1970a: 187).

Guba and Lincoln (1994:105) defined various competing paradigms considered as paradigms of choice in informing and guiding inquiry, especially qualitative inquiry. These include positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and related ideological positions; and constructivism. Each of these paradigms could be considered "as the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways" (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 105); ontology referring to the form and nature of reality, while epistemology, which relates to knowledge, refers to the relationship between the "knower or would-be knower and what can be known" (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 108).

Of major essence to this study, however, was the need to adopt an appropriate and acceptable paradigm to guide the research, notwithstanding the probability of a paradigm shift (Kuhn 1962/70a) or the idea that beliefs are basic and must be accepted simply on faith as there is no way to establish their ultimate truthfulness (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 107). And as mentioned in previous sections, the critical theory proved most relevant taking into consideration its contentious, evolutionary and transformational attributes, and thus paving way for exploring probable solutions to the research problem.

This approach to the research thus provided the latitude for an exploratory or qualitative research into possible influences of security culture in the governance of the security sector. This made it possible to discover, disprove and reinforce new ideas, beliefs or widely held views on the security reform and governance concept, and its acceptability or otherwise in effectively meeting security needs of the people in the two country case studies of choice, i.e. Ghana and Nigeria, and beyond.

Further details are given below for the choice of the critical theory among the others identified.

3.2.1 *Critical Theory*

The contributions of Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcus known, among others, as proponents of the critical theory in the early 1920s, are widely recognised (Held 1980; Cox 1981; Hoffman 1987; Buzan 1991; Wyn Jones 1999; Kincheloe and McLaren 2002). The Frankfurt School, which these renowned academics belonged to, attempted the revival of socialist ideals in a rapidly expanding capitalist world, prior to and during the during the Cold War, by espousing notions of emancipation, enlightenment and egalitarianism out of which derived the critical theory. The critical theory is an offshoot of the Marxist tradition which aims at social transformation and emancipation through critique (Fierke 2009). It formed a larger part of the

post-positivist thinking and ideology which led to development of critical security studies started by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde of the Copenhagen School (Mc Sweeney 1996: 81-93) and later reinforced by Booth (2005), Wyn Jones (1999) and Krause and Williams (1997) of the Aberystwyth School.

This theory has gained significance, particularly in the area of qualitative research, given its attribute of questioning existing views, perceptions or ideologies, and giving interpretations based on evolving political, security, social, economic and even cultural dynamics related to human activities and endeavours. This comes in handy with the authoritarian and bureaucratic security culture attributes and practices in Africa inherited from its colonial past, and with ongoing efforts to consolidate an evolving democratic security culture through security sector governance as part of security sector reform efforts.

Critical theorists sought to develop a critical perspective in the discussion of all social practices (Held 1980: 16). They also have a similar aim of laying the "foundation for an exploration, in an interdisciplinary research context, of questions concerning the conditions which make possible the reproduction and transformation of society, the meaning of culture, and the relation between the individual, society and nature" (Held 1980: 16). In all these, attempts on the security front were made by Buzan et al (1998) to reconceptualise security with regard to primary actors in international relations, security referents, securitisation of issues and issues of survival. While doing all these with Eurocentric undertones, Aberystwyth School focused more on reinforcing the human security component by shifting emphasis from the international relations realist angles of power, war and conflict to more of world security with focus on the civil society actors' security needs and concerns (Diskaya 2013).

While the thesis leans much more towards the Aberystwyth School of thinking, it seeks to go a step beyond that in order not to totally neglect the essential role of capacitating the state

democratically to still retain monopoly over the use of force, as eroding this attribute in recent past has led to several civil wars and conflicts to the detriment of society. The emphasis on democracy here is to judiciously respond to security threats in a consultative and responsible manner, while respecting principles of transparency, accountability and civilian oversight over security forces. It would equally seek to progressively contextualise SSR/SSG practices within a contextual hybrid security setting – i.e. employing positive ideals of both informal/traditional and modern/formal security norms and practices – while avoiding a Eurocentric or translational hybrid approach of transferring purely western norms, values and practices which may not be suitable and sustainable. This approach would be situated within the social democracy context for the progressive change or transformation required within the security sector in the African continent.

The major attribute of this critical theory, therefore, rests on the fact that it retains its ability to disrupt and challenge the status quo (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002: 87). The critical theory tradition is also always changing and evolving (Held 1980: 182). This attribute of the theory creates the space for revisiting existing paradigms, and using discursive, translational (Barrinha and Rosa 2013: 101-115) or hermeneutical approaches to add value or make inferences from data gathered or observations made. This adaptive approach facilitates qualitative research relating, specifically, to human activities, and which may be both predictable and unpredictable. But essentially, critical theorists are both concerned with interpretation and transformation (Held 1980: 15) which remained most relevant to this thesis.

This paradigm, in an attempt at answering the research question, provided the avenue for interrogating and interpreting the two variables of security culture and security governance, its interrelatedness, complexity, and possibilities of exploring transformation in the sector given several years of attempt at transforming security sectors, particularly in Africa, without much

success. The focus has mainly being on 'hard' reforms of restructuring institutions, equipping security forces and building their capacities, management of the sector and general security oversight responsibilities, without much focus on the 'soft' reforms which rests mainly on security culture entailing the upholding of positively shared security norms, values and principles which inform behavioural and attitudinal changes for the needed transformation required in the sector. The strength of this paradigm lies in its critical and interrogative attributes which make it possible for making inferences along the lines of change in the areas of acceptance of the concept of SSR/SSG and making it more effective in terms of security responses as opposed to its current status in West Africa and beyond.

Hermeneutics, which constitutes a critical element of critical theory, facilitated the interpretation of data and making sense of what has been observed in a way that communicates understanding (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002: 96-97). It entails the study of meaning and interpretation of historical texts (Mack 2010). The centrality of hermeneutics to the critical hermeneutical tradition makes the theorists contend that perception itself is an act of interpretation (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002: 97). In addition, the idea of pristine interpretation is non-existent, while discursive approaches to data interpretation cannot claim a privileged position for the production of authoritative knowledge. Analysis takes place within the boundaries and blinders (Kincheloe and McLaren 2002: 97). Reality, therefore, cannot be grasped from a single point of view (Held 1980: 204).

This notwithstanding critical theory lends itself to criticisms as the possibility exists to always question anything and everything, including widely acceptable and crystalised ideals, whether positive or negative, explore challenges and seek options to improve and bring about change. Those in the positivist tradition have criticised this theory for its subjectiveness, bias and theory-laden nature based on making interpretation, inferences and induction. But this, from the

epistemological point of view, also makes possible the reinforcement of critical security studies geared towards meeting the ever evolving rather than stagnant security needs of both state and non-state actors. This theory has also brought enlightenment through its emancipatory approach to critiquing both socialist and capitalist or liberal ideals with emphasis on social advancement as the end goal.

3.2.2 *Constructivism*

Constructivism, which is also referred to as interpretivism, connotes the idea of constructing one's own views, perception or mental image of what reality is. It has its intellectual roots in critical theory (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 259). Human beings' perception and interpretation of existence or reality forms a central theme of this paradigm. From the ontological and epistemological dimensions, constructivism is seen as the construction of social reality and the social construction of knowledge respectively (Guzzini 2000: 160).

Constructivists believe in the existence of a phenomenal world which is external to thought, but it opposes the idea that a phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of knowledge independent of discursive practices (Guzzini 2000: 159). The construction of social reality through knowledge is not entirely internal to discourse, but socially constituted through practice (Guzzini 2000: 160; Bourdieu, 1980: 87).

Constructivism relates mainly to human behaviour which is very unpredictable, evolving and subject to change. As a result, this paradigm seeks mainly to understand or comprehend these social phenomena. As Cohen et al (2007: 19) and Mack (2010: 8) rightly put it, scientists in the context of the constructive or interpretivist paradigm seek to "understand, explain, and demystify social reality through the eyes of different participants". The attribute of this paradigm, therefore, contrasts sharply with that of a positivist intention of seeking to explain an objective reality. In this particular context, learners construct their own meaning, build on prior knowledge

through new learning or discoveries, enhance learning by social interaction, and improve knowledge through 'authentic' tasks (Cooperstein and Kocevar-Weidinger 2004: 141).

The constructivist paradigm is also heavily influenced by hermeneutics, as in the case of critical theory and phenomenology (Mack 2010: 7). Hermeneutics and phenomenology – which advocates for a consideration of human beings' subjective interpretations and perception of the world as the starting point in understanding social phenomena (Mack 2010: 7; Ernest 1994: 25) – facilitate the understanding of social phenomena. Hence the systems of meaning, in this case, define how actors interpret their material environment (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 266). The interpretations made are based on a shared system of codes and symbols, languages and social practices (Guzzini 2000: 160). Constructivists also depend on induction or making of inferences in the interpretation of social reality. In doing this, however, action precedes observation (Cooperstein and KocevarWeidinger 2004: 141). In other words, experiential knowledge or activity leads to the formulation of concepts rather than concepts leading to the activity (Cooperstein and Kocevar Weidinger 2004: 141).

So while constructivists essentially seek to explain, shed more light on issues, construct their mental image and build on prior knowledge, critical theorists question the status quo and pursue changes towards transformation for the benefit of all actors. In addition, constructivism having its intellectual roots in critical theory, with commonalities in approaches, informed the choice of critical theory as the most preferred paradigm for the study.

3.2.3 *The Post-Positivist Paradigm*

The post-positivist school of thought transcends that of its predecessor, the positivist, critiquing the nature of observed reality from the positivist's point of view. Epistemologically, what is observed and the one doing the observation are not necessarily independent of each other, as the knowledge and values of the researcher has a tendency to influence that which is being

researched or observed. In other words, the observed reality is not all there is, as the researcher can reach behind it and reveal more fundamental layers (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 18). More importantly, all that is being observed is not construed as the absolute fact but is fallible and, as a result, all theory is revisable (Trochim 2006). Emphasis is, therefore, placed on triangulation, based on series or multiple measures and observations in order to arrive at the proposed reality, which in itself may be subject to error.

The notion of bias, thus, plays a key role in the post-positivist position as they also believe that all observations made are theory laden, and that scientists are inherently biased by their cultural experiences and world views among other things (Trochim 2006). Hence for positivists and post-positivists, emphasis on the 'objective truth' is paramount, but the notion of bias and making conjectures in arriving at the reality becomes a major point of departure. Theory, for post-positivists, is one step removed from reality, as it is largely arrived at through induction (Waltz 1997: 913).

The post-positivist stance thus acknowledges the role of bias in scientific inquiry, and proposes triangulation as a means of establishing objective reality. Hence, while this paradigm highlights cultural experiences and world view of events as having the tendency to cause bias in findings, it still makes a case for objective reality which could be contested at all times. The notion of triangulation, however, remained relevant to this study, given that data gathered from respective actors within the security sector helped establish certain facts and corroborated inductions or inferences made from the research.

3.2.4 *The Positivist Paradigm*

Positivism, as the French philosopher August Comte puts it, is driven by the motto, *Love, Order, and Progress*. The primary object of positivism is twofold: "to generalise scientific conceptions, and to systematise the art of social life" (Lenzer 1998: 317-318). Positivism is

mainly based on positive science which may deal either with objects themselves as they exist or with separate phenomena that the objects exhibit (Lenzer 330).

Its epistemological underpinnings reflect the 'knower' or 'would be knower' being independent of the phenomenon being investigated, as both are independent of each other. Emphasis on cause and effect takes preeminence (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 109-110). In essence, the positivist believes that reality can be apprehended directly without benefit or recourse to theory (Waltz 1997: 913). Thus, reality is what is observed.

Critics of this paradigm, nevertheless consider it as both reductionist and deterministic (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 109; Bernstein 1988; Hesse 1980; Reason and Rowan 1981). This conclusive and/or absolute perceptions of what exists, guided by natural laws and limited to what can be observed in reality, underscore its pejorative intent in a world of paradigms (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 105), and thus would not be conducive to this research.

Adopting this positivist stance for the research would have posed some challenges given that the inquiry undertaken in the areas of security culture and security governance were not issues to be construed as objective or falsifiable, based on which deductions could be made. More importantly, social activities or phenomena are largely subjective and dependent on the interpretation given by the researcher or the 'knower'. The emphasis is, therefore, not necessarily on cause and effect (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 109-110).

The above analysis of the most preferred paradigm of choice is summarised in the diagrammatic representation below.

Figure 3.1

Diagram Demonstrating Underlying Philosophical Assumptions on Qualitative Research and the Relevant Approach Employed for the Study



Source: Adapted from Thomas, P.Y., PhD Dissertation, 2010

The choice of the critical theorist paradigm, highlighted in the figure above, helped establish the following: "what is to be observed and scrutinised; the kind of questions that are supposed to be asked and probed for answers in relation to this subject; how these questions are to be structured; how the results of scientific investigations should be interpreted; how an experiment is to be conducted, and what equipment is available to conduct the experiment" (Kuhn 1996:10).

The interplay of security culture and governance of the security sector presented possibilities of demystifying the complexity of the security sector reform and governance concepts, facilitated probabilities for its acceptance, and created room for effective responses to security needs of the state and people of Ghana and Nigeria and, to a larger extent, the West African region.

3.3 Research Methodology

Many varied approaches are adopted in undertaking research, based on the philosophical underpinnings and the methodology to be employed. Crotty (1998) considers a research methodology as a strategy or plan of action that shapes choices and use of particular methods,

and in turn links them to desired outcomes. Research methodology could also be considered as a way of systematically solving a research problem (Kothari 2004: 4). The methodological process essentially covers the epistemological aspect of the research, laying foundations for research approaches and methods or techniques required for observation, collection and interpretation of data for desired outcomes. In its simplest form, therefore, a research methodology involves the systematic steps taken to solve a research problem, based on a defined logic (Saunders et al 2009: 5).

Systematic research encompasses specific methods for data collection, deliberation on the significance of the results obtained, and an explanation of any limitations experienced. The primary focus of research should be to increase knowledge of a particular topic in order to help solve relevant problems (Saunders et al 1997:1).

The collection or gathering of data, its analysis and findings are pertinent in ensuring that observations made are credible and provide specific or general answers to the research question. This would depend on choosing the appropriate method for data collection and analysis.

Three major types of research remain pertinent to this study. These are the quantitative, qualitative and mixed-method approaches.

3.3.1 *Quantitative Research*

Quantitative research relates to undertaking scientific-based research that uses numbers and statistical method, as it tends to be based on numerical measurements of specific aspects of phenomena; abstracts from particular instances to seek general description or test causal hypotheses; and seeks measures and analyses that are easily replicable by other researchers (Thomas 2003: 2; King et al 1994: 3-4). This type of research is generally associated with the positivist/post-positivist paradigm, and usually involves collecting and converting data into numerical form for statistical calculations and drawing conclusions. It is guided by one or more

hypotheses, with predictions about possible relationships between variables being investigated (Alzheimer Europe 2013).

The emphasis for this kind of research is based more on explanation and prediction, which facilitates the generalisation of findings to other people and places (Thomas 2003: 2; Glesene and Peshkin 1992: 6). It focuses on measurement and analysis of causal relationships between variables and not processes (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 8).

Objectivity is of utmost concern as the researcher tends to observe and measure data without any biases or personal involvement with the research subject (Thomas 2003: 2; Glesene and Peshkin 1992: 6). Great care is taken to avoid one's own presence, behaviour or attitude affecting the results of the research, while methods and conclusions of a study are critically examined for any possible biases (Alzheimer Europe 2013).

The qualitative nature of this research which relates mainly to social reality, cultural norms and values, and multiple relations and interaction at different levels of the social strata would not, therefore, make it possible to use this quantitative approach.

3.3.2 *Qualitative Research*

Qualitative research, as the name implies, relates to observing and making meaning of an inherent feature of a phenomenon relating mainly to social reality or behavioural patterns of an individual or a group. This type of research is considered as the world of lived experience where individual belief and action intersect with culture (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: 2).

The qualitative method of research, also seen as multi-method in focus, involves "an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter", laying emphasis on studying things in their natural settings and attempting to make sense of them, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them (Thomas 2003: 1). They use any and all of the research strategies, including case studies, ethnography, phenomenology, grounded theory, biographical,

historical, participatory and clinical research strategies (Denzin and Lincoln 2011: xii). This inquiry is largely based on the collection of a variety of empirical materials gathered through case studies, personal experience, introspection, life story, interviews, among others, that describes routine and problematic moments and meanings in people's lives (Thomas 2003: 2; Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 2).

This approach to research is usually associated with the critical theory or social constructivist paradigm which seeks for social change and transformation or socially constructed nature of reality (Walker 2015). It tends to be inductive in nature, by depending on data collected to develop a theory or look for a pattern of meaning from this data. It adopts the bottom-up approach to research which facilitate making inferences. In essence, qualitative research tends to focus on one or a small number of cases, use intensive interviews or depth analysis of historical materials, adopting discursive methods, and concerned with a rounded or comprehensive account of some event or unit (King et al 1994: 4).

This method was, largely, suitable for this study as it makes it easier to collect, analyse, interpret and critique socially complex and sophisticated data related specifically to issues of identity, norms, values and behaviour of individuals and groups, which could be very unpredictable.

3.3.3 *Mixed-Method Research*

As mentioned earlier, both quantitative and qualitative research methods are guided by a combination of positivist and post-positivist paradigms (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 3; Guba and Lincoln 1994). These two contending paradigms, with their inherent tension captured as "wars" (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 3; Datta 1994: 53-70; Gage 1989: 4-10; Guba and Lincoln 1994: 105-117; Rossi 1994: 23-36), made the application of both research types seemed rather impossible. Notwithstanding, the "pacifist", also referred to as the "pragmatists", have held the

view that both qualitative and quantitative research methods are indeed compatible rather than antagonistic (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 4-5).

In effect, both qualitative and quantitative research methods can be used effectively in same research project. Triangulation in this context is of essence in ensuring that both approaches complement each other in attaining the research objectives and logic. In doing this, however, emphasis is or may be placed on one of the methods, based on convictions, training and the nature of problems studied (Thomas 2003: 7; Strauss and Corbin 1990: 18).

Beyond the differences, in terms of paradigms and strengths and weaknesses of the qualitative and quantitative methods to the research, pragmatists hold the view that the two methods are alike in the fundamental values on which they are founded, including "beliefs in the value-ladenness of inquiry, belief that reality is multiple and constructed, [and] belief in the fallibility of knowledge" (Thomas 2003: 7; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998: 13).

More importantly, in adopting the mixed-method for research, emphasis is usually placed on whether the method chosen can yield convincing answers to the questions that the investigation is intended to settle (Thomas 2003: 7). It equally circumvents the philosophical and paradigmatic boundaries, making it possible for the combination of research methods in search of explanation, understanding or solutions to research problems.

The mixed-method approach, from the above, looks feasible for this research in combining the quantitative and qualitative approaches to research, where hypotheses, theories and sampling techniques based on numbers could be employed. Nonetheless, emphasis on the chosen research question relates more to the qualitative research approach than that of the quantitative.

Table 3.1
Evaluation of Paradigms for Research

Paradigm	Ontological Position	Epistemological Position	Research Type
Positivism	Objective, factual, absolute, independent	Objective, probable, falsifiable, deduction	Quantitative
Post-Positivism	Objective, fallible, dependent, bias, theory-laden	Objective, probable, falsifiable, deduction/induction	Quantitative Qualitative
Critical Theory	Subjective, fallible, interdependent, theory-laden	Social construction, bias and subject to change, induction	Qualitative Quantitative
Constructivism	Subjective, fallible, interdependent, theory-laden	Social construction, bias and based on interpretation, induction	Qualitative Quantitative

Source: Author, 2019

Table 1 above explains the ontological and epistemological approaches to research and the related research types or methods that correspond with these philosophical approaches. As demonstrated in the table above, in the exception of the positivist stance on the ontology and epistemology of inquiry which is objective, factual, independent, repetitive, deductive and falsifiable, those of the post-positivist, critical theorists and constructivist believe in the bias, fallibility and theory-laden nature of inquiry. The post-positivists, like the positivists, however believe in an objective reality, though not independent of the researcher, and the possibilities of making deductions.

The critical theorists thus see linkages or interdependence between the reality (the object) and the researcher (subject) where observations made, based on induction, stem largely from actions and subjective interpretation, in contrast with that of positivists whose observation, based on deductions, inform established facts. Positivists, therefore, apply the specific to the general case, while critical theorists, like the constructivists, apply the general to the specific.

This study, given its qualitative nature, therefore adopted the critical theorist research paradigm as the best suited philosophical approach to the study given its socio-cultural interrogative and security dimensions.

3.3.4 *Research Strategy: Comparative Case Study Method*

The exploratory nature of the research requires using the comparative case study method as the main research strategy for data collection, analysis and reporting as it also presents the option to be complemented by other research methods like interviews, questionnaires, sampling and focus group discussion. Yin (2009a:18) defines a case study as "an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon… set within its real-world context – especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident". Of critical importance to this research strategy is its fundamental assumption that an understanding of the case under consideration is contingent upon the examination of the context and other complex conditions related to the case(s) (Yin: 2012:4).

The comparison undertaken in the phenomena under investigation helped in two fundamental ways. The first, which encapsulates more of the traditional approach to cases, engages the compare and contrast logic in bringing out similarities and differences for lessons learned purposes, while the second focused more on the heuristic or discovery aspects of evolving phenomena through the tracing logic towards solving the research problem (Bartlett & Vavrus 2017: 6). The traditional approach is seen as more static, confined and deterministic within its context, while the comparative case study approach, in addition, gives more attention to complex issues including culture, context, space, place and even comparison within three axes which include the horizontal, vertical and transversal (Bartlett & Vavrus 2017: 14-15). It straddles state, sub-state and supranational spheres as well as entities and non-entities based on the process orientation or approach in which the real-world context is perceived in terms of

people, situations, events and the processes that connect these elements (Bartlett & Vavrus 2017: 8; Maxwell 2013: 29).

The comparative case study method made it easy to gather data, facilitate analysis and contribute largely towards solving the research problem as it examines security culture influences on security sector governance within its real-world context in the two different West African countries of Ghana and Nigeria (Guest et al 2013: 14). It also afforded the opportunity to undertake an in-depth study of both state and sub-state actors, while considering supranational perspectives within the security sector in the different contexts.

Additionally, it favours data collection within natural settings, as compared to relying on "derived" data (Bromley 1986: 23; Yin 2012: 5). This approach contributes to knowledge about individuals, groups, organisations, social, political and related phenomena (Yin 2009: 4). This also conforms to the critical theorist's approach to observing, interpreting and generating data as it "seeks to disrupt dichotomies, static categories, and taken-for-granted notions of what is going on" towards change and transformation (Bartlett & Vavrus 2017:10 in Heath & Street 2008).

The comparative case study research, despite it practical and explorative nature, does have challenges. This method did not attain widespread recognition as a method of choice in the past, but that of a last resort, given its exploratory or heuristic nature, and the tendency to perceive it as a prelude - at the exploratory phase in data collection - for other methods of inquiry as mentioned earlier. It equally has a tendency of being construed as lacking the rigour, the trust and credibility owing to its subjective nature and the perception held that the researcher employs it to find what he or she intends to (Yin 2012: 5). It is also quite complicated and requires a lot of tact and expertise in the research planning, design, data collection, analysis and reporting or triangulation of findings.

That said, the strength in employing this method of research lies in the fact that it provided the chance to examine issues across various fields of discipline, and triangulate findings based on the multiple cases adopted. The emphasis here is not on objective findings towards predictable actions, but to gain knowledge and understanding of complex unpredictable human behaviour, and find ways of improving on this dynamics. And as a means of validation, it sought to push the fronts of perceived reality in order to accommodate and reflect contemporary or evolving trends in meeting the needs of actors and stakeholders in the security sector reform and governance field.

In a nutshell, the comparative case study strategy or method afforded the opportunity to understand the behaviour of actors in the security sector and their approach to security governance, informed by their respective cultures. Additionally, the context, perception and dynamics of the actors and the sector was brought under closer scrutiny in order to understand complex relations and interactions within the sector, as well as make possible inferences towards a more acceptable and enhanced security governance of the sector.

Figure 3.2

Comparative Case Study Research Design and Processes



Source: Adapted from Yin, R.K. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Sage Publications, Fourth Edition, Vol. 5, p.1, 2009.

Figure 3.2 above depicts a comparative case study research undertaken in a linear but iterative way. This research method was planned and designed to facilitate the data collected in the field, complemented by other forms of data collection, including interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions, Information was gathered, based on this approach, and analysed and shared as a result of findings and patterns that emerged from the field, while the other accompanying research methods facilitated triangulation and validity of research findings based on data collected. The comparative analysis was guided by taking a look at challenges posed by issues of complexity, acceptance and effectiveness of SSR/SSG and how progressive security culture indicators or elements circumvented or mitigated these challenges towards enhancing SSR/SSG in both countries.

3.4 Research Methods

Research methods relate basically to techniques or tools chosen to facilitate the acquisition of data from both primary and secondary sources. The tools employed for data collection in this study included sampling, interviews, questionnaires, focused group discussions and desk research.

3.4.1 *Sampling*

Sampling, as a research act, process or technique, entails the selection or choice of a suitable subset or part of a collective whole or of a population to be studied, and based on which inferences are made from the findings of the characteristics of the subset studied to represent the larger population (Mungo Fridah 2002: 1). The sampling types used for this qualitative research were chosen to afford flexibility and a pragmatic approach in relation to sample type and size, as well as being able to blend with other research techniques for data collection (Marshall 1996:

524). These are the purposive or judgmental, the stratified and the snowball samples (Crossman 2014).

The purposive or judgmental sample makes possible the selection of a subset of a population based on the knowledge of that population and the purpose of the study (Crossman 2014). The sample size chosen, thus, comprised three major categories of actors in the security sector. These are members of the executive and legislative arms of government, and civil society. Under the executive arm, specific attention was paid to government officials in the relevant ministries in charge of the security of the state and its people. The specific ministries were those of the interior and defence. The security agencies, including the military and the police, also fall under the executive as public service institutions.

Under the legislative arm, select members of parliament serving on the defence and security committees formed part of the sample size while those within civil society comprised members of some security and governance-related non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in addition to some academicians and security experts. Some traditional leaders in the Southern and Northern sectors of both countries were also sampled, through interviews and focused group discussions where possible.

The stratified nature of the actors involved in this sample size necessitated a further division of the entire sample population into subgroups or strata, in order to make it possible to select samples within the specific subgroups (Mungo Fridah 2002: 8; Crossman 2014). Majority of these actors were identified based on institutional affiliation, thereby necessitating the use of the purposive sample type. There were, however, some other essential actors to this research who were not necessarily known, like civil society actors engaged in the fight against corruption as well as some vigilante actors, though falling in the groups identified above. As a result, the snowball sampling method was adopted to reach actors that were not known and difficult to

locate, particularly in the northern and southern parts of Nigeria where this study was undertaken.

These individuals or groups were identified based on recommendations from persons or respondents interviewed, in order to ensure a fairly exhaustive list of the sample size. Sampling errors were not ruled out given the specific types of sampling employed for the study, and the tendency of bias, lack of adequate resources to reach the entire population size in the southern and northern sectors of Ghana and Nigeria, and inadequate information in some cases given the sensitive, confidential and covert nature of security issues. Another major flaw encountered in the course of the research, based on gender factors, was the low representation of women in the population sample size. This had to do specifically with two major factors. The first was the limited number of women directly involved in SSR/SSG activities in the security sector with the requisite knowledge or expertise, while the second had to do with the unavailability of those identified to be interviewed given other engagements at the time. Notwithstanding, the women representation in the focus group sessions was quite impressive and made up for those with expertise in the sector but were unable to be interviewed. The chosen sampling types, to a large extent, facilitated the coverage of core and remote actors in the field of security governance and, as a result, provided credible basis for adequate analysis and triangulation of findings towards induction and inference.

3.4.2 *Interviews*

Interviews are intended to facilitate in-depth interaction with individuals/groups for observation and the collection of detailed information on a subject. Interviews take the form of a conversation where the researcher undertakes in-depth probe to uncover new clues, explore new dimensions of a problem, and to ascertain a vivid, accurate and detailed accounts of personal experiences on a subject (Simkiss et al 2014: 201).

Three fundamental interview types were considered as options for this research. These are the structured, semi-structured and unstructured interview methods (Gill et al 2008: 291). The structured interview entails verbally administering predetermined questionnaires with no scope for follow-up questions. This method of interview only allows for limited participant responses to questions. It was, therefore, of little use to in-depth study or research in this regard (Gill et al 2008: 291).

Unstructured interview, on the other hand, follows no logical or structured questions, but are based on initial general questions which serve as a starting point for further questions. The questions asked are not necessarily pre-conceived, and this method is employed where significant depth of a subject is required, or in cases where virtually nothing is known about the subject under study (Gill et al 2008: 291).

The semi-structured interview comprises verbally administering several questions which may be predetermined or preconceived, but also allows for further follow up questions which provides the option for the interviewer or interviewee to diverge into other areas to provide more detail on a subject or topic under investigation. The flexibility of this method allows for further exploration and follow-up of issues for clarification purposes, as well as the gathering of more qualitative in-depth information or data for useful analysis (Gill et al 2008: 291). The semi-structured data collection method, thus, served as the most useful and appropriate interview method for this research. The advantages of in-depth interviews conducted were that issues were thoroughly probed, clarifications sought, and sensitive information obtained (Simkiss et al 2014: 201).

The interviews were conducted with relevant government and civil society actors, including security experts and traditional leaders within the epistemic communities of culture,

security and governance. This afforded the opportunity of getting more precise and credible data for the research.

The snow-balling approach was used, as mentioned earlier, in order to enable the researcher contact and engage with other relevant security actors who could have been possibly left out of the interviews. Community-based interviews, which focused on specific sampled individuals, mainly traditional leaders, within structured local/traditional security systems, were undertaken to ascertain the civilian perspective on culture and security sector governance processes. And as mentioned earlier, all appointments with the few ladies recommended, particularly in Nigeria, did not hold as they were engaged in other activities during the course of field research.

Hence in all, research and academic institutions like the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana and the University of Ghana, located at Legon, were visited to conduct interviews, in September 2015, with security experts and conduct desk research. Some members of the Select Committee on Defence and the Interior of the Parliament of Ghana were also interviewed to gain insight into oversight, transparency and accountability issues. A visit was also paid to the Ministry of the Interior that oversees many of the security agencies having responsibility over internal matters, including the police, immigration, customs, excise and preventive services, the prisons and fire service, to also conduct interviews.

Former and current heads of military, police and intelligence agencies and units within these agencies were interviewed to seek their professional views and insight on the subject. From the international community side, arrangements were made with the UNDP and the British Department for International Development (DfID). Civil Society Organisations, including the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), were also visited for research and

interviews. Visits were also paid to the northern and southern parts of Ghana to conduct focus group discussions among traditional and opinion leaders on endogenous security culture, mechanisms and practices.

In Nigeria, the field research undertaken was equally divided into two major regions of North and South, including the Federal Capitol Territory (FCT) in Abuja and selected communities in Ogun State next to Lagos State. Academic institutions were also visited including Libraries and Tai Solarin University of Education, located in Ijebu Ode, to lecture, interview and also gather materials while on the field research. On the executive side, most of the officials interviewed opted to remain anonymous but some were from the Office of the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, retired senior military officers, civil society groups including Trust Africa Nigeria, an official from the British High Commission located in Abuja, the FCT, and Traditional leaders mainly in the Ijebu Ode and Ijebu Itele districts of Ogun State.

A head of a vigilante group who opted to remain anonymous, given the nature of work he and his followers do also gave detailed accounts of their activities and collaboration with local government authorities and the police under the leadership and guidance of the traditional leaders in the respective communities.

3.4.3 *Questionnaires*

Questionnaires are considered as tools for collecting and recording information about a particular issue of interest (Corporate Research and Consultant Team). Burcu (2000: 2) identified two different types of questionnaires. These are the Mail and Self-Administered questionnaires. The Mail questionnaires are prepared questionnaires that are mailed to respondents, explaining the purpose and objectives of the questionnaire and the value to be derived from responses to the questions (Burcu 2000: 2). The Self-Administered questionnaires, on the other hand, are presented to the respondents by the researcher or a person so identified in an official capacity

(Burcu 2000: 2). The researcher explains the purpose of the questionnaire and leaves the respondent to respond to the questions. Completed questionnaires may be collected later or sent by the respondents. The advantage of this method lies in it being less bias, accurate sampling, possible high response rate and providing explanations for better clarity as compared to the self-administered questionnaire (Burcu 2000: 2).

The questionnaires to be administered could also be structured or unstructured. Structured questionnaires are usually associated with quantitative research which deals mainly with numbers, and which focuses, among others, on knowing how many of, how often about, and how satisfied is a researcher with an event or a phenomenon (Corporate Research and Consultant Team online). Structured questionnaires also go mainly with closed-ended questions, which are usually conclusive in approach, and limits respondents to a yes' or 'no' answer or alternatives being offered (Reja et al 2003: 161; Foddy 1993: 127). The unstructured questionnaires, on the other hand, are more exploratory in nature and are more associated with qualitative research which goes with open-ended questions. The open-ended questions give room for respondents to answer questions without any influence from the researcher (Reja et al 2003: 161; Foddy 1993: 127).

The open-ended questions were, thus, adopted in crafting the questionnaires and in facilitating a more in-depth or detailed responses to questions. This elicited responses related to behavioural patterns, personal experiences and opinions, beliefs and practices, as well as exploring new dimensions of the subject under research. Questionnaires were therefore designed to facilitate answers to questions by relevant actors who could not have the time to grant an interview, or prefer responding to questions through questionnaires particularly in Nigeria. It was also employed for data collection due to limited time and/or lack of adequate resources to cover a wider section of the populace within which the actors resided. These questionnaires were

designed with open-ended questions to allow flexible responses and gather detailed information for analysis.

General questions guided interviews and focused group discussions held to establish the existence, particularly, of endogenous security cultures and their positive or negative influence on governance of the security sector, but were equally nuanced to understand and capture the different contexts and dynamics in the different countries. Emphasis was placed on which indigenous values, norms and standards guided governance processes in addressing security threats or challenges in the communities, localities or the country under consideration, and how relationships were managed with regard to the interface between these different and varied cultures in addressing security needs in respective countries. Follow up questions also came up in various forms depending on responses and the need for further clarification or suggestion to address challenges.

Specific questions were also posed in both countries with regard to drafting national security policies to give a comprehensive framework to security in the national interest, agree on common and diverse threats to the people and the state, and define national strategies and implementation plans to address them.

3.4.4 *Focus Group Discussions*

Focus group is considered as a special type of group based on its purpose, size and composition, formed to assess needs, encourage interventions, explore or generate new or a range of ideas on a subject or research area (Simkiss et al 2014: 202-203). In this group, "collective conversations" are held with focus on collective activities (Liamputtong 2011: 3; Kamberelis and Dimitriadis 2008: 375; Kitzinger 2005: 56). Ideas gathered or generated from this group discussion could provide background information gathered for designing more structured questionnaires. A focus group generally comprises six to eight individuals sharing certain

characteristics that are relevant to an ongoing research. Focus group discussions are organised in order to obtain information on participants' beliefs and perceptions on a subject or topic of interest (Simkiss et al 2014:203; Gill et al 2008: 293).

Focus groups are considered to be appropriate for capturing and exploring the depth and nuances of opinions with respect to an issue; understanding differences in perspectives or opinions; understand factors that influence opinions or behaviour; and learn more about actors or participants by observing their interactions (Education, Training and Research (ETA) Associates 2014).

The focus group discussions were adopted to help gather more detailed information, clarify issues, refine observations made, contrast diverse views, as well as help triangulate research findings. These discussions were held mainly with traditional leaders in Ghana, including several queen mothers and women opinion leaders, who were very much open to this form of discussion in the northern and southern sectors of the region, including Sunyani in the Brong Ahafo Region and Abutia Kloe in the Volta Region, on what constitutes security, governance and probable positive cultural influences to enhance these concepts. This helped in getting different and diverse insights or perspectives within groups with similar backgrounds.

The situation was much different in Nigeria as the traditional leaders interviewed preferred being interviewed from their homes or palaces on one-on-one basis. The researcher was, however, accompanied by two academics from the university, a male and female, to facilitate interactions based on culture and protocols. They equally participated in discussions which contributed to enriching the data gathered.

Information gathered reinforced desk researches carried out and facilitated the collation and analysis of data. The epistemic community played a major role in the collection of data, as well as beneficiaries of security services.

3.5 Data Sources

With regard to the primary sources of data, official documents from government ministries were reviewed to gain insight into government policies and practices on security sector reform and governance processes, especially within the executive and legislative arms of government. Newspaper articles and available journals with first-hand information on the subject were also accessed.

Secondary sources of data were gathered from published or unpublished articles in various books, journals, newspapers, numerous libraries and bookshops in Ghana and Nigeria, and the internet among others. Again, other relevant actors, as mentioned above, with second-hand information and the grasp of cultural and security sector governance issues, were also interviewed or accessed for relevant information and collection of data. All these were complemented with desk research gathered from the internet, books and journal articles among other sources.

3.6 Triangulation

Triangulation in research plays an important role in establishing the validity or certainty of research findings, by confirming the accuracy of the situation reflected in the findings, and to the extent that these findings are evidence-based (Guion et al 2011). In essence, triangulation is considered as a method used in qualitative research to check and establish the validity of a study being conducted through the analysis of a research question from multiple perspectives (Guion et al 2011; Patton 2002).

The complex nature of security sector governance, reflected in multiple and diverse actors, varied cultural influences, the fusion of security cultures and its impact on decision-making processes as individuals and groups, require the collection of accurate or valid data in order to make the findings more credible. This necessitated using more than one research method to

investigate the research question, in order to enhance confidence in the findings (Bryman's 2004: 1-3; Denzin 1970). This, in effect, also minimised the uncertainty of the interpretations based on two or more independent measurement processes (Bryman 2004: 1; Webb et al 1966).

Two different types of triangulation were employed. These are data triangulation and methodological triangulation (Bryman 2004: 2; Denzin 1970). In the data triangulation approach, data was gathered through several sampling strategies already identified, covering different actors at different times in different social contexts (Bryman 2004: 2; Denzin 1970). Methodological triangulation, on the other hand entailed using the different data collection techniques including interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions to collect or gather data, in an attempt to establish some commonalities or variance.

In doing the triangulation, care was taken to avoid the tendency of hurriedly jumping to conclusion on findings, given that the points of convergence of the different methods or sampling strategies adopted in this research were not necessarily conclusive of a valid or credible data as some assertions were perceived to be flawed. Notwithstanding, and based on the qualitative approach adopted for the study, points of convergence, similarity of opinions or commonalities contributed to the identification of some key concepts for categorisation and codification. Differences in findings, however, provided options for further inquiry in ascertaining the root cause of the variance. That said, and based on the critical theorist approach to research and triangulation, findings based on security culture influences or non-influence on security sector reform and governance in Ghana and Nigeria respectively were not taken as the absolute truth.

3.7 Research Analysis

Research analysis basically “brings conceptual order to observed experience” (Daly 2007: 209). The analysis entails subjecting social reality to closer scrutiny in an attempt to "identify patterns and uniformities" which is considered as nomothetic (Daly 2007: 212; **C**rotty, 1998). On

other hand, research analysis is also undertaken to identify the uniqueness and variability of individual behaviour referred to as idiographic (Daly 2007: 212). So, while nomothetic relates more to the quantitative research methods, the idiographic deals more with the qualitative approach and case study method. This research, which focuses on different actors and varied cultural traits, perceptions and needs, thus, adopted the idiographic approach, with emphasis on trends, patterns, uniformities, uniqueness and variations in behaviour. This approach is, however, not mutually exclusive from that of the nomothetic as they complement each other in various ways.

In essence, the analysis phase of this research, which more or less covered all phases of the research work, transformed raw data gathered through the various research methods in the field into new knowledge based on findings generated. Hence reading, understanding and interpreting the data gathered formed an essential part of the research analysis based upon which what constitute social reality is inferred through the process of induction (Thorne 2000: 68-70). The process of induction relates mainly to generating ideas or using the ideational approach to data interpretation, based on which the meaning of a phenomenon could be uncovered or deconstructed (Thorne 2000: 68-70). In doing this, emphasis was placed more on why something happened rather than how it happened.

From the ontological, epistemological and theoretical perspectives, the analysis undertaken in this research was considered as constituting the critical component that bridges the gap between what is perceived as social reality and what is known or understood as such, based mainly on subjective interpretations (Mauthner and Doucet 2003: 415). In doing this, the data gathered in the field focused on the what, how and why of social experiences of security sector governance in both Ghana and Nigeria. This was intended to depict the nature of what exists, and further interpret how security cultural influences could make governance better or worse. This

facilitated inferences made with regard to the importance of culture and its potential influence on enhancing security sector governance amidst complexity and making security sector reform acceptable.

This was done through a combination of the perspectives or viewpoints of both the participants and the researcher known respectively as the emic and etic focus of induction (Scuhtt 2012: 322; Daly 2007: 212-213, Denzin & Lincoln 2003: 1-45; Fetterman 1998; Guest et al 2013: 11-12).

The issue of reflexivity was, as a result, given prominence based on interpretations made from "a particular background and set of values [of the researcher] and not simply based on the situation itself" (Scuhtt 2012: 333; Altheide and Johnson 1994: 485-499). This underscores the assertion that "Researchers are only human, after all, and must rely on their own senses and process all information through their minds" (Scuhtt 2012: 332-333; Altheide and Johnson 1994). Reflexivity, in this regard, was essential for drawing meaningful or qualitative conclusions for the research. In doing this, the positive values and norms being practiced in the security sector were reinforced, while those necessitating a relook and change in approach were equally given prominence.

Some analytical strategies were adopted in the course of analysis, including the constant comparative analysis - which involves the comparison of similar or different data gathered towards conceptualisation (Thorne 2000); narrative analysis - which "displays the goals and intentions of human actors; it makes individuals, cultures, societies, and historical epochs comprehensible as wholes" (Schutt 2012: 339); and discourse analysis – which emphasises uncovering societal influences underlying behavioural and thought patterns (Thorne 2000).

These analytic strategies were adopted to facilitate the coding, categorisation, themes or concepts and probable theories (Schutt 2012: 328). Put differently, content analysis of data

gathered through interviews, questionnaires and focus group discussions involved coding and classification of data, or categorising and indexing, with the aim to making sense of the data collected, and highlighting the important features, messages or findings that emerged (University of Surrey online).

The security sector comprises different actors and institutions with diverse roles and responsibilities informed by different beliefs and practices. It is also multi-sectoral as it involves different ministries, some of which are not core security institutions but, playing very important and relevant roles. Hence an analysis of this sector was undertaken in the context of a security system in which the actors were mapped out in relation to the other, by looking at how relations between their beliefs and practices can help positively impact an enhanced and effective governance within a hybrid context (Stroh 2015: 1-91; Meadows 2009: 1-202).

With regard to security cultural influences – aimed at minimisation of the complexity and clarification of the SSR/SSG concept, the focus was on exploring avenues for imbibing or adopting the right security culture values and attitudes, and generally undertaking sensitisation on the security terrain towards acceptance and improved governance of the sector. Hence security culture provided a general framework for analysis. This made possible a theoretical proposition on demystification of a complex security sector, and engendering recognition and acceptance of reform, as well as change and transformation towards enhanced SSG in countries in transition in West Africa and beyond.

In a nutshell, the research analysis began right from the selection of a research topic through the data collection and analysis phases to writing the research report.

3.8 Theoretical Proposition

This research made the proposition that shared norms and values on safety, protection and freedom from fear, influence the acceptance and commitment towards security sector reform and

governance efforts, hence imbibing the appropriate security cultural values, norms and practices by both state and sub-state actor groups, would ensure the needed change and transformation towards successful SSR/SSG processes in West Africa.

3.9 Justification of Methodology

Planning and designing this research required careful selection and application of research approaches, strategies and methods to facilitate appropriate data collection, analysis and validation of findings. This informed the choice of the research methodology above in conducting this qualitative research through the comparative case study strategy in Ghana and Nigeria. Several reasons accounted for this choice.

Firstly, the research being undertaken is largely exploratory in nature, and to an extent descriptive or narrative. Hence adopting a quantitative or mixed-method approach to guide the research design and methodology in the collection and interpretation of data, would not totally serve the purpose of subjecting security cultural norms, values, behaviour and attitudes to adequate scrutiny. More importantly, some level of subjectivity or bias from the researcher was required in the interpretation of data, as well as interdependence between the researcher and the social reality or phenomena investigated. These facilitated finding an appropriate solution to the research problem.

Secondly, the research, as mentioned above, was heavily dependent on values, norms and behavioural patterns of the different state and sub-state actors within the security sector. The culture/security culture of these actors were predictable in some cases, based on institutional arrangements and dynamics, but also unpredictable in some cases given cultural differences, the tendency to adopt hybrid forms of culture, evolving security and governance dynamics, as well as the ideational, ethnographic and phenomenological tendencies inherent in these norms, values

and decision-making processes. These characteristics required adopting a qualitative approach to the research.

Thirdly, this research attempts to understand and explain why certain phenomena exist the way they are, including norms, values and behavioural patterns. This provided the basis for drawing lessons and proposing probable changes, based on inferences and inductions, towards transforming the security sector. Doing this also required adopting not only a qualitative approach to the research, but also using the comparative case study method for analysis. This made it easy to, not only compare and contrast but also, facilitate the tracing logic in understanding developments in their real-world context. Based on this, major patterns emerged and served as a basis for theorising the future conduct of enhanced security sector governance in transitional and other societies in West Africa. The qualitative approach equally proved useful in highlighting untapped potentials within the cultural and traditional settings of indigenous sub-state actors in various communities, and its positive impact on the security sector as a whole in respective countries.

Last but not least, the theories adopted for analysis in this research are meant to provide adequate framework for critiquing the status quo and conducting thorough and systemic analysis of the security sector, its actors and governance processes towards positive change and transformation. In effect, the qualitative research method was employed in this inquiry, based on highly unpredictable social phenomena, which also necessitated a subjective and biased interpretation of social reality, leading to possible inferences and inductive conclusions. This qualitative approach facilitated the interpretivist approach to the data collection, precisely because issues related to culture are dynamic and ethnological in nature, and thus requires flexible qualitative methods. The identification of actors and sampling of data might have some

quantitative attributes in ensuring adequate sampling and data collection. Notwithstanding, the emphasis was more on the qualitative than the quantitative or mixed-method of research.

3.10 Research Ethics

Ethics in research is considered largely as established norms for conduct which helps in distinguishing acceptable behaviour from the unacceptable. Put differently, ethics could also be considered as a method, procedure or perspective that guides decision-making on how to act, and for analysing complex problems and issues (Resnik 2011). Maintaining high ethical standards in research is essential in ensuring that studies undertaken follow acceptable rules and regulations, while respecting the rights of privacy and confidentiality of other researchers, officials and participants, among others, to be engaged in the process (Smith 2003: 56).

Determining what is acceptable and unacceptable, or right and wrong, is usually subject to all manner of controversies or disputes as decisions to be made in this regard could be largely subjective or interpreted differently in relation to differences in values and individual life experiences. Upholding the right ethical standards in research is necessary for the protection of intellectual property rights, ensuring the credibility of research, protect sources and confidentiality of facts, and avoid falsifying facts, misrepresentation of data and error in research which could have dire consequences (Resnik 2011: 2).

Hence in undertaking this research, ethical principles and requirements in the fields of academia, human rights and general social responsibility were taken into consideration in ensuring an accurate, credible and acceptable gathering and generation of data towards useful analysis and findings in meeting the objective and rationale of the research. Approval was sought from the academic institution enrolled in on the basis of meeting ethical standards before conducting the research. This process outlined specific requirements which were followed in the field in gathering data based on approved ethical standards. Some of these ethical principles

include honesty, objectivity, integrity, openness, respect for intellectual property, confidentiality, and non-discrimination among others (Resnik 2011:2-4.).

The application of these principles proved useful and formed the basis for conducting a credible, trustworthy and acceptable research which took cognisance of respect of actors engaged in the field, as well as preceding works done in this research area. Indeed, the security sector does not only engage various actors, but predisposes these actors to varied forms of high security risks. Hence the protection of sources of information and human rights, ensuring confidentiality, as well as the respect of different cultural norms, values, belief systems, and opinions or perspectives proved vital in acquiring open, frank, objective and useful data for the research.

3.11 Limitations

The study faced some limitations given the sensitive nature of issues on security, culture and governance. The sensitive nature of data required for the thesis partly hindered collection of data, owing to some security personnel, diplomatic officials and international partners refusing or not willing to divulge information. Request for confidentiality by some research participants who provided very useful and relevant information limited the provision of data. Professional networks within the security agencies and institutions, however, provided some way out for the collection of data, while respecting ethical considerations surrounding gatekeeping (Bound 2012). Gender representation in the security sector was also quite limited and in cases where contacts were made for interviews for those identified in the field, particularly in Nigeria, they were unavailable for diverse reasons. This might have been purely co-incidental, given many different engagements ongoing at the time the study was conducted. This notwithstanding, the snow-balling approach to data collection proved useful.

The security situation, particularly in the middle belt and north-eastern part of Nigeria continues to deteriorate, and is generally in a state of flux, given the activities of the terrorist

group 'Boko Haram', and the farmer-herder disputes across the country. This posed difficulties for field work owing to the risk involved in visiting these areas.

Limited resources equally hindered a wide coverage and focus of the field work. Sampling and collection of data was, thus, restricted to reasonably optimal cases, taken into consideration the North-South divide in both countries of Ghana and Nigeria.

3.12 Conclusion

This chapter sought to outline the research design and methodology of the study by providing an appropriate framework for undertaking research through the adoption of the right research methodology, the collection and analysis of relevant data of the study, as well as cater for limitations and constraints. It gave consideration to the philosophical underpinnings of this research; the research approach to data collection; and the method of analysis and presentation of findings. These were mainly based on the critical theorist research paradigm and the qualitative research approach to the explanation of the ontological and epistemological issues under consideration. The study also employed the comparative case study strategy in its inquiry, while conducting semi-structured/one-on-one interviews by using open-ended questionnaires, and also through focus group discussions to gather data. The primary and secondary methods of data collection through policy documents and papers, journals, books, newspapers and desk research among others, facilitated adequate data collection for the study.

The comparative case study approach adopted in the gathering of data in Ghana and Nigeria also proved useful in the comparative analysis of findings in the field and a better understanding and explanation of phenomena, while the different methods of data collection helped in the triangulation of trends and patterns in the field towards a theoretical proposition based on the grounded theory approach.

This research methodology was adopted in order to ensure that the right participants in this research were identified, as well as appropriate research methods adopted to gather, interpret and analyse data collected towards answering the research question as precisely as possible.

CHAPTER 4

SECURITY CULTURE AND SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN WEST AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

Security sector reform (SSR), and for that matter security sector governance (SSG), has gained increased attention in the past decade within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); a region confronted with diverse security challenges. These challenges, commonly referred to as transnational or cross-border crimes, include small arms trafficking, narcotics or drug trafficking, human trafficking, intra-state conflicts, terrorism and recently piracy (UNODC 2013: 1-62; Addo 2005: 1-71; and Addo 2006: 1-23). All these security challenges have undermined the security of ECOWAS countries and its population, resulting in displacement, deaths and destruction of properties among other things.

In addition to all these challenges, bad governance practices, including unconstitutional changes in government, exclusion in decision-making processes and the sharing of wealth, corruption, and the promotion of regime interest rather than the interest of the citizens and the state, have also resulted in political instability and unstable democracies in the region (Bryden *et al* 2008: 4, 12-22; and Bryden and Chappuis 2015). All these have contributed to undermining statebuilding processes in the region and beyond.

These security challenges, among several others, have necessitated responses requiring changes in approach to addressing them; the need for reorientation of attitudes, and the adoption of appropriate security cultures towards reform and transformation. In the process, regional security frameworks have evolved towards putting in place governance structures and implementation mechanisms to address these issues. These frameworks have largely gravitated from the regime-centred to human-centred approaches to addressing security issues, laying emphasis on addressing the needs and welfare of community citizens. These frameworks include

the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework 2008; ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 2001; and the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and Governance 2016.

Despite the existence of these useful security frameworks, mechanisms and processes, challenges still persist in the reform and governance of security within the ECOWAS region. These challenges are reflected mainly in terms of the lack of comprehension of the security sector reform/governance concept, given its complexity, colonial legacies, including the Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone divide, diverse security culture practices despite common community security arrangements, and the ineffective implementation of security frameworks and mechanisms in member states.

Given these developments, the need arises for a review of normative, legal and governance arrangements put in place so far in West Africa to address (in) security issues, and to establish to what extent regional security culture has influenced or enhanced security governance in the region. The term 'security culture' is used here to reflect shared values, norms and principles adopted or used to address or combat threats in the ECOWAS region. In doing this, notions of ideation, which gives room for departure from perceived norms and values, as well as reflexivity which presumes the translation of regional norms and values to the national context, are assessed. Some good and bad practices are equally highlighted in the context of positive and negative influences of security culture on security governance practices. This provided options to improve upon SSR/SSG processes towards possible transformation of the SSR/SSG concept in the ECOWAS region and beyond.

More importantly, ways of engendering an appropriate mix or hybrid indigenous and acquired security cultures in security sector governance are highlighted. This is intended to provide the background or context for looking at the comparative case studies of Ghana and

Nigeria towards establishing ways in which security culture has contributed or could contribute to enhancing SSG for a secure and transformed region, capable of meeting the security needs of ECOWAS citizens and its Member States.

4.1.1 *The Evolution of Security Culture in West Africa*

4.1.1.1 *Pre-Colonial Era*

West Africa, and for that matter the rest of Africa, went through a period of colonisation under western influences from the late 1870s to 1960. The colonisers sought to have a presence in Africa to help them establish institutions for exploitation of natural resources, tap the vast amount of existing labour to facilitate their objectives, and use systems of taxation to sustain their imperialist objectives in the continent (Gann and Duignan 1969; and Adu Boahene 1985). Colonial rule eventually became possible through military conquest and the signing of treaties which, to an extent, also revealed the level of resistance to imperialism on the continent (Adu Boahene 1985: 31-44, 114).

The colonisation of the continent introduced 'western' or the so-called 'modern' cultures that had some similarities and differences with pre-existing indigenous traditional cultures in pre-colonial times. This western culture, no doubt, impacted both negatively and positively on political, security, economic and social conditions and systems in place upon its introduction. Indeed, various scholars have differed on the impact, be it positive or negative, of colonialism in Africa, particularly in the context of its influences on the culture and traditions of indigenous societies. Ajayi (1968:196-197; and in Adu Boahene 1985: 44) for example argued that:

> the most fundamental aspect of the European impact was the loss of sovereignty… once a people lose their sovereignty, and they are exposed to another culture, they lose at least a little of their self-confidence and self-respect; they lose their right of self-steering,

> their freedom of choice as to what to change in their own culture
>
> or what to copy or reject from the culture.

As illustrated by Ajayi above, prior to colonisation of the continent of Africa, Africans had pre-existing cultures, including security cultures, that informed and regulated their way of life, as well as guaranteed, to a large extent, their safety and minimisation of threat in their kingdoms, chiefdoms and communities. Before 1880, about 80% of the African continent was ruled by kings, queens, clan and lineage heads in empires, kingdoms and communities (Adu Boahene 1985:1). Also as a typical indigenous, traditional and developing society, it had well organised security communities in which the traditional leaders discussed and put in measures and mechanisms to safeguard the safety or security of their people and communities (CHRI 2007: 10).

Political organisation of society was done based on lineages or at the clan or village level, while indigenous African political systems and institutions that facilitated governance were based largely on kinship and common ancestry (Martin 2012: 11). Roles and responsibilities were ascribed to the various actors in the community based on either democratic or consultative governance systems, or dictatorial exigencies. In addition to palace guards and informants in the king's palace and the communities, these kingdoms and chiefdoms had armies and vigilante groups that guaranteed the security and safety of individuals in the towns and villages, creating a conducive environment for undertaking development activities within the communities (Umar and Bappi 2014: 11; and Rotimi 2001).

These traditional systems of governance did not only prove useful to clans, chiefdoms and communities, but also suited the cultural context and environment in addressing their political, security, socio-economic and other vital needs towards their survival. Hence Africans, despite the evolution and emergence of post-colonial systems of governance, characterised by

western institutions and practices, continue to recognise the traditional forms of governance and largely adhere to its norms and values, which sometimes contradict those of the modern systems (UNECA 2007: 1).

Two main types of African traditional institutions of governance existed in pre-colonial times. These were classified into decentralised and centralised systems of governance (UNECA 2007: 3-5). The decentralised systems were largely based on consensual decision-making arrangements with variations from one place to another. This system sought to curb the concentration of power in an individual or institution, while doing away with hierarchical power relations (UNECA 2007:3; Leggesse 2000; 1973). In the context of dispute resolution for instance, differences were resolved in a win-win manner as opposed to a win-lose situation, with emphasis on negotiations (UNECA 2007: 3; and Martin 2012: 17). This system equally focused on individual views and rights as against opinions of the majority, in which case an individual had the right to veto decisions or opinions of the majority (UNECA 2007: 3).

Despite these rights enjoyed by individuals, they were equally entreated to respect the wishes and interests of the community through compromises or else face isolation in some instances. This arrangement helped to prevent conflicts between minorities and majority segments of society and, more importantly, reinforces the modern day human security concept of accommodating individual, community and state security needs. A setback to this system of traditional governance lies mainly in the time consuming nature of consensus-building towards decision-making processes. Examples of this type of governance system were found in some parts of eastern Nigeria, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia (UNECA 2007: 3).

The centralised system entailed empowering kings or monarchs with varying degrees of power, be it absolute in a dictatorial sense or limited with checks and balances by other actors or institutions, for governance (UNECA 2007: 4; Beattie, 1967; Osaghae 1989: 53-75; & Busia

1968). In traditional institutions with checks and balances for example, provisions were made through customary laws based on traditions and customs empowering council of elders, traditional priests and opinion leaders, among several others, to hold traditional leaders accountable for their decisions (Busia 1968; Coplan 1997: 27-60; and Martin 2012:12).

Community residents also wielded some significant level of influence as a collective action towards a despotic leader, and could sometimes reverse or change some decisions not in favour of the people. The centralised system was thus characterised by some levels of dictatorships and some level of democracy and accountability. Accountability in this system was, however, construed as a bit weak given the combination of executive and judicial powers by kings or monarchs. In addition, some members serving on the council of elders owed some form of allegiance to these traditional leaders or to be relatives (UNECA 2007:4).

The above illustration indeed negates the assertion that prior to the arrival of Europeans on the shores of Africa, the continent was static and bereft of any kind of evolution or transition towards modern trends of civilisation (Afigbo 1985: 487).

4.1.1.2 *Colonial Era*

Between 1890 and 1910, the continent experienced rapid changes, characterised by its conquest and occupation by imperial powers. By 1914, however, the whole of the continent did not only come under European influence, but was subjected to European rule. New systems of administration and governance were introduced, as efforts by Africans to maintain their sovereignty and independence failed (Gueye and Adu Boahene 1985: 138). Centralised forms of colonial rule were thus established for the retention of legislative authority in metropolitan areas, in which we had Governors who were more or less sovereign, but reported to His Majesty's government; and consultative councils representing commercial interests that played more of an advisory role.

At the district or provincial level, we had European Administrators who represented the interest of the colonisers, while local Chiefs, as African component of the governance structure, were also elected to facilitate the 'indirect rule' within occupied territories (Crowder 1985: 317). The indirect rule in this regard was construed as a conjunctive administration in Africa; "that which joined African authorities, in traditionally-held or European-imposed political roles, to the colonial government, but in an obviously subordinate capacity" (Crowder 1985: 315). This, according to a former colonial Governor, Lord Lugard, was necessary as institutions and methods would only command success and promote happiness and welfare of the people if they are deeply-rooted in their traditions and prejudices (1929: 211; and Asiwaju 1985: 315& 318).

In furtherance of this objective, George Léyguès (1906: 1, in Asiwaju 1985: 315) reinforced the indirect rule approach by stating that "The fundamental principle of our colonial policy must be scrupulous respect for the beliefs, habits and traditions of the conquered or protected peoples". This statement was quite instructive to the extent that it showed the need for the recognition of the role of traditional or indigenous institutions in facilitating the acceptance and effectiveness of foreign policies rather than its forceful imposition on citizens or governments. However, it fell short for its imperialist motives and tendencies.

Hence direct rule was largely restricted to the coastal areas where it was considered feasible with a fairly dominant presence, as compared to the hinterland areas, where the colonial presence was quite limited and required some traditional leadership to facilitate colonial objectives through the so-called 'native policy', albeit forcefully (Delavignette 1946: 121; Betts 1972 and Asiwaju 1985: 317). The term 'native' was employed surreptitiously to qualify the European policy at the time in order to portray an African dimension towards its acceptability and implementation. This was based on the general perception; both in theory and practice, that

colonial rule could only take place effectively through the use of indigenous personnel and institutions in a complementary and supportive fashion (Betts 1972 and Asiwaju 1985: 312).

Herein lies the proposition for hybridism, not in a neo-colonial context but rather with recognition for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of African states to own their policies, determine their direction, and lead through prudent and inclusive governance systems to achieve them. The notion of this hybridism must be underpinned by sound indigenous and exogenous principles, norms and values in order to circumvent its challenges in a contemporary world.

Indeed, the introduction of this new colonial administrative system was geared towards the exploitation of economic resources, labour, collection of tax, as well as the establishment of authoritarian rule to facilitate the imperial motive. Colonialism thus became the bane of Africa, especially between 1880 and 1935. This development "represented an assault on established cultures" (Adu Boahene 1985: 1). It was equally construed as "… overthrowing a whole ancient world of beliefs and ideas and an immemorial way of life" (Adu Boahene 1985: 3). The emergence and entrenchment of colonialism and its systemic imperatives on the continent, no doubt, introduced new cultures and different ways of doing things which affected indigenous political, economic, security, religious and social ways of life.

On the security front, already established indigenous security systems in the pre-colonial era had to accommodate or be subsumed under newly introduced western political and security arrangements. The major or initial area of influence was in the area of security governance and policing, given the need to ensure the safety and protection of colonial officials, exploited resources, and a stable and peaceful environment for trade. In the case of Ghana, for example, the Ghanaian traditional society had in place notions of policing meant to promote and protect cultural values and democratic ethos of the state or polity (CHRI 2007: 10). This social mechanism was disrupted with the emergence of colonialism and replaced by the "Colonial

Police Model", designed to advance and protect the colonial interest as against the rights of those colonised (CHRI 2007: 10; Appiagyei-Atua 2006: 8). Hence, the designs of the imperial powers to subdue, exploit, control and profit from resources on the continent largely gave rise to authoritarian or dictatorial methods or means of ensuring peace, security and stability on the continent.

With time, particularly in the post-colonial or independence era, western security practices were introduced side by side the traditional indigenous ones, which eventually constituted the basis for the establishment of modern security architecture and their dynamics. These practices dominated and influenced contemporary security mechanisms and practices, despite co-existing with the traditional ones in Africa, and for that matter a globalised world. The introduction of these colonial security practices were essentially meant to "ensure the protection of colonial officials; maintain peace and security necessary for economic exploitation through the production and trade in agricultural and mineral resources and manufactured goods; and to generally enforce the "rule of law" to various political and economic ends" (Atuguba 2003:2). This phenomenon led to the contentious development between tradition and modernity, in which indigenous security practices were subsumed and sometimes ignored to the advantage of modern security cultural practices, which made its acceptance and effectiveness sometimes difficult.

4.1.1.3 *Cold War Era*

The Cold War which spanned a period of about half a century, right after the Second World War in 1945, was bi-polar in nature and was fought on ideological and geo-strategic grounds between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). On the ideological front, the USA pursued policies based on capitalism (Meltzer 2012: 3-31) – which subjects itself to the dictates of free market with private ownership of property or resources for production – while the USSR pursued policies aligned with

communism (Brown 2009: 1-618) – where property is owned by the public or community based on control from the state. The major focus for this 'bloodless' war was in Europe, reinforced by victories of these two powerful states in the Second World War. Notwithstanding, the influence and ramifications of the Cold War, or better still the 'battle' or competition between the two powerful allied states in Europe at the time, were felt across the globe (Painter and Leffler 2005: 1).

` The US, for instance, seeing that communism was gaining grounds the world over with the Soviet's determined motive for world domination, embarked on the Marshall Plan, an economic initiative towards the reconstruction of Europe, as a means of gaining and maintaining control over Western European states (Hogan 1987: 1-445). The USSR equally concentrated, first and foremost, on gaining influence and control over territories in Eastern Europe while promoting its geostrategic objectives. All these activities were basically geared towards maintaining power and control through access to weapons of mass destruction and resources (Leffler and Painting 2005: 58-87). Other African states also made decisions to remain non-aligned to any of the two power blocs or superpowers which led to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which, in effect, was considered as a 'Third World" response to the Cold War (Arnold 2006: xxv)

All these activities reinforced a 'westernised' security culture on the continent of Africa, as de-colonisation and the assumption of sovereignty by independent African states made these states to practice an acquired security culture passed on by colonisers. Davidson (1992: 10) construed events after colonialism as nationalism metamorphosing into nation-statism. The acquired colonial practice of control and subjugation of the populace by the ruling class did not cease but rather became reinforced. Hence what looked like liberation struggles from the onset 'was not a restoration of Africa to Africa's own history, but the onset of a new period of indirect subjection to the history of Europe" (Davidson 1992: 10; and Mohan and Zack-Williams 2004:

8).

In effect, the systems of ‘direct rule’ by colonial Governors and ‘indirect rule’ by chiefs, through strict regulations and control towards taxation policies, exploitation and export of resources, and the establishment of security forces rather than services to enforce colonial policies and decisions, continued in form and content. The Governors who exhibited legislative, executive and judicial powers by themselves instead of different branches of government or administration reinforced control of power and to an extent, patronage systems through neo-patrimonial systems and arrangements leading to the establishment of one party rule.

This form of governance became a new autocracy (Mohan and Zack-Williams 2004: 8; Davidson 1992; Mamdani 1996; and Ekeh 1997: 83-110). Revolutionary nationalist movements in most African states equally exploited the Cold War rivalry to pursue their interests, aligning themselves with communist or socialist ideals (Leffler and Painter 2005: 1-2). In effect, the Cold War era with its ideological underpinnings and alliances only deepened and entrenched this so-called ‘modern’ or ‘westernised’ security culture, but hardly obliterated the indigenous ones.

With the end of colonialism and the advent of independence, the inherited or acculturated western security systems and practices dominated political governance and security practices. Responses to political dominance and control of power gave rise to political dissent and agitations by civilians and the populace in general. These open rejection of authoritarianism, fueled by the Cold War ideological battle, eventually led to military dictatorships and revolutions spanning a period of about three decades on the African continent which led to several regime changes through military coups and revolutions (Hutchful and Bathily 1997).

Military dictatorships, coups d’état, and autocratic regimes, thus, dominated the governance and security landscape until the end of the Cold War when emphasis began to shift towards more democratic means of security and political governance. West Africa was not left

out of these developments as Ghana and Nigeria, for example, experienced military dictatorships and autocratic rule marked by military coups and undemocratic governance during and immediately after the Cold War era. The resultant effect of all these was the contention between issues of 'tradition' and 'modernity' in which hybrid systems of political and security governance co-existed through various legislations. All these led to changes in all facets of governance, necessitating the need for reforms in political, economic and security spheres.

Capitalism and its ideals began to guide the pursuit of governance in all spheres of endeavour with emphasis on democracy, the rule of law, good governance and human security among others. The seemingly gradual collapse of communism and the advent of capitalism led to the quest for transparent and accountable governance, the call for the respect of people's rights and private ownership of the means of production which eventually culminated in several civil wars in Africa and the eventual taking of root of democracy and good governance on the continent.

Civil wars, mainly in the MRU sub-region of West Africa and southern and eastern parts of the continent became manifest as the Cold War gradually came to an end and super powers' interests in the continent dwindled. The breaking down of the 'Berlin Wall' in November 1989 and the merger of East and West Germany, as well as emergence the Bretton Woods system, brought about a whole new dimension and perspective which reinforced capitalist systems of governance rather than the very well embraced communism. The search for peaceful resolution to conflicts caused by rebellion against repression, control and bad governance practices in general gained grounds.

4.1.1.4 *The Changing Context of Security Culture*

All said and done, the issue of change and continuity in the context of culture, and for that matter security culture, during the period of colonialism and its aftermath, generated interesting

debates and perceptions on the subject. To start with change was perceived, in rival mythologies of European imperialism and colonial nationalism, to be introduced by European rule into traditional societies (Afigbo 1985: 487). This was construed by imperial apologists as a progressive change which was "a dramatic and beneficial linear transition from a static and barely productive traditional culture to a dynamic and limitless modernism" (Afigbo 1985: 487). Recent scholars however discarded such claims or proposition of a static African traditional culture. They argued that traditional societies were far from static and have evolved over time from its pre-colonial through colonial to post-colonial times.

The Colonial Nationalists have considered this view of European imperialists as a "disruption" and "the process by which unsympathetic and uncomprehending imperialists shattered the idyllic world of colonial peoples leaving in its place turmoil, instability and uncertainty" (Afigbo 1985: 487). These modern scholars thus dispute the static nature of African societies, seeing it more in the light of products of generations informed by centuries of millennia of change. In other words, modernisation through change or modification of culture in Africa has been a continuous process from earliest times, characterised by factors such as social mobility, urbanization, occupational specialisation, and labour migration (Afigbo 1985: 487).

So in effect, the above demographic and evolutionary processes indicate a dynamic and changing cultural values and norms in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial epochs. These changes have largely been in the form of voluntarily or forcefully imbibing modern cultural values with its positive and negative attributes in addition to the already existing indigenous ones. This has made it possible for the hybridism that is experienced currently in African societies across the continent and indicates the potential for acculturation, while equally maintaining indigenous traditional norms and values. The quest for the recognition, therefore, of the interplay of tradition and modernity, leading to the acceptance of positive traditional and

modern values towards reform and effective governance of the security sector in West Africa, remains the hypothesis this thesis intends to prove or disprove.

4.2 ECOWAS's Security Culture and Regional Security Frameworks

West Africa's security culture and practices are believed to be based largely on pan-Africanist ideas and ideals which informed the struggle for and liberalisation of the continent from the vestiges of colonialism and apartheid (Jaye: 2008: 165). These shared ideals are common to and thought to have emerged from a heterogeneous and diverse societies within the West African region and beyond in pre-colonial, colonial and the post-independence era. Indeed, Jaye (2008:155) and Soderbaum (2001: 63) argue that patterns of regionalisation within West Africa have been created through shared history, manifested through highly integrated pre-colonial kingdoms, empires and cultures.

ECOWAS's security culture is equally informed by both ideation and the availability or otherwise of capacity and material resources in response to security threats or its minimization (Williams and Haacke 2008: 128). In reality, however, the 'majoritarian conception of culture' which accommodates some degree of divergence or occasional contestation of ideas in relation to norms and practices manifests in the ECOWAS region (Williams and Haacke 2008: 130; Meyer 2005: 529). Hence, ECOWAS's responses to community or transnational security challenges, based on its adherence to norms and principles, have sometimes been mixed or contradictory (Jaye 2008: 156). Reasons for non-adherence to some of the principles or norms are attributable to colonial legacies, as well as ideological, economic and personal factors. These factors, as a result, create the room, sometimes, for biases in interpretation and importance attached to issues considered as threat or otherwise to ECOWAS member states and its people.

Security culture is considered on the normative side "as encompassing shared patterns of thought and argumentation that establish pervasive and durable security preferences by

formulating concepts of the role, legitimacy, and efficacy of particular approaches to protecting values" (Johnson 1995a:6).

In practice, however, "culture is manifested in specific norms and practices [as] ideas informing a shared culture tend to find expression in shared discourses [which] are themselves actualized in habitual practices" (Williams and Haacke 2008: 129; Neumann and Heikka 2005). These shared values and norms, captured in the founding documents and subsequent regional security legislations and policies, inform the collective decision-making of the regional organisation, ECOWAS, which in effect influences and shapes its nature and development. It equally helps explain what, to the organisation, constitutes a security threat, and why it does or does not respond to particular threats with possible security implications (Williams and Haacke 2008:131). Jaye (2008: 154) summarised ECOWAS's embryonic security culture in the following ideals:

- equality, territorial integrity and political independence of states;
- solidarity and collective self-reliance;
- non-aggression and good neighbourliness;
- peaceful settlement of disputes;
- adherence to democratic governance;
- zero tolerance for power obtained and maintained through unconstitutional means; and economic and social development on the understanding that security of the peoples and states are inextricably linked.

These ideals, most of which are captured in *Declaration A/DCL.1/7/91 of Political Principles of the Economic Community of West African States*, guide and preserve community relations mainly in political, economic and security spheres.

ECOWAS at the time of its inception, 28 May 1975, had purely economic objectives of integrating the West African region based on free movement of persons and goods, enhanced trade and investment, common customs arrangements and other related socio-economic issues. These were captured in ECOWAS's founding document, *Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States,* concluded in Lagos, Nigeria. With time, the institution's focus shifted in response to the Cold War dynamics, by integrating common community security arrangements that would secure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its Member States. This led to the adoption of the *ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression* (PNA) of 22 April 1978 also in Lagos, Nigeria, and subsequently the *Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance of Defence* (PMAD) made in Freetown, Sierra Leone on 29 May 1981.

These two security protocols sought to address fears about inter-state security threats and facilitate inter-state cooperation on community security and defence arrangements. This was intended to further promote integration efforts, and prevent undue, divisive, suspicious and external influences or attack in the region (ECOWAS Treaty 1975). These initial security efforts laid the security foundations for subsequent reinforcement of community security arrangements.

The signing of the 29 July 1993 *ECOWAS Revised Treaty* in Cotonou, Benin, reinforced the need for early warning and conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms for the containment and addressing intra-state conflicts that threatened to engulf the MRU sub-region, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea at the time, and the ECOWAS region at large, given its spill-over effects. This proposition manifested in the adoption of the *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, and Peacekeeping and Security* in Lomé, Togo, on 10 December 1999. This Protocol, however, had gaps which needed to be addressed to make it more effective.

Hence the adoption of the *Protocol A/SP1/12/01on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, and Peacekeeping and Security* in Dakar, Senegal, on 1 December 2001. This supplementary protocol, also known as ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, focused on issues such as prevention of internal crises, democracy and good governance, rule of law and human rights. These issues needed to be observed in order to create the conducive environment for attaining the security, peace and stability goals of the region.

Despite the adoption of all these initial security frameworks and arrangements, bad governance practices, including regime protection, unlimited rule of power, unconstitutional changes in government, political marginalization and exclusion, and corruption, continued to pose significant challenges to peace and security in the region. This reinforced a shift in focus and emphasis on the security of ECOWAS citizens as compared to that of Member States, owing to pressure for community residents, mainly civil society and human rights activists among others. These efforts eventually culminated in the adoption of *The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)* on 16 January 2008 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

The ECPF encompassed major initiatives for enhancing the safety of life and property, as well as the security of Member States and institutions in the region (ECPF Preamble). Its emphasis on the safety of life and property and the security of not only the member states but its people is instructive. Article 4 of the Framework seeks to transform the region from an 'ECOWAS of States' to that of an 'ECOWAS of the Peoples' under the ECOWAS Strategic Vision. More importantly, the ECPF has a major purpose of serving as a reference for the regional economic grouping and its member states in attempts at strengthening human security. These ideals, though laudable and worth pursuing, is yet to fully manifest in specific programmes and activities of the regional bloc.

After all these frameworks, the need arose, given all the ongoing challenges of transnational crime in the region and internal security problems, as well as human rights abuses by security agencies, to ensure a standardised, comprehensive mechanism and concerted effort to restructure the security sectors of various ECOWAS Member States in order to ensure effective and efficient security sector governance and security services provision and delivery. The regional body, therefore, came up with a 2016 *Supplementary Act on ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance*. This security sector reform and governance policy framework, supplementary to the 1999 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, came up with core principles, essential features, implementation mechanism and gender mainstreaming on SSRG in West Africa.

ECOWAS's regional security frameworks are therefore largely reflective of its security cultures acquired over the years since its inception in the mid-1970s.

4.3 Security Culture and Security Governance in West Africa: Challenges, Progress and Prospects

As established in the previous sections above, ECOWAS's security culture reflects thoughts or patterns of argumentation crystalised around common ideals, principles and values for community safety of ECOWAS Member States and its peoples. ECOWAS's security culture may or may not influence its security governance processes in West Africa. This, as mentioned earlier, could be attributed to several factors, including issues based on ideation or contestation of ideas, the availability or otherwise of resources, and state or individual interests and considerations. Governance of the security sector in ECOWAS, on the other hand, is made possible through established institutions, mechanisms and processes.

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2015) definition of governance would be re-emphasised in this context which considers governance as public goods and services that every citizen is entitled to from the state, and which the state has a responsibility to deliver to its people. The elements of governance have four major categories, and these include safety and rule of law; participation and human rights; sustainable economic opportunity; and human development. The safety and rule of law aspect of governance is sub-divided into rule of law, accountability, personal safety and national security. Though these elements identified are mutually reinforcing of each other, the sub-categories of safety and rule of law provide benchmarks for assessing the status and effectiveness of security services delivery in West Africa, and Africa as a whole.

With regard to ECOWAS structures and institution for governance, Article 4 of the ECOWAS Conflict Mechanism established the Authority, the Mediation and Security Council (MSC) and the Executive Secretariat now the ECOWAS Commission. The Authority, as the highest decision-making body of ECOWAS, has the powers to act on all security matters as relates to the Mechanism. The MSC, which comprise 9 Member States of ECOWAS, acts on behalf of the Authority by making appropriate decisions for the implementation of the Mechanism. Meetings of the MSC which is presided over by the current Chair of the Authority takes place at three levels, including that of Heads of State and Government, Ministerial and Ambassadorial levels. The ECOWAS Commission facilitates the implementation of policy decisions of ECOWAS.

The above-mentioned institutions comprise the Executive wing of ECOWAS with additional supporting organs. The organs established to assist the MSC in Article 17 of the Mechanism are the Defence and Security Committee (DSC); the Council of Elders (CoE) now Council of the Wise (CoW); and the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) now known as the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). The DSC, which comprises the Committee of

Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) and Committee of Chiefs of Security Service (CCSS), is in charge of providing technical assistance and expert knowledge in the area of peacekeeping and deployment of the ESF, while the CoW uses good offices roles and their rich experiences to serve as mediators, conciliators and facilitators. The idea of the CoW is based on the recognition of the effectiveness of traditional mediation roles in the West Africa region that helps in the resolution of disputes among conflicting parties. These institutions and organs are complemented by the established Observation and Monitoring Zones and an ECOWAS Situation Room to facilitate the work of the regional body in its conflict prevention, early warning and response efforts under its ECOWAS Early Warning Response Network (ECOWARN) operationalised in 2003.

The ECOWAS Court of Justice, the Community Court, is charged with giving legal advisory opinion on any matter that requires interpretation of community text. Some of the cases relate to the determination of violation of human rights, disputes relating to the interpretation and application of Acts of the Community, and adjudication on disputes between institutions of the community and their officials among others things. The Court was created pursuant to the 1993 Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, and officially began operations in November 1996 after the coming into effect of the 1991 Protocol that created the Court (ECOWAS Community Court of Justice *Protocol A/P.I/7/91).*

The Authority of Heads of State and Government also established the ECOWAS Parliament, also known as the Community Parliament, in August 1994 upon the signing of the Protocol of the Parliament. It was established under Articles 6 and 13 of the 1993 Revised Treaty of ECOWAS. The Protocol which came into force in March 2000 led to the inauguration of the Community Parliament in November 2000. This regional parliament serves as "a forum for dialogue, consultation and consensus for the representatives of the people of the Community

[with a view to promoting] integration" (ECOWAS Community Parliament *Protocol A/P.2/8/94* 1994: 4).

These structures, institutions, mechanisms, processes and legal frameworks facilitate the governance process within ECOWAS with specific regard to issues of community security. The three major governing arms of the ECOWAS, including the executive, parliament and judiciary, are structures or state mechanisms and processes for governance and are established for the benefit of ECOWAS Member States and its peoples. Decision-making and policy implementation undertaken both at the regional and national levels in the ECOWAS region have civil society input from the WACSOF and in the areas of security West African Network on Security and Democratic Governance (WANSED). These are meant to ensure the needs of the people are catered for based on human security ideals, and adequate provision of oversight from all stakeholders in the process.

4.3.1 *Security Sector Governance and Statebuilding Processes in West Africa*

The essence of security sector reform/governance in West Africa and beyond is to maintain secure and stable states for the community and its peoples. Hence SSR/SSG is mainly construed, not as an end in itself but, as a means to an end. This brings up the concept of statebuilding in West Africa which follows similar trajectory as is done in different parts of the world. The differences in approach might, however, be related to the context, dynamics and, above all, actors involved. This may be due to different and varied cultural traits which require its recognition and acceptance to facilitate effective SSG processes toward an integrated and strengthened ECOWAS member states and human development in the region.

Additionally, broader reform approaches are required to make SSR efforts effective given the multi-faceted nature of threats to both the state and its people. Hence the need to link SSR/SSG efforts to statebuilding goals and objectives, which presents the opportunity to explore

a much more comprehensive way of addressing security issues from a broader perspective, rather than a limited, technical and narrow approach to SSR (Jackson 2009: 1).

This approach feeds into the human security debate that encompasses a broad range of issues, but with the emphasis on accommodating the interest of the individual or people in addition to that of the state. Institutions and legitimacy of central authorities play major roles in building a state as it forms a critical link between statebuilding and nation-building. But success in this area is mainly defined by external intervention and its possible impact on socio-political cohesion.

Statebuilding as conceived in a previous chapter connotes "overcoming institutional blockages, or changing the 'rules of the game', through turning bad governance into good governance" (Chandler 2010: 6). With regard to home-grown, national and whole-of-government approaches, statebuilding could also be perceived as "an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations" (OECD 2008d cited in OECD 2011: 20).

Indeed, commonly identified indicators for state weakness which leads to state failure include notions of "disharmony between communities, inability to control borders and the entirety of the territory, a growth of criminal violence, corrupt institutions, and a decaying infrastructure" (von Bogdandy *et al* 2005: 581). Again, in the field of security, statebuilding activities are undertaken through the establishment of security sectors in accordance with democratic norms, good governance, and the call for civilian control of the sector, accountability, transparency and observance of the rule of law, (Schroeder et al 2013: 382).

Of equal importance is the "cultural change in terms of how people relate to that state as well as how people conduct everyday business" (Jackson 2009: 4). This relates strongly to the issue of nation-building which provides a much broader context for and linkage to statebuilding

processes. Nation-building, as defined in an earlier Chapter, relates more to the endogenous context and embraces 'collective identity formation' in a country by indigenes through redefining issues of cultural identity, and the use of traditions, indigenous institutions and customs (von Bogdandy *et al*2005: 586). Though external influences may be quite limited (Scott 2007: 3), they, nevertheless, provide an opportunity for support and collective efforts toward successful statebuilding activities. In this regard, a cultural projection of a nation is made manifest through sets of assumptions, values and beliefs, which facilitate the legitimisation of state structures and processes (von Bogdandy *et al* 2005: 586).

In drawing lessons for the future, approaches to statebuilding, security and governance require a rethink, and the need to adopt and mainstream transformative approaches in which hybrid forms of progressive traditional and modern practices would inform theories and policies (Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163; and Podder 2013: 353-380). Current security threats to peace, stability and development including, conflicts, terrorism, transnational crimes and environmental degradation in West Africa, have necessitated the need for reforms in both post-conflict and transitional societies to effectively address these threats.

SSR could contribute to statebuilding by building the integrity of the security system, establish or promote its legitimacy, and promote the governance of the sector through citizen participation, in order to transform the sector towards respecting the security needs of both the state and its people (Weigand 2013: 18; Patel 2010). In ensuring this is done, governance serves as the critical element in providing guidance and direction through policies informed by the contribution of all stakeholders, including both state and sub-state actors. Hence the necessity to revisit the critical element of security sector governance (SSG) in an attempt to facilitate SSR efforts in West Africa.

4.3.2 *Challenges, Progress and Prospects of SSG in West Africa*

Political governance in Africa, and for that matter West Africa, has faced major difficulties in areas of exclusion of relevant actors in decision-making, bad governance practices, including misapplication of resources, nepotism, corruption and unequal distribution of wealth, as well as external influences with its attendant conditionalities and western-imposed views and practices. Similar challenges are experienced in the governance of the security sector in the West Africa region where most of the countries in transition are either emerging from authoritarian rule, like Ghana and Nigeria, or years of intra-state conflicts in the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Guinea Bissau, just to mention a few (Marc *et al* 2015: 99-137). These challenges are seen in various forms and at different levels of manifestation, and have made the delivery of security goods and services rather difficult, leading to increased threats and destabilisation in the region.

The genesis of the challenges could be traced mainly to colonial practices inherited from colonial authorities, and which have led to the emergence of traditional or regime security practices rather than that of human security (Mohan and Zack-Williams 2004: 8). This led to the centralisation of power in the executive, weak institutions, and human rights abuses among other things. Other negative effects of bad governance include weak civilian control of the sector, narrow or limited knowledge of the security concept, emphasis on western security practices rather than integrating both indigenous and western forms of security practices, and an ill-equipped security sector. This development necessitated the need for reform and transformation in the security sector in order to make it effective and efficient in maintaining peace and stability in ECOWAS Member States.

The security sector in West Africa, comprising Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries, has similar characteristic features regarding its structures and institutions, security

mechanisms and processes, legislations, its management, and to an extent security cultures that influence behavioural patterns and attitudes in the discharge of services within the sector (Bryden *et al* 2008: 27-303). A cursory look at the 15 West African states in the ECOWAS region reveals that while efforts at reform of the security sector in few of the countries are quite impressive and worth emulating, as in Mali in the past and Sierra Leone, depicting transitions from authoritarian rule and conflict situations respectively, others have remained lukewarm in their efforts towards reform like Ghana and Nigeria, and worse still some have remained completely adamant to calls for restructuring and reforms in cases of The Gambia, particularly under former President Yahya Jameh, and Guinea Bissau for example. Emphasis has also been placed on adopting a transformative approach to SSG practices in West Africa which focuses on change in attitude or behaviours rather than a mere restructuring or reform institutions, and the provision of needed resources or *materiel* for effective and efficient security agencies.

At the regional level, challenges to SSG have been faced in three major areas, including the needed political will to drive SSR/SSG, translating regional security frameworks into credible programmes and action to effectively combat transnational criminal activities, and strengthening regional security institutions, including ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), to combat crime, terrorism and contain conflicts in West Africa. Several ECOWAS security frameworks identified above, and with specific reference to the ECOWAS Conflict Mechanism, the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, the ECPF and the ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance, contain adequate security provisions to guarantee peace and stability in West Africa.

West African leaders have, however, been selective in their political decisions in addressing security challenges as were in the cases of Burkina Faso, Togo, Mauritania, Ivory Coast and Guinea Bissau to mention a few (Bamfo 2013: 12-22). In these instances, responses to

some of the issues were swift, for instance Togo, while in others engagements were either slow or there were disagreements in the appropriate course of action to undertake owing to differing interests and suspected acts of complicity. All these are attributable to individual or national interests against that of the regional, colonial alliances, geo-strategic considerations, resource constraints, including fiscal resources, and the non-involvement of other stakeholders, like the civil-society, in finding solutions to these challenges. Thus, despite the existence of West African security culture, its consideration in governance of the security sector becomes limited owing to its non-recognition and personal consideration of some leaders within the organisation.

Within the ECOWAS Member States, it would have been expected that security decisions made at the regional or sub-regional levels would logically translate into its implementation, but that is not always the case. The reflexivity in security decisions and its implementation is undermined by lack of sensitisation and inadequate cooperation and partnerships between Member States and its citizenship. Issues of corruption, limited grasp or understanding of security concepts and their evolution, as well as lack of expertise in respective areas have equally contributed to this. As a result, there are still problems of civil-military relations, regime security manifestations in the form of militarization, authoritarian rule, coup d'état and political repression, and non-inclusive governance of the sector.

With the exception of Senegal and Cape Verde to an extent, almost all West African countries are confronted with these challenges (Bryden *et al* 2008:14-15 &18). Intra-state conflicts used to be rampant in the region, particularly Mano-River Union sub-region of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. Others also include Guinea to an extent, Guinea Bissau and some parts of Nigeria, Senegal and Ghana on limited scales. These and many other challenges, including long-term rule, have brought about dysfunctional security sector in

countries like the Gambia. This has also affected security oversight functions from different stakeholders within state and sub-state actors at national and regional levels.

Despite these identified challenges, some progress have been made in selected West African countries with prospects for further improvement and enhancement of SSG in the region and beyond. Since its inception, as has been observed earlier, ECOWAS's major priority was in the area of regional integration. With the end of the Cold War and advent of the post-Cold War era, characterised by several complex, multi-national and multi-tasking security challenges, the ECOWAS adopted several security legislations, mechanisms and processes to prevent, manage and resolve the crisis. These well-thought out and well-crafted security frameworks have succeeded, to a large extent, in minimising the threat to peace and security in West Africa. The intensity of intra-state conflicts in the region has reduced drastically, while many West African countries are making concerted efforts to entrench democracy and the rule of law in their polity (Marc *et al* 2015: 156-161).

In the area of SSR/SSG, some best practices remain instructive, and which could serve as useful case studies for improving upon reform and governance in the security sector in West Africa. In the specific case of Mali, for example, the 1991 revolution/coup d'état paradoxically spurred on improved civil-military relations which made it possible for the initiation of a transformation of the security sector from the one-party authoritarian rule and military dictatorship to the democratic governance of the sector. This was inspired at a national conference in 1991 through the acknowledgement of wrongs by the armed forces that rendered apologies and made appeals to civil society to forgive them for wrongs committed, as well as making the request to work in harmony towards a peaceful country (Bryden *et al* 2008: 191-193)

This effort, however, was quickly undermined by the Tuareg rebellion and its associated incessant attacks and terrorist in the northern parts of Mali in 2012 which eventually affected the

state of security in all parts of the country (Bryden and Chappuis 2015: 79-95). This transformative approach through recognition of bad practices and behaviours, and the genuine willingness and desire for change through the recognition of all stakeholders and their contribution, is instructive in improving democratic governance in the security sector. This, nevertheless, requires the political will to sustain the efforts in this direction.

In the case of Sierra Leone, going through several years of intra-state conflict and the emergence and rebuilding of a robust and quite effective security sector, based on trust between and among the leadership, security agencies and civil society, present a good case study for SSR/SSG practices in the region (Bryden et al 2008:18, 283-300). This was made possible through the required assistance given by the United Kingdom government and other partners in efforts toward post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding processes (Horn *et al* 2006: 109123). The national truth and reconciliation process, no doubt played a major role in this transition and transformation of a dysfunctional security sector through traditional reconciliation processes (Hoffman 2008: 129-141).

These positive developments, though not perfect, demonstrate the prospects and possibilities of transforming the security sector in West Africa. This would, as has been observed, require a change in attitude and behavioural patterns reflected in wrong cultural practices, the acceptance of a need for a change, and the involvement of all major stakeholders in bringing about the expected a change.

4.4 Conclusion

West African countries are going through transitions, emerging from authoritarian rule or military dictatorships into democracies, and conflict into post-conflict, peacebuilding and statebuilding processes. All these countries have been confronted with several challenges,

including challenges in the governance of the security sector that have resulted in undermining development and integration efforts in West Africa.

Over the past few decades, emphasis on security or minimisation of threats have been largely focused on the state, resulting in regime security practices and self-perpetuation in power with its attendant human rights abuses and other bad governance practices. In recent years, however, developments have shifted more towards guaranteeing human security, which largely places emphasis on minimising threats to individuals and citizens of states, as well as guaranteeing their well-being and welfare. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008: 6-7) and the African Union Agenda 2063 (2013: 8) have laid emphasis on people-centred policies, which must not necessarily be to the detriment or weakening of the state.

In guaranteeing a peaceful and stable West Africa and, for that matter, Africa as a whole, and in realising the 2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals (2030 Agenda: 3), security remains a critical element. And in this regard, governance of the security sector is not only essential but requires conceptualising SSR based on the integration of both traditional and modern norms, values and practices to make peace, security and development possible. Hence in addition to grasping appropriate governance standards, security culture considerations, which entail shared security norms, values and principles, are equally important. This will reinforce a hybrid form of SSG that could help improve on governance of the sector and eliminate state repression of citizens, having in mind the adoption of the human security concept and transformation of the sector and its integration into statebuilding processes.

Putting citizens at the centre of SSG must take into consideration their security concerns, practices, and norms and values which sets the appropriate objective of enhancing governance and delivering security goods and services in the region. This will, to a large extent, guarantee sustainable peace and development.

CHAPTER 5

SECURITY CULTURE INFLUENCES ON SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND PEACE AND STABILITY IN GHANA

5.1 Introduction

Ghana's security sector reform experiences since the 1980s have made major contributions to the establishment of democracy and stability in the country. This was largely influenced by its mixed or hybrid but not necessarily perfect formal and informal cultural dynamics derived from its historical antecedents and based mainly on its traditions and colonial legacies. Attempts at security sector reform in Ghana focused on series of activities to streamline security sector management, oversight of the sector and delivery of security needs and services in the country. Its efforts to overcome economic crisis in the late 1970s to mid-1980s, military dictatorships and legitimacy crisis, as well as weak institutional capacities and building a culture of democracy in the early 1990s to 2000, laid the foundation for economic and security reforms, and socio-economic development of the country (Hutchful 2008: 111).

Security reform efforts covered eliminating coups d'état and military dictatorships, addressing the culture of silence and abuses of human rights, reforms within the various security and justice institutions and agencies, and creating a stable environment for the pursuit of democratic governance and socio-economic development of the country (BICC 2004: 62-65). Efforts were also made to draft a new Constitution, that is the 1992 Constitution, with adequate security sector provisions and security legislations covering the intelligence, police and the armed forces, and opening the space for eventual dialogue and improving civil-military relations within a culture of democracy. All these were made possible with external support or assistance from donors or international partners who facilitated concessional loans and grants, as well as technical support, to undertake these reforms.

These reforms were, nevertheless, carried out based on some conditionalities informed by western cultures and tradition, some of which proved to be favourable while others were not. They were also selective or *ad hoc* in nature as they were not undertaken within a comprehensive security sector reform and governance plan or agenda. Other limitations to Ghana's security sector reform agenda included but were not limited to weaknesses in governance and security sector oversight, lack of transparency and accountability, and selected reforms of security agencies. Indigenous security institutions and mechanisms for maintaining security, peace and rule of law in the country were also largely ignored in the reforms (BICC 2004:7-8). These challenges, together with negative external influences and the general neglect of indigenous culture and institutions, however, require redress in enhancing the governance of the security sector.

This case study, as mentioned in previous chapters, thus sought to explore if security culture influences in Ghana – which connotes shared safety values, norms and behaviours – from respective security actors, played a role in minimising the complexity of the SSR/G concept and helped clarify the role of security actors, as well as facilitate the acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in Ghana by both security providers and referents. In doing this, the chapter briefly captures the historical background and evolution of the Ghanaian state from its pre-colonial, through colonial to its post-independence era in order to establish its cultural and security culture antecedents, which shaped its political developments and governance dynamics under autocratic, military dictatorships and constitutional governance.

It follows this with the conceptions and perceptions about security culture and security governance in the country, while revisiting Ghana's security sector and governance arrangements to envision the security structure in place, identify the security actors and their roles and functions in providing security needs of the state and its people. The case study then traced early

attempts at security sector reform and formalisation of the reform and security governance processes in order to asses efforts embarked upon thus far in security reforms in the country. This is then followed by how effective these reforms have been by looking at the security challenges confronting the country and the effectiveness of responses, as well as which way the country is headed through security sector governance. Options are then explored for enhancing security sector governance in the country by looking at security culture influences and its effectiveness in demystifying the complex SSR/SSG concept and terrain, its security arrangements and multiple security cultures, towards the acceptance and enhancement of security reform and governance in the country. Conclusions are subsequently drawn on findings based on the field research undertaken.

5.1.1 *Brief Historical and Cultural Background on State Formation and Post-Independence Political and Security Developments in Ghana*

5.1.1.1 *Geographical Boundaries and Location*

Ghana is believed to have stemmed from the Burkinabe word 'Ga-Na' which means "warrior king' (Owusu-Gyamfi 2012). The country which was formerly referred to as the Gold Coast was named after the Ghana Empire, also known then as Awkar - an important trans-Sahara trading route located in the present-day area of south-eastern Mauritania and Western Mali - when it became independent. It is located in West Africa and has three neighbouring countries including Cote d'Ivoire to the west, Togo to the east and Burkina Faso to the north. Its southern part is bordered by the Gulf of Guinea which has the Atlantic Ocean. The country also covers a distance of 522 miles from its southern portion to the north, and 355 miles from its eastern portion to the west. Its four ecological zones are classified into the southern savanna, the forest zone, the Sahel transition zone and the northern savanna zone (Assimeng 1999: 35). It has 16 regions and 254 districts.

The inhabitants are believed to have settled here before 1471 when the Europeans established contact with them. The people migrated from southern Sahara around the North-West or Central Africa (Assimeng 1999: 36). The northerners and the Akans were among the first settlers in Ghana before other major ethnic groups including the Gas and Ewes (Fynn 1974: 3). The following map gives a vivid and graphic description of Ghana:

The Map of Ghana



Source: Graphic Online, Ghana, available at https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/new-ghana-map-with-16-regional-capitals.html. (Accessed: 19 August 2019)

5.1.1.2 *Pre-Colonial Historical and Cultural Antecedents*

Prior to becoming a nation, Ghana had to deal with many pre-colonial historical and cultural issues as did most of its West African and African neighbours. These historical issues centred on "indigenous, Islamic, European, migrant African, and Asian [phenomena in the face of] local, continental, and global concerns" (Konadu & Campbell 2016:3). All these provided the space and opportunity for the founding of the Gold Coast, made up of the British Togoland, the Ashanti Protectorate and the Fante Protectorate, to evolve into the modern day Ghana; the area which grappled with issues of slavery and colonialism between the 16th and 19th centuries respectively. The interactions through trade, wars, settlement, spread of religion and education among others, influenced and facilitated Ghana's acculturation to its modern state, though largely retaining its primordial cultural values, customs and tradition (Assimeng 1999: 1-270; Danquah 1928; Nukunya 2016: 3-316; Mair 1960: 447- 456; Migeod 1920: 109 - 125; and
Goody 1975).

5.1.1.3 *Colonial Era and Western Cultural Dominance and Influences*

Ghana's colonial period spanned 1902 to 1957 which was marked by a period of foreign rule and domination. The departure of the Danes and the Dutch between 1850 and 1870 and the final defeat of the Ashantis by the British colonial forces in 1874, as well as the abolishing of the slave trade, paved way for British colonial rule in the Gold coast (Gocking 2005; Arhin 1985). The colonial period witnessed the exploitation of natural resources, introduction of western form of governance and indirect rule, and its accompanying western cultures and influences among others. The Western culture then was manifest mainly through autocracy but with indirect rule as a façade; unequal terms of trade; use of force by security forces rather than services leading to abuses of human rights, appointment of administrative officials and introduction of western form of literacy among others. The several decades of domination and control led to several forms of

resistance by individuals and groups which culminated in the fight for independence (James 2012: 109-112).

The United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), and later the Convention People's Party (CPP), led by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah secured Ghana's independence in 1957. Of much importance to these developments were the changes that colonialism brought to Ghana. These included introduction of the English language as a lingua franca, establishment of legal and political institutions, integration of different ethnic and tribal groups into a polity, and the introduction of western education and religion, among others, all of which were based on western cultures and tradition (Nukunya 2016: 139-178' Assimeng 2007: 120).

5.1.1.4 *Post-Independence Developments*

After its first and second World War years and the struggle for independence from the onset of the 20th century, Ghana got independence from British colonial rule in 1957 and remained under one-party rule until 1966 when its first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, was overthrown in a coup d'état. Since then, several coups and counter coups truncated the democratic process in the country until 1993 when constitutional rule was restored under the former military leader Jerry John Rawlings. Military rule spanned a period of about 22 years compared to 14 years of civilian rule between 1957 and 1993. Adekson (1976: 251-272) explained the causes of instability to include Ghanaian political, tribal and class contradictions backed by personal rivalries, and external influences from Western imperialist quarters, underpinned by a contentious and changing ideologies in the struggle for footholds in Africa. Corruption, termed in the local parlance 'Kalabule' or 'Gyinabu', also served as a major cause for the 1979 Revolution which resulted in widespread killings but also, arguably, began the change in negative behavioural practices, including addressing moral decadence, attitudinal changes from 'top-bottom' to 'bottom-up' approach to governance, and reform of institutions and

the Ghanaian economy towards democracy, growth and development (Rothchild 1985: 1-6; Sam 2004; Adedeji 2001: 1-27; Chazan 1983).

Political instability was, therefore, prevalent amidst dictatorial tendencies, human rights abuses and lack of inclusive governance (Brenya *et al* 2015:1-14). The ushering in of democratic governance, initially under a transformed military regime to a civilian government of Jerry Rawlings, and its subsequent consolidation through alternation of power between the two major political parties of NDC and NPP brought about relative stability, peace and development in an unstable region for the past two decades and over. This development facilitated attempts at reform of the security sector in the areas of civil-police and civil-military relations, given negative perceptions generated by human rights abuses of past military regimes, and in particular that of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) led by former President Jerry John Rawlings (Table 5.1)

Table 5.1

Table Depicting Civilian/Military Governments in Ghana from 1957 to 2016

Name of Government	Name of Leader	Year	Duration	Remarks
Convention People's Party (CPP)	Dr. Kwame Nkrumah	1957 - 1966	9 yrs.	One-party civilian government (overthrown through coup d'état)
Military - National Liberation Council (NLC)	Col. E. K. Kotoka/Major A.A. Afrifa	1966-1969	3 ½ yrs.	Military Government (overthrown through coup d'état)
Progress Party	Mr. K.A. Busia	1969-1972	2 ½ yrs.	Civilian government (overthrown through coup d'état)
National Redemption Council (NRC)/Supreme Military Council I (SMC I)	Col. I.K. Acheampong	1972-1978	6 ½ yrs.	Military Government (overthrown through coup d'état)
Supreme Military Council II (SMC II)	Lt. Gen. Fred W.K. Akuffo	1978-1979	11 Months	Military Government (overthrown through coup d'état)

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)	Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings	June-Sept. 1979	3 Months	Military Government
People's National Convention (PNC)	Dr. Hilla Limann	1979 -1981	2 ½ yrs.	Civilian government (overthrown through coup détât)
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)	Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings	1981-1993	11 yrs.	Military Government
National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Flt. Lt. J. J. Rawlings	1993-2001	8 yrs.	Democratically elected government through multi-party elections
New Patriotic Party	Mr. J.A. Kufuor	2001-2009	8 yrs.	Democratically elected government through multi-party elections
National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Prof. J.E.A. Mills/Dr. John Dramani Mahama	2009-2016	8yrs.	Democratically elected government through multi-party elections
New Patriotic Party	Mr. Nana A. D. Akuffo-Addo	2016-2020	4yrs.	Democratically elected government through multi-party elections

Source: Adapted from Assimeng 1999:191, with author's additions.

5.2. Conceptions and Perceptions about Security Culture and Security Sector Governance in Ghana

Culture is defined in the 2004 Cultural Policy of Ghana as "… the totality of the way of life evolved by our people through experience and reflection in their attempts to fashion a harmonious co-existence between them and their environment material and non-material". Similarly, Anquandah (2007) sees culture as a life-style manifested by a particular people and society, and which generally describes human behavioural pattern. Also, culture within the traditional set up and indigenous institutions, is generally perceived as a way of life that manifests in the form of dresses and clothes worn, food eaten, precautionary measures adopted for self and society preservation, as well as the way of worship among other things. These definitions resonate with the general perception of culture among the traditional leaders in

Sunyani as a way of life of a people, reflected in their day-to-day activities in various communities (Focus Group Discussion, Sunyani, Brong Ahafo Region, 18 September 2015).

Culture, though seen as a way of life of a people, is equally construed as the fulcrum around which issues of 'complexity, acceptance and effectiveness' revolve. It involves panoply of multiple stakeholders whose activities lead to the provision of security for the country (interview Aning, KAIPTC, Accra, May 2015; also see Aning *et al* 2018: 121-135). The activities of these stakeholders are underpinned by a set of values and norms for societal behaviour. Norms, in this sense, apply to how people think and behave or a 'shared reality', and when routinised becomes cultural practices, while values relate to the moral judgement which may either inform behaviours or not (Frese 2015: 1327-1329; Shteynberg 2009: 46-69; Premark 1959: 219-233). Notwithstanding, different sets of values and norms can only be accepted when they are acculturated and internalised. This underscores the fact that cultural differences exist between people and entities including groups, institutions and even countries in the comity of nations, and peaceful coexistence could only be guaranteed through the recognition and acceptance of those differences manifested in behavioural patterns and traits.

Security on the other hand, and as discussed in chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis, remains a deeply contested and problematic concept but perceived as having two contradictory yet complementary faces which include political and social ordering towards stabilisation of the state and local power structures, as well as ensuring the protection of citizens or human beings' safety, livelihood and welfare (Bagayoko et al 2016: 7; Luckham and Kirk 2013: 1-30). In his keynote address at a Roundtable on Police and Policing in Accra, Ghana, in August 2001 on the theme "Challenges to Policing and Police Reform in Ghana Today", then Minister of the Interior, Hon. Alhaji Malik Al-Hassan, admitted that ensuring security at any level in the country was not easy

and could be as complicated and elusive as the HIV/AIDs virus (African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR) Roundtable on Police and Policing 2001:1).

In the Ghanaian context, security is perceived as the protection of the state and its borders, the people of Ghana, as well as maintaining public safety which includes the prevention of crime. It equally relates to their survival, well-being and satisfaction (¡nterview with Hon. Fritz Baffour, Chair, Select Committee on Defence and Interior, House of Parliament, Ghana, 18 May 2015). Others are also of the view that security connotes a situation in which people hold the belief of freedom from attack, damage or harm from robbery, terrorism, murder, assassination, scams as well as corruption. Some equally equate security to development by way of addressing development concerns by overcoming poverty, illiteracy, land disputes and challenges related to access to basic utilities or necessities (Aning *et al* 2018: 135).

Security is, thus, difficult to define but easier to explain as it relates more to human beings, their way of life, and issues to do with their survival, safety, well-being and contentment (interview with Mr. K. Bentum Quantson, retired Director of the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) and the Criminal Investigations Divisions (CID) of the Ghana Police Service, Accra, Ghana, 18 April 2019; Quantson 2008: 1-7). Beyond this, however, traditional leaders hold the view that security is God's given resources to mankind, including water, trees and other natural resources for survival, and thus should not be mishandled.

It therefore entails precautions taken to protect lives and property or the legal protection against possible harm or loss (Focus Group Discussion, Sunyani, Brong Ahafo Region, 18 September 2015). Others also think good relations and leadership guarantee security, but courage and truth define these qualities (Focus Group Discussions, Abutia Kloe, Volta Region, 15 September 2015). These definitions raise issues which reiterate a varied sense of definition of security in which negating all acts of insecurity to the state and its people become essential, but more importantly that security may not connote the absence of fear and threats per se, but having the capacity to respond to them if or as and when they arise.

Security culture, in an organisation or institutional context, entails having ideas, customs and social behaviour which influence the security of that entity either in a positive or negative manner. The major dimensions of cultural influences hinge mostly on the individuals or groups of persons taking into consideration their attitudes, cognition, behaviour, commitment, norms, responsibilities and compliance (Petric & Roer 2018: 7&14). In the broader context of a country, such as Ghana, security culture entails the securitisation and responses to security threats to the state and its citizens informed by common values and norms (Addo 2008: 197-211). The normative and transactional basis for solidarities in a security context is taken into consideration, which is in turn informed by networks of social interaction based on the tradition and customs of these groupings, institutions or agencies (Bagayoko *et al* 2016:11).

Thus, labeling or identifying an issue as a security threat and responses taken to address or mitigate such threats or fears are done by a conglomeration of both state and sub-state actors within the current democratic dispensation as compared to the past, under military rule, where the regime in power determines what constitutes security threats in the country. These values and norms are guided by the organic law of the land, that is the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, other security legislations including the Police Force Act, 1970 (350), the Armed Forces Acts, 1962 (105), and the Security Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (526) among others. The National Security Council and its affiliate Regional and District Security Councils play such roles within the formal security sector, while the Traditional Councils and National Peace Councils (NPC) on the other hand, made up of chiefs, religious and opinion leaders take responsibilities mainly within the informal security sector, though these roles are not mutually exclusive but complement each other.

Within the informal sector, some traditional leaders perceive security culture as measures or ways chiefs and their subjects adopt to ensure peace or safety in a community (Focus Group

Discussion, Sunyani, Brong Ahafo Region, 18 September 2016). Some examples include the protection of water sources against pollution, the way to eat and not get choked on food, as well as counseling and learning lessons through local proverbs and riddles to ensure the protection and safety in human endeavours. Conflict prevention, management and resolution also constitute an aspect of ensuring security in communities. These cultural practices serve to guarantee security in homes, communities, towns and the country at large.

Governance of the security sector entails the ability to manage complex structures and institutions to deliver or address the needs of the people in order to ensure they are free from fear and want. This requires providing effective leadership, translated as competent authority, which must play a key role in creating an appropriate platform for dialogue and governance of the security sector. It also requires the need to lead, give direction, coordinate affairs, diffuse tension, and promote cooperation in enhancing the governance of the security sector. An effective oversight would, however, serve to minimise the complexity of the governance process (interviews with Jaye and Aning, KAIPTC, Accra, 08 May 2015).

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2015) definition of governance in chapter 2 of this study considers governance from the viewpoint of citizens where they have the right to expect the provision of political, social, economic public goods from the state. These public goods are divided into four major categories to include safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunity and human development, but emphasis in this thesis is placed on the first category which relates to safety and rule of law.

Modern and traditional governance processes in Ghana have constitutional acceptance and is derived from the pre-colonial and colonial antecedents. This diarchy recognises governance through common and customary laws which facilitate the regulation of behaviours, practices and interaction among individuals, groups, communities and the people within the

territory of Ghana (Amenumey 2011: 1-280; Assimeng 2007: 164 – 191; Nkunya 2016: 85-94; Brobbey 2008). This system of governance resonates with Boege *et al*'s (2009: 14) conception of governance which goes beyond the Westphalian approach towards a more complementary system of formal and informal or endogenous form of governance which draws on "progressive attributes of social order and resilience within communities".

The formal system of governance, made up of the executive, parliament and judiciary, is presided over by the President of the country who is democratically elected through multi-party elections, while that of the traditional governance system is presided over by Chiefs and Traditional Councils who ascend thrones by nomination or succession. Both forms of government gain recognition and legitimacy under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana and among Ghanaians (Chapters 8, 10 & 11; Articles 270-277) though legitimacy for specific individuals, like the President and Chief, and institutions under these systems of governance vary. The Constitution, however, guarantees the recognition, honour and dignity of the chieftaincy institution 270 (2a-2b) but forbids their direct participation in politics except if they abdicate the chieftaincy title (270(1).

Notwithstanding, local ownership of policies and strategies for implementation still remain a major challenge in the governance process as donor funding and support in the area of governance are still tied to conditionalities which in some cases propose western approaches for project implementation, lack of recognition for local actors and input, as well as underestimating the difficulties involved in statebuilding and transformation processes (Nathan 2007:7).

5.3. Ghana's Security Sector and Governance Arrangements

Self-preservation and survival as a prime objective of every state form the basis of Ghana's security arrangements and governance processes. The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992: Articles 83-85) and the 1996 Security and Intelligence Agencies Act (526) define

the structure, functions, mechanisms and processes involved in the identification, prevention, management and elimination of threats to the peace, security and stability of Ghana. Ghana has no national security policy that defines its national interest and threats, or proffer strategies to address them. The functions of the core security actors are guided by the 1992 Constitution, the Police Service Act 1970 (350), the Armed Forces Act 1962 (105), the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act (SIAA) 1996 (526), as well as their respective service regulations.

The Constitution and the SIAA outline the structure of the security sector and its key actors. At the apex of the security architecture is the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is chaired by the President and has representations from both the executive and judiciary, while the legislature maintains oversight over the security sector. Section 4(a) of the SIAA requires the NSC to take appropriate measures to safeguard the internal and external security of Ghana among other things.

The President has the prerogative to seek counsel from the Council of State on national issues (*Constitution of the Republic of Ghana* 1992: Article 89). The Council of State comprises a body of prominent citizens of proven or distinguished character. They include persons who have formerly held positions of Chief Justice, Chief of Defence Staff of the GAF, Inspector-General of Police (IGP), President of the National House of Chief, a representative from each region of Ghana, and eleven other members appointed by the President. These persons are appointed by the President in consultation with the House of Parliament. The Council of State, among other things, advises the President on the appointment of security service chiefs, including the military, police and prisons services, and appointment to their security services Councils formerly chaired by the Vice President, but now by the President through a Constitutional amendment.

The NSC has other supporting structures which include the Regional Security Councils (REGSECs) and the District Security Councils (DISECs). The REGSECs and the DISECs replicate the composition and structure of the NSC with the Regional Ministers and District Chief Executives chairing these Councils at the regional and district levels respectively. Their basic duties are to perform functions to be assigned by the NSC and in turn provide early warning to the government on the likelihood of any security threats to the region, district, country or the government (Security and Intelligence Services Act 1996: Section 5).

Within the security sector arrangements are national and private security agencies or companies that provide operational and tactical security services in response to security threats in the country. The national security agencies include the following:

- The Ghana Armed Forces (GAF);
- The Ghana Police Service (GPS);
- Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and the Customs, Excise and Preventive Services (CEPS) – which are paramilitary in nature;
- The Ghana Prisons Service representing the penal or corrections system;
- The Ghana National Fire Services (GNFS);
- Bureau for National Investigation (BNI), External investigation wing referred to as the Research Bureau within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC), and the Defence Intelligence (DI) within the GAF; and
- Private Security Companies (PSCs).

Figure 5.1

The Structure of Ghana's Security Architecture defined by the 1992 Constitution



Source: Adapted from Bluwey & Kumado (eds.), November 2007, p. 18, with author's own additions.

The Service Councils for the various security agencies are responsible for regulating their activities, and are supposed to ensure the proper management, integrity and professional standards in the agencies. They are guided by specific legal acts and set of regulations for the security agencies. Differences, however, exist between these legal frameworks and their accountability requirements (Hutchful 2008: 115-116 in Bryden *et al* 2008). The Armed Forces Act of 1962, for example, made no provision for legislative oversight, while that of the Police Service Act (350, Section 36) calls for the submission of annual reports by the Minister of the Interior, after 30th of June, on the administration of the police service to parliament. This, however, is hardly ever done if at all (Aning 2015: 19-35). The Police Service Act also makes provision for the regulation of PSC in Ghana. Since its establishment, the Police Council has faced some key challenges including political control in terms of its composition and the chair

which is determined by the President, as well as limited activities related to promotions, demotions and dismissals (Aning 2015: 27).

Another body of relevance is the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) headed by a Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, and assisted by two deputies. This Commission, in Article 218(b) of the Constitution, is given the mandate to investigate complaints concerning the functions of the Public Service Commission, the GAF, the GPS and the Prisons Service in relation to unfair service restructuring, unequal access to recruitment into these services or unfair administration. The investigation also covers alleged violations of fundamental rights and freedoms under the Constitution.

Violations are taken to court for prosecution in accordance with the rule of law. Also in a similar vein of transparency and accountability, the Auditor-General's Department is responsible for auditing public accounts of Ghana and all public offices, as well as other bodies or organisations established by an Act of Parliament, thereby submitting an annual report to Parliament for oversight purposes. Hence the accounts of all security-related Ministries, Departments and Agencies would be subject to probity and accountability geared towards effective and efficient service delivery *(Constitution of the Republic of Ghana* 1992: Article 187; Aning & Lartey 2009: 7).

The House of Parliament provides oversight security responsibilities through three major Select Committees including that of Defence and the Interior in charge of the security agencies; the Finance Committee which deals with the budget for the NSC and oversees the activities of the CEPS; and the Public Accounts Committee which oversees budgets for the military and military expenditure (Aning and Lartey 2009: 6-10). The Judiciary interprets and oversees the enforcement of law and order, as well as protection against human rights abuses (*Constitution of the Republic of Ghana* 1992: Articles 125 -162).

The works of these formal structures are complemented by that of the indigenous governance structures made up mainly of the Traditional Councils, the Regional Houses of Chiefs and the National Houses of Chiefs (*Constitution of the Republic of Ghana* 1992: Articles 270-277). The Chieftaincy institution predates the colonial and post-colonial era, taking roots from the pre-colonial era and regarded as an institution of honour and dignity (Aning and Addo 2005: 104; Article 270(b)). This traditional institution "represent[s] [its] people's history, culture, laws and values, religion and even remnants of pre-colonial sovereignty" (Aning and Addo 2005: 104), and plays significant roles in local and national governance despite its challenges. The ideals and conceptions that underscore the 'resurgent heritage' of traditional authority in Ghana include the belief that all power stem from the people; that traditional authorities reflect the embodiment of traditional values and norms; and that the traditional leaders serve as the bridge between the past, and future (Aning and Addo 2005: 106).

A 'chief' is defined in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana as "a person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or queen-mother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage" (Article 277). Chiefs or queen-mothers and their elders preside over their subjects as custodian of the land, values, customs and tradition of their people, and administer their communities, districts and region based on customary law. The Chief Priest also plays specific roles, mainly spiritual, in contribution to this effort.

Chiefs and their elders interpret and codify the customary law, as well as compile these laws and lines of succession as applicable to stools or skin, and as required of them by the Ghanaian Constitution (Article 272(b); Brobbey 2008). Customary law and usage, among other things, define crimes, taboos and threats to the survival of the community. Acts contrary to community laws, rules and regulations attract severe fines and punishment, and in some cases

banishment or death. The chiefs and elders, thus, securitise issues and depend on the consent of community residents to enforce it.

The attributes of traditional structures and governance processes captured above facilitate governance mainly within the rural/ local governance spheres, but chiefs equally advise on issues affecting chieftaincy at the regional and national levels. Issues related to chieftaincy or the traditional set up, depending on their nature, context and at what level, are handled by the Traditional Councils, the Regional or National House of Chiefs and finally the Supreme Court, where their Judicial Committees are unable to resolve them. The Houses of Chiefs, thus, have appellate jurisdiction in any cause or matters related to or affecting chieftaincy (*Constitution of the Republic of Ghana* 1992: 273(1)).

As mentioned earlier, the chieftaincy institution is protected from state interferences to the extent that Parliament has neither power to accord nor withdraw recognition to or from a chief, nor undermine the honour and dignity of the institution (*Constitution of the Republic of Ghana* 1992: 270 (2a and 2b)). Parliament may, however, determine the composition of the members of the Regional House of Chiefs. They are also required to perform functions as may be conferred upon them by or under an Act of Parliament. The Chiefs are not allowed to take part in partisan politics, and those wishing to do so are required by the 1992 Constitution (Article 276(1)) to abdicate their stool or skin which reflects the symbol of authority. This is meant to preserve their status as custodians of the land, unifiers, wise men and women who must be as neutral and impartial as much as possible. They may, however, be appointed to public office for which they are qualified (Article 276 (2)). Given the negative traditional or cultural practices which undermine the rights of individuals, chiefs are tasked with evaluating traditional customs and usages so as to eliminate customs and usages that are outmoded and socially harmful (Article 276 (2c)).

The institution is tasked with the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts at the various levels of jurisdiction. Hence if traditional councils are unable to resolve disputes which are chieftaincy-related for example, they refer the matter to the Regional House of Chiefs, then to the National House of Chiefs until a final pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the issue. Where disputes threaten social harmony and outbreak of conflicts, the DISECs and REGSECs are allowed to intervene at their respective levels and where necessary, the NSC comes in. These structures, processes and mechanisms, thus, complement each other in taking appropriate measures to safeguard the internal and external security of Ghana.

A newly established institution known as the National Peace Council (NPC) was established in May 2011 to promote peace in Ghana and provide for related purposes (for more details see NPC Act 2011 (818); and National Peace Council Strategic Plan 2013-2017). The NPC was established by Act 818 of the House of Parliament with the objective to facilitate and develop mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as to build sustainable peace in Ghana.

One major function of the Council among several others is to facilitate the amicable resolution of conflict through mediation and other processes, including using indigenous mechanisms towards peacebuilding. This outfit creates avenues for civil society intervention in disputes, some of which involves government institutions like the electoral management body and political parties, as well as in cases where government is considered as a party to a conflict or dispute, and which requires an independent body to intervene. Its role or functions has eventually evolved towards a kind of ‘good offices’ role which is widely recognised and accepted by most if not all parties in a dispute. This was made possible by the representation of highly respected individuals on the Council from widely recognised religious bodies and traditional institutions, as well as respected opinion leaders. The NPC has affiliate Regional Peace Councils (RPCs) and

District Peace Councils (DPCs) that complement its work, and perform similar functions at the regional and district levels in the country.

Figure 5.2

Security Sector Oversight Control Bodies in Ghana



Source: Adapted from Bluwey & Kumado (eds.), November 2007, p. 18.

The above-mentioned structures, institutions, processes and mechanisms embody Ghana's peace and security architecture with clear roles and functions for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts or threats to the state. These institutions have their own institutional cultures – derived mainly formal/colonial and informal/traditional cultures, mechanisms and processes for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and for the minimisation or elimination of threats in the governance of the security sector. Hence an understanding, appreciation, recognition and acceptance of these institutional cultures, comprising a mixture of both indigenous and foreign cultures, would be essential in facilitating changes in negative behavioural practices of the actors towards enhancing good security governance practices and meeting security needs of the people and the state.

5.4 Early Attempts and Formalisation of Security Sector Reform in Ghana

Ghana's security sector reform agenda was initiated in the early to mid-1990s after several years of coups d'état, military rule and dictatorships spanning a period of over two and a half decades. The genesis of these security reforms in the early 1980s took place under the erstwhile Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) military regime which later on

transformed into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) political party which ushered in a new democratic dispensation. The military dictatorships (1966, 1972, 1978, 1979 and 1981) which first began with the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of Ghana in 1966, were briefly interspersed by two other civilian governments (1969-1972 & 1979-1981) under the 2nd and 3rd republics as indicated in Table 5.1 above.

The reforms which first focused on the economy of the country were in response to the many years of corruption, economic crisis and eventual economic doldrums which led to Jerry Rawlings' revolution in 1979 (Aryeetey *et al* 2000; Rabinowitz 2018: 169-196; Adedeji 2001:120). The causes of instability, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, included Ghanaian political, tribal and class contradictions backed by personal rivalries, and external influences from Western imperialist quarters, underpinned by a contentious and changing ideologies in the struggle for footholds in Africa Adekson (1976: 251-272). Corruption or 'Kalabule' also served as a major cause for the 1979 Revolution which resulted in widespread killings though initiating changes in negative behavioural practices towards growth and development (Rothchild 1985: 1-6; Sam 2004; Adedeji 2001: 1-27; Chazan 1983).

Alagidede *et al* (2013:6) observed a strong correlation between negative economic growth and periods of political instability and external shocks in Ghana by stating that "[t]he first negative growth occurred a year after the first military coup d'état in 1966, while the period 1972, 1979 and 1981-82 coincided with military intervention". The 4 June 1979 revolution and 31 December 1981 military coup engendered eventual class struggles among the people with socialist and capitalist undertones towards steering the country out of its political and economic crises (Yeebo 1985: 64-72; Graham 1985: 54-68).

Developing and getting the country out of its economic and political woes required major recovery efforts and structural changes which led to a consideration of the International

Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank interventions through which the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) were implemented (Government of the Republic of Ghana 1983; Konadu-Agyemang 2001; Donkor 1997; & Hutchful 2002). The Bretton Woods institutions came with conditionalities perceived as encroachment on national sovereignty as developing countries at the time had no choice but to accept the conditions in an attempt to reverse the economic woes of the country (Loxley 1990: 827).

Tsikata (2006: 101) observed that Ghana's status of having 'anti-Western' sentiments, informed by its non-aligned posture, but with clear socialist tendencies, did not immediately attract the IMF and the World Bank to its aid as it sought resources to offset terms of trade deficits and recover from 'Africa's lost decade'. But through this initiative, Ghana gained the status of a "star pupil" of the SAP, despite several challenges, thereby establishing the bedrock for further reforms and sustained stability and development (Tsikata 2006: 99). This was attributed to the strong local and national outlooks in the initiation of the programme and the early years of the ERP embarked upon. Adedeji, like Chazan, equally attributed this success to former President Jerry John Rawlings' "strength of character and unwavering determination" (Adedeji 2001:1 from Chazan 1983).

As part of the IMF/World Bank conditionalities to rationalise the economy and promote fiscal discipline and good governance, the state had to roll-back its major control or intervention in the economy through subsidies and other socialist policies, cut down its military or defence expenditure, and shift from excessive militarisation to opening the space for democracy to thrive.

In the area of military and militarisation, Hutchful (1997: 251-278) identified six stages of transformation to include the politicisation and democratisation of the Ghanaian military between 1982-1984; its political disengagement and partial re-professionalisation between 1984

1987; undertaking further reforms and subsequent transition to democracy from 1987- 1992; the enhancement of civilian control over its activities from 1992-1996; a restructuring of the Armed Forces of Ghana; and facilitation of civil-military relations in the new democratic dispensation.

Subsequent period of stability, mainly from the commencement of the 4th Republic of Ghana in 1992, facilitated the building of democratic institutions, separation of powers among the three branches of government, and awareness creation and the practice of good governance in the country. This was made possible largely by a strengthened opposition and the opening of the media space for freedom of expression (Boafo-Arthur 2007: 63-64). The security landscape also benefited from this development, as more demands were made on government and its security agencies to respect the rights of people and remain accountable to citizens.

The Government of Ghana embarked on a National Institutional Renewal Programme (NIRP) in December 1994 as part of efforts to transform and strengthen a weakened and corrupt public service oriented towards development and promotional needs (Opoku 2010: 160; NIRP 1995: 3). This initiative was not carried out immediately in the security institutions and agencies especially under the National Democratic Congress Party government, which was largely an extension of the Jerry Rawlings' PNDC, until much later in the 2000s and beyond when major reforms were embarked upon (Aning & Lartey 2009:2). Notwithstanding, the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana streamlined, rationalised and clarified roles of all the prominent security institutions for effective functioning and security service delivery. Other key legislations including the 1996 Security and Intelligence Agencies Act 526 also contributed towards defining the structure, composition and function of Ghana's national security and intelligence apparatus.

The formalisation of SSR and SSG concepts and processes only gained grounds in Ghana after the 2000 elections which brought about the transfer of power from one democratically elected regime to the other – that is from the NDC to the NPP (Hutchful 2008:111& 117 in

Bryden *et* al 2008; and Aning and Lartey 2009: 2). This included reforming formal security governance structures and indigenous ones, though donor support was initially geared towards formal security institutions and agencies.

The period from 2001 to 2008 experienced basic reforms which were undertaken on ad hoc basis within security agencies and institutions rather than in a transformative and holistic manner. It was neither based on drafting a security policy to guide the sector nor structural reforms under the Kufuor administration. Selected security reform initiatives were embarked upon within the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, and also within some of the security agencies including the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service.

Series of security dialogues were also undertaken to sensitise and share experiences and good practices on security reform and governance initiatives towards effective and efficient security delivery (see Hutchful 2008 in Bryden et al 2008: 111- 128; Aning 2004; ASDR Roundtable on Police and Policing 2001:1-44). Security Sector Management (SSM) programmes were organised for both civilian and military personnel from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) (Ghana News Agency, 14 July 2004). Donor support facilitated some of these security reform and governance initiatives despite initial reluctance under the PNDC regime and the NDC Government. Security Sector Management (SSM) programmes were organised for both civilian and military personnel from the MoD (Ghana News Agency, 14 July 2004).

These efforts succeeded to the extent that a platform was created for constant dialogue between civilians and their police and military counterparts in meetings, seminars, conferences and in the media. The discourse facilitated sharing of lessons from past experiences and prudent security practices, as well as cross-fertilisation of ideas between the security agencies and civilian security technocrats on capacity-building and the need for an effective and efficient service delivery of security needs in a democracy (OECD 2007: 38-39; also see Atuguba 2003:

1-29; and Addo 2002). All these were made possible by a transition process marked by a peaceful and stable democracy in which the economy thrived and people became informed and empowered enough to demand the respect of their rights.

The late President of Ghana, Prof. Evans Atta Mills of the NDC, and his team who took over from the NPP Government after 8 years in opposition sought to focus more on improving the welfare and service conditions of security personnel, among others, under the 2009 Single Spine Pay Policy Scheme (See Ghana Government White Paper on the Single Spine Pay Policy, WP. No. 1/2009, November 2009). The scheme was designed to address low salaries and wages towards motivating interest and increased productivity in the public service towards better performance as compared to the private sector. The single by 1 January 2010, which would constitute about 50% increase in comparison to the GHS1.9 billion at the end of spine pay reform was estimated to raise the base pay wage bill in Ghana to GHS2.8 billion 2008 (Cavalcanti 2009: 1 in World Bank Policy Research Paper, December 2009).

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), however, considered this as too expensive, unsustainable and had the propensity to increase government fiscal deficit with dire consequences on the economy (World Bank 2017: 74-85). Government's move in this direction was informed by the fact that Ghana, in 2011, it arguably became the fastest growing economy in the world (*Daily Graphic* cited on myjoyonline.com 2011; Euler Hermes 2011: 3), and was also among the top ten fastest growing economy in the world in 2012 (*The Sun* cited on myjoyonline.com 2012; and Harding 2012: 2-3). It also had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2014 amounting to US$48.7 billion (Ghana Statistical Services 2014).

The John Mahama-led government that took over governance of the country after the death of former President John Atta Mills generally maintained the policies of its predecessors, in addition to enhancing the presence and image of the security services, especially the Ghana

Police Service. But despite this significant progress made in the past decade, owing to the stability and upholding good governance practices alluded to earlier, more still remains to be done (see Atuguba 2003: 1; Hutchful 2008 in Bryden et al 2008: 111& 124; and Badong 2009: 6). The absence of a national security policy which ideally defines the interest of the state, its internal and external threats, and strategies and resources required to address these threats has captured Ghana's securitisation of issues as *ad hoc* (Bluwey and Kumado 2007: 2-11).

Challenges also persist in the areas of resistance to change within the security institutions and agencies, lack of political will, and the belief that there are more pressing demands in other sectors of the economy, including health and education (Beckitt and Bakrania 2010: 10; Hutchful 2008: 124 in Bryden *et al* 2008). Though security sector governance, including issues of oversight, accountability and transparency in the security agencies and institutions, has seen some levels of improvement in recent times, owing to vigilance of civil society groups and actors, issues of corruption and lack of expertise in this area have served as a hindrance. Efforts to build capacity of parliamentary committees to ensure effective and efficient resourcing of security agencies and complementary service delivery also stalled and lost momentum.

Notwithstanding and as mentioned earlier, civil society – comprising NGOs, policy and security think-tanks, and citizens in the general – played and continue to play active oversight roles through the engagement of government officials in the media, by demanding transparency and accountability in their performance of duty and service delivery. In addition, the traditional security mechanisms have complemented the formal security mechanisms in successfully managing perennial ethnic conflicts mostly in the northern parts of Ghana, and chieftaincy and occasional religious disputes across the country (Aning and Addo 2005).

The successes chalked with regard to the macro-economic indicators present an interesting scenario for lessons to be learned, while the potential equally exist to strengthen

security sector governance as part of the statebuilding processes towards a more stable democracy for growth and development.

Issues of security governance in the traditional system have been based mainly on the protection, security and safety of kingdoms and chiefdoms and their residents, despite limited attempts at introducing structured reforms as in the case of the formal sector. With time, however, it became necessary to undertake reforms by transforming the chieftaincy institution from fighting wars and defending themselves against their enemies in pre-and-post colonial times to pursuing dispute or conflict resolution, natural resource management, and other political, economic and social development programmes in the post-independence era (Brobbey 2008: ix-x). Legislative reforms based mainly on the Chieftaincy Acts of Ghana (Act 370 of 1971; and the Revised Act 759 of 2008) and Chieftaincy provisions in the Ghanaian Constitution provided the basis for these reforms.

Notions of leadership and legitimacy were central to important factors considered in ensuring successful security governance within the traditional institution (Focus Group Discussions, held in Abutia and Sunyani in the Volta and Brong Ahafo regions of Ghana respectively on 15 and 18 September 2015). Security referents were perceived to be in families, homes, communities and the nation and, thus, the focus of security governance in terms of meeting safety, security and protection needs was to be seen in this direction. Traditional leaders were equally of the view that there were some issues that fell squarely within the domain of the traditional leaders, and only these leaders had the skill, expertise and legitimacy to handle them as pertains to modern security governance arrangements. Some of these issues relate to seeking spiritual protection and healing, and adjudicating some disputes or conflicts, which the formal governance arrangements would have problems handling.

Some practices within the traditional governance system, alluded to earlier, are also perceived under modern value systems as backward and amounting to human rights abuses. Controversial examples were cited about the lack of discipline of children and youth leading to social ills and crimes given that when corrective measures are taken, it is considered within modern security and justice arrangements as human rights abuses. This partly underscored the inherent tensions between the two approaches to security governance, with needed reforms to improve upon or integrate values, norms and standards. The need to do away with obsolete traditional customs that are harmful to the individual and the integration of traditional and modern approaches to security governance were equally highlighted. This was attributable to the fact that some security issues, including crime and robbery, have become too modern and complicated to handle by traditional security institutions, while others are equally best handled by them like alternative dispute resolution which is much cheaper and faster in some instances than pursuing cases through the legal justice system.

In a nutshell, using only 'top-bottom' approaches to address SSG issues undermine local content and local ownership, which leads to the lack of proper understanding of the concept, as well as lack of legitimacy of leadership in the process. Again, some traditional values, norms and standards also differ from that of the modern security governance and arrangements and thus require major behavioural and attitudinal changes in embracing the concept. Hence, the concept of security sector reform is considered as new, foreign and largely construed as imposed rather than internally spearheaded (Bryden and Olonisakin 2010: 6). Formalisation of SSG in Ghana, therefore, had to contend with some of the above-mentioned issues and find common and systematic approaches to ensuring a hybrid or integrated modern and traditional security governance system.

5.5 Ghana's Security Challenges and Responses: Whither Security Culture in Security Sector Governance?

5.5.1 *Summary of Ghana's Internal and External Security Challenges*

Several security challenges have confronted Ghana and posed threats to the peace and stability of the country. These threats can be categorised into internal and external security threats. The internal threats include chieftaincy, land and ethnic disputes; violent crimes including armed robberies, kidnapping, car-jacking, ritual murders and homicide; and perennial traditional/religious conflicts and disputes between settler farmers and cattle rustlers (Tonah 2007: 3-240; Appiahene-Gyamfi 1998: 409-424; Adinkra 2005). Beyond these are also issues of food insecurity, inadequate health facilities and poor sanitation, and environmental challenges. External security threats, on the other hand, have manifested mainly in the form of transnational criminal activities including smuggling, human, drug and small arms trafficking, as well as piracy, violent extremism or terrorism (Addo 2006: 1-23; Birikorang 2007; Addo 2008: 197-209).

On the international front, the promotion and protection of the interest of Ghana, the respect for international law and treaty obligations, as well as the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means define its foreign policy and treaty obligations (*Constitution of the Republic of Ghana* 1992: Article 40(a-c). In this context, and as a country, Ghana is expected to adhere to other principles including that of the United Nations, the African Union and the ECOWAS, together with other international organisations of which Ghana is a member (Article 40d (i-iv)).

5.5.2 *Ghana's Security Complexes cum Security Culture Influences in Responses to Security Challenges*

The values guiding Ghana's pursuit for foreign policy is categorised into five major areas. These include national self-preservation or survival; emancipation of Africa and restoration of the

black people; establishment of power and influences in Africa; pursuit of world peace through the policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment; and international cooperation for development through intergovernmental action (Bluwey 2002: 46-47; Addo 2008: 198). These values were promoted mainly under President Kwame Nkrumah's CPP government, based on the ideals of anti-colonialism, pan-Africanism and anti-imperialism in the Cold War era.

Thus, an integrated domestic and external security policies guide government's intervention in responses to security threats, be it prevention, management or resolution, but the extent of the application of these values and effective and efficient engagement of the security architecture toward responding to the state and people's security needs require some critical assessment for enhancement.

Responses to security challenges in Ghana are varied and are mainly undertaken by various security actors at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, with support from international partners. Additionally, traditional security structures and mechanisms have played complementary roles in ensuring effective responses to security needs. However, in attempt to assess the level of governance, and its effectiveness or impact on providing security needs of both the state and its people, roles played by internal and external actors are reviewed, while assessing the extent to which SSG efforts are externally driven and its general impact on the security reform process. This is expected to establish the level of complexity of the SSG process, given the different security cultures at play, the extent of legitimacy and for that matter acceptance, and options for enhancing the SSG process in Ghana. To do this effectively, conflicts in the Yendi chieftaincy dispute between the Andanis and the Abudus, and that of the Hohoe religious/settler-indigene disputes in Ghana, are used as brief illustrations.

5.5.2.1 *The Yendi Conflict and the Missing Elements of Cultural Sensitivities, Legitimacy and Acceptance*

The Yendi conflict, which mainly highlights the lack of legitimacy and therefore 'acceptance' issues, stemmed from chieftaincy succession disagreements between two gates (or royal families) – the Andaniyili and the Abuduyili – in the Dagbon Kingdom which was based, largely, on the rotation system from 1849 to 1953 (Mahama & Noble 2005). This ethnic group is patrilineal and, therefore, the most qualified son inherits the father after his death (Amankwa 2005). The kin-makers are believed to follow a strict indigenous and widely acceptable customary process for selecting the most qualified descendant, mainly a son or one of the most qualified sons of the demised king.

Amankwa (2005) recounts the intrusion of the Europeans, mainly British and Germans, in 1899 to partition the Dagbon Kingdom, disrupt the rotation system to the skin, and introduce a new voting system. Prior to this, it is believed that the rotation system put in place by the people of Dagbon for selecting their kings worked rather well. The new voting system is believed to have included a probationary period for a selected king who had the tendency to be removed for performing below standard. This and other new practices, obviously, were alien to the indigenes and believed to have led to the disruption of the traditional system in place. The lack of codification during the pre-colonial days, and which the British also tried to find a lasting solution to but without much success, always affected and undermined standard practices within the chieftaincy institution (Amankwa 2005).

This and subsequent political interferences in the post-independence period, including that of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) and later the Progress Party (PP), based largely on western forms of governance introduced at the time, truncated the rotation and succession order in determining who became a king, i.e. Ya-Na. The political drift later aligned

the two gates, Andaniyili and Abuduyili who had the same grandfather in the person of Ya-Na Abdulai II, to the two leading political parties, the NDC and the NPP respectively, with traditional alliances to the CPP and PP respectively. This was partly to amass political sentiments and votes for political power, as well as the greed for access to land and other resources in the area (Sulemana 2009:110 - 138).

This chieftaincy dispute eventually worsened and led to fighting between the two related chiefdoms caused mainly by disagreements surrounding the celebration of the Muslim festival, Eid al-Adha, and the Bugum (fire) festival in Yendi under the auspices and leadership of the Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II. The Abudus preferred to celebrate these festivals separately from the one to be organised by the Ya-Na as they questioned his authority and leadership as the Chief of the area. The Abudus, aligned to the NPP Government which was in power at the time, subsequently went ahead to celebrate their own Muslim festival under police/military protection, thereby undermining the power and authority the Ya-Na. This development equally informed the Ya-Na's mistrust and rejection of an offer of police protection by the NPP Government to him and his palace, based on a suspicion of planned attacks on his life. The brewing tension led to the imposition of a ban on the celebration of the Fire festival by the REGSEC under the directive of the NSC and a 6.00 am – 6.00 pm curfew in the area (Republic of Ghana, 2002).

The curfew which was expected to be in place from 24 to 26 March 2002 at the request of the DISEC did not hold as the Ya-Na requested the then Regional Minister, Prince Imoro Andani from the Andani Gate, to call off the curfew and lift the ban on the celebration of the Fire festival (Republic of Ghana, 2002: 67; Iddi 2013: 41). The Minister accepted the proposal and obliged with the Ya-Na's suggestion by lifting the ban on the celebration of the Fire festival, as well as calling off the curfew on 24 March 2002 without consultations with either the REGSEC or the NSC. This unilateral decision by the government official sparked protests from the Abudus who

felt dissatisfied with the reversal of the decision and fears of possible attacks on their lives by the Andanis.

Fighting thus began on 25 March 2002 and culminated in the murder of the Ya-Na on 27 March 2002, allegedly by members of Abuduyili, in a three-day war under rather inexplicable and mysterious circumstances, and the destruction of properties at his palace and elsewhere (Iddi 2013: 39-43). The degeneration of the dispute and its escalation was attributed to lapses in security in the area. Iddi (2013:42) argues that the "Yendi crisis of March 2002 was a clear case of security failure on the part of government both before and during the crisis". His reason for this assertion was attributed to the slow response on the part of the security forces to the 'mushroom clouds' which gathered into a 'fog of war' in Yendi as the security forces waited for the conflict to break out before responding to the crisis. The security forces were also understaffed and ill-equipped to respond effectively and proportionately to the crisis.

In addition, the unilateral lifting of the ban on the Fire festival celebration and the calling off of the curfew at the request of the Ya-Na obviously compromised the security situation. Coordination between both traditional and modern security arrangements was poor and decisions were undermined by party political alliances and ethnic considerations. Similar killings of 33 citizens also took place on 9 September 1969 which made the murdered Ya-Na a regent at the time (Mahama & Noble 2005). The disputes and killings, as well as destruction of property, in the March 2002 Yendi crisis brought instability in the region, and left the conflict partly unresolved till 2019 (Republic of Ghana 2002; Iddi 2013: 39). The uneasy peace continued to perpetuate fear and insecurity in Yendi and its environs, given the tendency for the conflict to reignite with subtle conflict triggers, as the structural causes of the conflict had not been resolved.

The illustration above clearly indicates lack of cultural awareness and sensitivities, and the essential role legitimacy plays in the acceptance of leadership towards effective governance. It equally unveils the inefficient management of the conflict as a result of lapses in both modern and traditional conflict management and resolution mechanisms, and thus leading to disastrous consequences. Hence, despite the existence of security governance structures and mechanisms, lapses in the coordination and complementarity between and among these structures in a hybrid context eluded most if not all the actors involved. The police and military present in the area were unable to prevent the outbreak of the war, despite clear signals or early warning signs and curfews imposed in the area under the directive of the National Security Council.

5.5.2.2 *The Hohoe Conflict and the Essential Role of Cultural Awareness and Sensitivities in Management and Resolution of Disputes*

In contrast to the Yendi conflict, a potentially dangerous conflict in the Hohoe District of the Volta region of Ghana which equally threatened to engulf the entire district and its surrounding areas was eventually managed and resolved amicably based on lessons learned from the past, and the complementary use of the hybrid indigenous and modern security arrangements in place (Iddi 2013: 44-47). The conflict erupted in June 2012, during the tenure of President John Atta Mills of the NDC government, between the indigenous Ewes from the Gbi ethnic group, and the settler Zongo (Muslim) community.

The genesis and triggers of the conflict were attributed to two main factors. The first was in relation to the destruction of the Hohoe Hospital properties by the Zongo youth who accused the hospital staff of delays resulting in the death of their electrocuted colleague by name Mr. Magid Malik, and the wrongful assault on a mortuary attendant suspected to be taking their deceased colleague to the mortuary against Islamic belief (Okoampa-Ahoofe 2012; Iddi 2013: 43-44). This action subsequently led to a ban on the entire Zongo community by the Paramount

Chief of the Gbi Traditional Area, Togbiga Gabusu VI, preventing them from burying their dead on the land for the wrongful abuse of hospital staff and destruction of hospital properties.

The second had to do with the exhumation, by the Hohoe youth, of the late Magid Malik and the late Chief Imam of the Zongo Community who were all buried after the ban, and which was seen as a violation of the ban imposed on the Zongo community by the Traditional Council (*Ghanaweb,* 11 June 2012). In response to these acts of exhumation considered by the Zongo youth as sacrilegious, the Zongo youth went on rampage and attacked the palace of the Paramount Chief of the Gbi Traditional Area, vandalised his properties, torched two of his cars and took away some regalia from his palace. They also torched some houses and vandalised some properties in the Hohoe municipality (*Ghanaweb.com,* 11 June 2012; & *Modernghana.com,* 18 June 2012).

These attacks, particularly on the palace of the Paramount Chief Togbiga Gabusu VI, angered the Gbi youth who equally considered the act as sacrilegious and thus engaged in reprisal attacks, resulting in violent confrontations in the municipality (Iddi 2013: 43). Houses, shops and other properties of the Zongo community residents were also destroyed, leading in the process to three reported deaths, and the burning of several houses and vehicles as a result of the fighting in the municipality (*Panapress.com,* 16 June 2012).

Swift responses to this conflict by the political and civil society leadership at the national, regional, district and municipal levels, facilitated by the existing traditional and the modern security architecture, however, led to a timely and peaceful resolution of the conflict (Iddi 2013: 44-47). The swift and formidable response came as a result of the intelligence gathered by security agencies about the likely spill-over of the conflict beyond the municipality, with ongoing attempts at mobilisation of other Zongo communities across the country to support their tribesmen. All relevant actors, including politicians, top security personnel, the various security

councils from the National to the District/Municipal levels, the Volta Regional House of Chiefs, the National Peace Council, the Chief Imam and some civil society organisations, facilitated mediation efforts, negotiations and dialogue, complemented by the deployment of 200 policemen and 300 military personnel in the municipality (Iddi 2013: 46-47; *Daily Graphic* carried on *Ghanaweb.com*, 15 June 2012; & *Panapress.com,* 16 June 2012). This laudable partnership between the state and sub-state actor groups in the resolution of the crisis gained a lot of recognition and commendation from Ghanaians and other international observers, given the potential spill-over effects and lax in responses to the crisis at the initial stages. This partnership goes to demonstrate the potential effectiveness and efficiency in the governance of the security sector.

The contrast between the two conflict scenarios of Yendi and Hohoe enumerated above, therefore, reflects the need to reinforce the hybrid approach of engaging both the indigenous and modern security architecture in the governance of the security sector in Ghana. This approach was highlighted in the two focus group discussions held in Abutia Kloe in the Volta Region and Sunyani in the Brong Ahafo Region with members of traditional councils.

In Abutia Kloe, the Traditional Council reiterated existing community partnerships and collaboration between the Ghana Police Service and the Council in which the GPS is called upon to resolve issues and vice versa in cases where the Council has the competence (Focus Group Discussion, 15 September 2015, Abutia Kloe, V/R). Calls were equally made to increase police presence and resources in the area as that serves to prevent crimes and facilitate timely intervention in the prevention of conflicts. In the case of Sunyani, the Traditional Council referred specifically to partnerships and collaborative efforts between and among the Chiefs and their people and the GPS in the identification and arrest of criminals in the community.

They equally cited the intensity and complexity of crimes in recent times as compared to the past, such as rape, abortion, armed robbery and murder, hence requiring this important partnership between the indigenous and modern security arrangements to combat them (Focus Group Discussion, 18 September 2015, BA/R). They also highlighted the potential of the traditional councils to deal effectively with spiritual issues in the communities that the law courts may have absolutely no jurisdiction or physical means of adjudication.

Lessons from the above cases indicate the need to always contextualise security responses based on expertise, knowledge and cultural exigencies of diverse actors from different institutions for successful conflict prevention, management and resolution. Pursing only top-bottom approaches or translational attributes in governance and security responses to threats or security needs without a consideration of the context and hybrid nature of actors involved results in failure with dire consequences.

5.5.2.3 *Positive Manifestations of Contextual Hybridism in Electoral Dispute Resolution*

Another pertinent area in the security governance process reinforcing the need for positive or progressive attributes of hybridity, that is contextual rather than translational hybridity, relates to the management and resolution of electoral disputes in Ghana. Since the onset of democratic governance in 1992 and its consolidation for more than two decades, elections have experienced tensions, violence and several electoral disputes, one of which ended up in the Supreme Court for final judgement in 2012. But the most tensed and highly contested election was that of 2008 where the ruling NPP was defeated by then opposition NDC party with a slim margin of about 40,000 votes. Emphasis on the 2008 elections, however, relates to the robust, hybrid and quite resilient governance and security institutions that helped in preventing the escalation of widespread violence, management of conflicts, and the resolution of several electoral disputes across the country (Debrah 2016: 371-387; Ayelazuno 2011: 22-47). The trade

unions, churches, political parties, policy think-tanks and other civil society and non-governmental organisations got involved in averting a potential violence and national crisis. As Meissner (2010: 10) rightly observed, "… the positive course that the elections ultimately took, and the peaceful change of government they brought about, are in the end a purely Ghanaian success".

Table 5.2

Major Events in Ghana's Political Trajectory: 1957 - 2020

1957-1958	Attempts at political pluralism
1958-1964	Elected Civilian Regime
1964-1966	One-Party System (CPP)
1966-1969	Military Regime
1969-1972	Elected Civilian Regime
1972-1979	Military Regime
1979-1981	Elected Civilian Regime
1981-1992	Military Regime
1992-1996	Political Transition
1996-2008	Emerging Democracy
2008-2020	Consolidated Democracy

Source: Adapted from Institute of Security Studies (ISS) Situation Report (Zounmenou 2009: 2; & Gocking 2005)

Zounmenou (2009:7) equally buttressed the strong and effective partnerships between civil society organisations, the media and the Electoral Commission of Ghana which helped to raise awareness about the necessity of transparent elections. In addition, however, he alluded to the peaceful power alternation in the country to three principal factors, including the political leadership decision to uphold constitutional term limits; the acceptance of the democratic consensus by social and political actors; and the efficient national election system or machinery (Zounmenou 2009: 1). This in no way projects the electoral system of Ghana as a perfect one, as many lapses exist and requires consistent attention. Notwithstanding, it holds major potentials for further consolidating democracy and good governance if values, norms and good governance practices are continually observed, as well as putting the collective interest of the country first.

5.5.2.4 *International Partnerships and the Issue of Translational Hybridism*

On the international front, responses to transnational crimes and peacekeeping engagements have transpired mainly within the pursuit of Ghana's foreign policy objectives. These objectives have been based on the principle of good neighbourliness towards achieving prosperity and dignity for all Ghanaians and their neighbours (Kufuor 2002: 6). This has manifested within the spheres of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, with Ghana's strong participation in the activities of ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations. But given a rapidly changing or evolving global context, President Kufuor, in his first term of government from 2000-2004, encouraged collaborative partnerships between all security actors toward effective pursuit of Ghana's foreign policy objectives in addressing transnational crimes and strengthening the country's defence component of the foreign policy. He placed emphasis on civil society participation in this regard as this was perceived to be weak, with responsibilities mainly on the executive and legislature. The President iterated the following:

> Equally of great interest to me is how to cooperate with other states to deal effectively with cross-border crimes and weapons proliferation in our sub-region. It would be equally instructive to read your suggestions about the defence component of our foreign policy and how to set up an effective coordination mechanism between the Executive, Parliament, Academia, foreign policy practitioners and civil society so that such reviews of our policy options would occur on a more regular basis (Kufuor 2002: 11).

This call on civil society, including academics/security experts and policy practitioners, was instructive in generating the desired partnership needed towards reinforcing Ghana's foreign policy objectives and strategies in addressing its external security needs and challenges for the country. The call created space for freedom of speech and expression, and also underscored the

need to mainstream shared values and preferences in securitising issues, and responding to external security threats within the ECOWAS region and beyond (Addo 2008: 203). The media facilitated this effort through civil society demands for accountability and performance in addressing security challenges confronting the country, be it terrorism, cross-border crimes like smuggling of goods and trafficking of small arms, drugs and human beings etc. Security experts' views are equally sought on how to remedy the situation, while officials of government and their relevant ministries are called upon to address the situation in radio and television interviews and discussion programmes across the country.

Despite unquestionable commitments to regional, continental and other international security arrangements, some of the identified transnational security challenges have intensified, while others remain elusive and potential future threats. Questions of reflexivity in national and regional security arrangements based on shared values, and the commitment and willingness to address challenges in the region, particularly ECOWAS, still linger. At best, the argument could be made that Ghana's attempts at addressing regional security challenges in the context of implementing ECOWAS security and governance protocols have not gone much beyond the rhetoric as issues of corrupt leadership, weak institutions, security lapses, and the lack of interagency coordination and inadequate resources continue to linger as in other West Africa countries (Addo 2006; & Addo 2008).

In the area of security sector assistance and support from donors, while discussions and dialogue about the SSR concept and its implementation were initiated, facilitated and promoted essentially by an Accra-based security think-tank, the African Security Dialogue and Research, it also depended largely on external funding and support for its programmes, undertaking some in partnership with other international NGOs including the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). From 1999-2003 for instance, the MacArthur Foundation gave a grant of US$300,000 for

undertaking a research on Security Sector Reform and Democratisation in Africa; and from 2001-2003 the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) also gave US$300,000 for a research project on Africa Military Expenditures which it implemented in partnership with the SIPRI. It equally benefited from the UK Government Global Conflict Prevention Pool funding to the tune of US$187,000 for conducting research, seminars and workshops on Security Sector Governance in Africa from 2003 to 2006 (Hutchful 2018).

On direct support to the Government of Ghana, the British Government, through its GFN-SSR programme now Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), focused mainly on networking, research and information sharing, capacity-building, and promoting the SSR Concept in Ghana (GFN-SSR, December 2007). In addition to this, other security sector reform, governance and management training programmes, aimed at capacity-building, were undertaken by the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) and other security and academic institutions with expertise in the area. This focused mainly on training and equipping the military. The African Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) also focused on "enhancing peace support operations capabilities; security sector reform; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; curbing small arms proliferation and misuse; and researching the economic and financial causes of conflict" (DFID ACPP, September 2004). As part of this programme, Ghanaian peacekeeping troops were deployed in Cote d'Ivoire under ECOMICI in 2003 through ACPP funding to the tune of £3.5 million (DFID, September 2004: 10).

These support and training programmes were underpinned by western cultures and ideologies and were undertaken based on certain conditionalities. The knowledge gained and capacity built were thus translated and acquired respectively.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Ghana Office also played active roles in the support of security reforms in the country. The UN agency which has a much broader and holistic definition of security in line with the human security definitions considers issues of exclusion from governance and decision-making processes as well as corruption as having a negative impact on a country's security and stability (interview with Justice Agbezuge of UNDP Ghana, 19 May 2015). It has largely focused its attention on addressing small arms and light weapons proliferation in Ghana (Tandoh & Satsi 2017) and has also made significant contribution to the establishment of the National Peace Council in Ghana. Its support in this area has contributed to the development of the National Peace Council's five-year Strategic Plan from 2013 to 2017 which guided its programmes and activities over the past years (Awinador-Kanyirige 2014: 1).

In addition to its support to the National Peace Council, the UNDP has also facilitated capacity-building in the area of alternative justice and lending support to Chiefs and other traditional and religious leaders in the country, as some have adjudicative functions under the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution (*Ghana News Agency*, 27 July 2013).

In as much as these assistance and support from donors have facilitated the introduction of the SSR concept and capacity-building within security agencies, contributions to security sector reform and governance in Ghana, and for that matter West Africa and Africa as a whole, still faces challenges from examples given above (Brzoska 2003: 6). This, in most cases, is attributed to the undemocratic and regime centredness of African governments, unpredictable security environment, huge military budget expenditures, and lack of immediate reward from assistance to the security sector as compared with other sectors which are mainly development focused (Brzoska 2003: 6-7; Knight *et al* 1996: 1-37; and Davoodi *et al* 2001). Few exceptions however exist in post-conflict countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia where the British and

American governments invested heavily in security sector reform efforts, made easy by defined roles in peace agreements and in support of UN-led post conflict reconstruction efforts (*Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement*, August 2003 and Lomé Peace Agreement on Sierra Leone, July 1999).

In all these support or assistance, the contentious issue has been that of donor influences and demands in the areas of donor aid, prescriptive programmes, and conditionalities. The security sector benefits directly or indirectly from donor aid in the context of guaranteeing human security which covers broad areas of security needs. Aid, despite its benefits, however goes with conditionalities in accessing donor funds to implement national policies and programmes. It equally requires accountability and transparency as a means of justifying expenditures on identified areas with proposed impact.

The Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy (2011-2015), which was later revised (2014-17), was developed to help the country attain a middle-level income status by the year 2020 (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP), GoG 2010). The aid component of Ghana's GDP declined significantly from approximately 25.2% in 2002 to 9.8% in 2008 owing to Ghana's qualification to access the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) funds and Multilateral Debt Relief (MDRI) (Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 2014:3).

Notwithstanding, the Ghanaian Government has argued that "[t]he use of policy and process conditionalities by development practitioners have undermined the delivery of aid in considerable ways, especially when conditionality is subjected to DP [Development Partner] interpretation" (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 2010: 13). This makes the acceptance of future aid problematic and its effectiveness is equally questioned given the high demands associated with it. Justice Agbezuge acknowledged the country's challenges regarding donor support to the security sector mainly in the form of imposed conditionalities in terms of

meeting specific project requirements during project implementation (interview with Justice Agbezuge, UNDP Ghana, 19 May 2015). While some of these conditionalities may be necessary, for instance with regard to transparency and accountability, it was equally acknowledged that some of the demands from these conditionalities are considered by recipient countries as unrealistic and in turn stifle project implementation.

It has generally been argued, though, that the country's security needs must be addressed from government's perspective, and security assistance must be tailored to the priorities or security needs of the country and its people. Government, thus, has the option to refuse the offer and adopt homegrown approaches in terms of security responses to issues (interview with Mr. Samuel Amankwah, Director of Research, Ministry of the Interior, Accra, 10 May 2015).

Going forward, the current government of Nana Addo Dankwa Akuffo-Addo has taken a different approach to the aid issue by visualising 'Ghana beyond Aid'. This policy strategy is meant to afford government the opportunity of using Ghana's own resources and human capital to develop its economy, while reducing its dependence on development partners for financial, human and technical aid or support in this direction. President Akuffo-Addo out-doored the 'Ghana beyond Aid' Charter during his 2019 May Day address in Accra (See details on myjoyonline.com, 1 May 2019).

A successful implementation of this policy would facilitate governance and decision-making within the security sector without following prescriptive security programmes, but equally maintaining transparency and accountability standards (Brzoska 2003: 9; and Winkler 2002: 8). This approach would create options and the potential for acceptability, local ownership, and sustainability of the SSG concept with local content. This does not, however, eliminate possibilities of adopting SSR/SSG best practices for effectiveness and efficiency in the sector.

Responses to conflicts and disputes of this kind in the domestic and international fronts have informed Ghana's relative peace and stability over the past decades amidst coups d'état, land conflicts and chieftaincy disputes, domestic and transnational crimes and other related security challenges, and have equally manifested in the areas of its peacekeeping endeavours abroad. The challenges identified above, no doubt, present issues of complexity and acceptance of the SSR/SSG concept, and the need to explore useful means to enhance its implementation in Ghana.

5.6 Options for Enhancing Security Sector Governance in Ghana

For Ghana's growth and development to be sustained and improved upon, the country's security sector and governance must be enhanced in order to overcome the many security challenges that threaten to undermine this prospect. This would require taking a look at specific options to improve the governance process as part of statebuilding efforts.

To begin with, the issue of security culture, looking at its major impact in responses to security challenges in the sector, must be rethought and properly understood in order to facilitate effective security governance. This is very necessary given the composition of the sector, characterised by many security actors with different conceptions and perceptions about security. The sector, as noted above, comprises core security actors made up of security personnel; management and oversight bodies manned by government officials and civil servants in the executive, legislative and judiciary; and civil society actors including non-governmental organisations. There are also justice and rule of law actors made up of human rights institutions and activists, the penal system and traditional justice actors, and non-statutory security personnel including the private security companies among others. We also have international actors like donors and other international partners who bring their influences to bear through the promotion of security concepts, drafting of projects and programmes, undertaking training and capacity-

building, as well as rendering support and assistance through funding towards their implementation.

Clearly, the multiplicity of these actors with different security cultural values, norms, practices and dispositions present a complex and dynamic set of security referents that need to coordinate joint efforts in addressing common security needs and threats to the Ghanaian state and its residents. Former President Kufuor underscored the essence of this partnership for effective responses to security needs of both the state and its people (Kufuor 2002: 6). These complex security cultures, however, require clearly defined roles and responsibilities to help address who does what, when and how. These cultures range from formal to informal security cultures, with varied political, ethnic, ideological and professional/organisational undertones, and all of which have values, norms and principles regulating thoughts and behavioural patterns and dispositions. This must equally be complemented by a basic reorientation of attitudes or behavioural changes that emanate from grasping security objectives and dividends based on possible outputs and outcomes of such changes.

This presents options for credible transformation rather than reform in the security sector. This would, however, be made possible through the recognition of the existence of the different and multiple security cultures and sub-cultures for that matter, and the decision to either embrace or co-exist with these cultures. This brings to the fore the contentious issue of modernity and tradition and finding common grounds within a hybrid context for co-existence.

In the two conflicts reviewed above, it was quite obvious that the one involving the murder of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II, overlord of the Dagbon Kingdom in Northern Ghana, had its roots from years of external influences attributed to the intrusion of the Europeans, mainly British and Germans in 1899 as cited earlier (Amankwa 2005). This intrusion led to the partitioning of the Dagbon Kingdom and the disruption of the rotation system to the skin

(throne), and as a result an introduction of a new voting system. This act eventually led to the disruption of an existing traditional governance system, and its replacement through an imposition of a modern form of governance that has brought about major divisions between two related royal houses until only recently when the 'peace pipe was smoked'. The introduction of the new voting system, through colonial influences, took place without the recognition of existing cultures with its indigenous dynamics sustained over several generations. A 'top-bottom' approach in this instance did not also help in resolution of conflict until the traditional conflict resolution approach was adopted.

Additionally, the politicisation of the chieftaincy institution, particularly in the post-independence era, also made it difficult to address the conflict given the changing levels of legitimacy for both the political elites and that of the chiefs involved in the disputes. Legitimacy here is generally construed as the legal or cultural acceptance, recognition and support to the state or traditional leadership in the execution or implementation of policies or decisions reached towards meeting the needs of both the state and citizens or community and its residents (Hoehne 2011: 6-7 from Weber 1956:170). In the traditional context, legitimacy stems from the local history, culture and tradition and depends on a leader's ability to cultivate and maintain that legitimacy or lose it (Keulder 2010: 152; Hoehne 2011: 7). The loss of legitimacy through the Yendi conflict cost the Ya-Na's life.

In the other conflict at Hohoe in the Volta Region between the indigenous Ewes from the Gbi ethnic group and the settler Zongo (Muslim) community, a lasting solution was found given that internal actors who understood the culture of the disputing factions and the local context collaborated with several other security actors or stakeholders, both state and sub-state, using a 'bottom-up' approach to find solutions to the problem. There was also a classic engagement of both the modern and traditional security arrangements to resolve the crisis, thereby underscoring

the strength in adopting an appropriate hybrid security governance system in security responses. In this context, issues of ideation, based on rich experiences and knowledge of the indigenous context and dynamics, contributed effectively in containing the conflict.

With regard to the resolution of electoral disputes, similar efforts were made by engaging and activating Ghana's security architecture in responding to a very tense electoral dispute between the two traditional parties of NPP and NDC which could have easily destabilised the country. Though the Supreme Court eventually dismissed the allegation of diverse and flagrant violations of statutory provisions and regulations governing the conduct of the December 2012 elections on a unanimous decision of 5 to 4, and though the opposing party disagreed with the decision it accepted the judgement (Asante and Asare 2016: 1-6). This was as a result of the perceived fairness, credibility and transparency demonstrated by the Supreme Court in its hearings throughout the process. Foreign interference in this context was rather minimal geared mainly towards calling for peace and urging the use of legal and peaceful means to resolve the dispute.

On the issue of donor aid and conditionalities, responses from interviews conducted suggest the need for government to refuse foreign concepts, programmes and projects that ignore the local or indigenous context and content. This is because conditionalities make it difficult for the implementation of programmes as it aligns with prescriptive or 'top-bottom' approaches to addressing issues, which eventually gets rejected by the populace.

The above lessons demonstrate the need to coordinate joint effort among diverse security actors to achieve stated security goals and objectives, which would require gaining insight into the security culture of actors, as well as issues of leadership and legitimacy. This will build trust and confidence in the modern and traditional governance systems and thereby facilitate the

broader acceptance of the concept and the willingness for its implementation at the various levels, including the grassroots.

The lessons drawn from the above case study could be summarised in the diagram below:

Figure 5.3

Diagram Depicting Top-Bottom and Bottom-Up Approaches to Governance of the Security Sector in Ghana



Source: Author, 2019

The actors referred to above operate in a triangular context in which levels of engagement or interaction in the security governance process vary at horizontal and vertical levels, but could adopt the top-bottom or bottom-up approaches in response to security needs depending on which comes in as relevant in a hybrid system. The horizontal level depicts relations between these state and sub-state security actors in responding to security threats and needs, while the vertical level reflects their growing levels of interaction from the grassroots through the national to the international level. The actors at the top of the triangle are mainly international partners with heavy influences, considered as imposing proposed policies and concepts including that of the security sector reform/governance concept.

The second-level tier in the triangle are the official or state actors that serve as the interface between the international partners and the sub-state or local actors, who are usually construed by the sub-state actors at the lower level of the triangle as responsible for implementing programmes and projects, some of which are not conducive or do not conform to local traditions or context. Some of these officials of government are seen to easily accept and propagate concepts from international partners as a result of bribery and corruption which eventually undermines the trust and confidence reposed in them.

The negative behavioural challenge of corruption which undermines transparency and accountability in the effective and efficient delivery of justice and security needs to the state and its people remain a major threat to Ghana's security. Hence, in the case study review of fighting transnational crime for instance in the West African region, issues of drug, human and small arms and light weapons trafficking have proved very difficult to address owing to the weak capacities and inability of state institutions to address entrenched corrupt practices within the sector (Atuobi 2007). Complicit acts involving government officials, lack of adequate equipment and resources, lack of proper coordination and porous borders have contributed to these persisting challenges.

Similar challenges also exist on the domestic front where corruption within the criminal justice system undermines efforts to fight crime in the country. The recent revelation by an investigative journalist in Ghana, Anas Aremeyaw Anas, of bribery and corruption within the judiciary in which higher officials in the judiciary, mainly judges, were caught on tape negotiating or accepting bribes remains instructive in seeking ways and means to improve upon governance in the security sector (Banesseh 2015; *BBC News*, 8 December 2015). This is cardinal to leadership in eliciting the legitimacy required to govern the security sector.

5.7 Conclusion

The guiding research question in this case study has been to assess the extent to which security culture influences could minimise the complexity and facilitate the acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in Ghana. This was informed by the quest to enhance security sector governance in the country. In achieving this objective, however, it becomes obvious that several intervening factors, including the understanding of the concept of SSR/SSG, the recognition and clarification of complex security culture interactions, and the need to attain the required level of legitimacy or acceptance from security referents, must be circumvented.

These issues have lingered and served as stumbling block to consolidating security sector governance efforts in Ghana and, for that matter, West Africa and beyond. Security sector governance has, thus, been limited to reforms within security institutions and agencies without a holistic approach to grasping the SSR/G concept. Limited efforts are also made to map the actors and their respective cultures, as well as recognise and understand the complexity of the security terrain as a result of the mixed cultures and how to effectively govern within this context. Above all, an informed leadership quest to bring about proposed changes based on a national security policy and transformation of the sector does not appear to be a priority.

This case study, therefore, serves to unveil existing security culture challenges that hinder effective governance of the sector, and serve as a guide to the process of enhancing reform and governance of the sector. In doing this, it was established mainly through desk reviews, interviews and focus group discussions that SSR/G as security concepts are indeed foreign but must be understood in the indigenous context in which it is implemented. Doing this would, nevertheless, require an informed and legitimate leadership capable of identifying with the security needs of the state and its people, and being able to effectively coordinating multiple security actors, both internal and external, with varied security cultures to deliver.

Security governance in this context would take place in a highly contentious but hybrid environment, where the diarchy in modernity and tradition needs to be contextualised in achieving results. This must equally be guided largely by bottom-up approaches to drafting and implementing a national security policy that holistically incorporates the interest of the Ghanaian state and its people, and internal and external threats with proposed measures, responses, modalities and concepts to guide the process of implementation. Adequate strategies and resources must equally be availed to facilitate its implementation.

The mix of security cultures, both local and foreign, would require the need to imbibe positive foreign cultures and values that are relevant to the local context, while eschewing those that undermine prudent indigenous security governance and mechanisms and that have helped secure and stabilised the state thus far. The transformative element in this process would, however, require behavioural or attitudinal changes through effective awareness creation and sensitisation on the SSR/G concept, its purpose and objectives, benefits in terms of output and outcomes to be derived, as well as capacity-building and skills training to embrace and implement the concept. Acculturation through socialisation and exposure must, therefore, be guided by the Ghanaian value system and normative standards derived from its Directive Principles of State Policy which is clearly spelt out in the Ghanaian Constitution.

Given the tendency for negative behavioural practices, resistance to change and the unpredictability of human behaviour, qualitative attributes through good leadership and sound security culture values based on notions of ideation and discourse must come into play to guarantee success of the entire process. This must be based on positive attributes stemming from the values and norms of both modern and traditional governance systems, and as reflected in the positive steps taken by stakeholders in the security sector to prevent, manage and resolve disputes or crisis. They include being fair and honest, having integrity, seeking the truth,

recognition of actors and understanding their roles, and gaining the needed legitimacy and acceptance, among others, in a spirit of unity and togetherness to lead and govern. All these values inform progressive cultures or security culture and are enshrined in most if not all the legal frameworks, including the Ghanaian Constitution and other governance and security legislations. Hence the issue of relativism or ambiguity does not necessarily arise as all these values, principles and standards have moral and legal basis in common and customary laws as reference points for guidance, education and practice.

In conclusion, security culture in the Ghanaian context could be largely perceived as providing an ideational context for understanding wherein, certain preferences in both modernity and tradition have become established for effective security governance. Additionally, it has created shared patterns of thought and argumentation that have established pervasive and durable security preferences in attempts to understand or formulate concepts, legitimacy preferences, and the efficacy of particular approaches, mainly 'bottom-up', to protecting values (Williams and Haacke 2008:129; Johnston 1995a: 6).

Also, 'software' changes through imbibing positive culture, values and behaviour, as well as the respect of democratic principles, is gradually emerging as compared to 'hardware' changes based on Western security models of reform, including re-equipping, rebuilding and training (Murray 2009:187-188; and Sedra 2013: 371-374). It is therefore obvious, thus far, that security culture in Ghana could and has had 'major influences on security sector governance in Ghana which has brought about changes which appear more 'intrinsic' than cosmetic or 'instrumental' in security governance and responses to security threats and needs (Hill 2012: 93). This has largely contributed to the peace and stability the country currently enjoys in terms of prevention, management and resolution of security challenges in the country and explains why culture matters. Therefore, a focus on cultures would certainly minimise the complexity of the security

sector and facilitate the acceptance and enhancement of the SSR/G concept in the country towards meeting both state and sub-state actors' need.

CHAPTER 6

SECURITY CULTURE INFLUENCES ON SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE AND PEACE AND STABILITY IN NIGERIA

6.1 Historical Background

The name Nigeria is believed to have stemmed from a Berber word "Ni Gir", also written as 'N'jer', which stands for the River Gir or the flowing body of water (Jefferys 1964: 8 & 444-450). The coining of the word 'Nigeria' has been contested but largely attributed to Flora Shaw, wife of a former British Governor General Lord Frederick Lugard of then Northern and Southern protectorates of the country (*Times of London* 1897; Meek 1960). Nigeria refers to the 'Niger area' thereby reflecting an amalgam of the word 'Niger-ia'. Other definitions also refer to the Latin meaning of the word 'black' or a 'dark area'.

Nigeria is located between latitudes 4°N and 14°N in West Africa and shares borders with the Republic of Benin to the West, Niger to the North, Chad to the Eastern part and the Republic of Cameroon to the South-Eastern part. It is bounded in its southern part by the Atlantic Ocean in the Gulf of Guinea area. As the most populous country in Africa, it has a current population of about 200,963,599 people (World Bank Data 2019) with a total landmass area of 356,669 square miles or 923,769 square kilometres. It has the general West African vegetation of a coastal savanna, mangroves, forest vegetation from the southern portions to its middle belt, and a dry Savanna or Sahelian vegetation to its northern parts. The country comprises 36 states with an additional Federal Capital Territory (FCT) of Abuja, which is its capital town. The following map gives a vivid description of Nigeria:

The Political Map of Nigeria



Source: United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) [Online] Available at https://www.unido.or.jp/en/coming/3077/. (Accessed: 19 August 2019).

The Nigerian state which got its independence on 1st October, 1960 from the British and became a Republic in 1963 experienced a lot of activities in its pre-colonial and colonial periods which contributed immensely towards the formation of its polity. Trans-Saharan trade from the Northern parts of Nigeria across the Sahara desert to North Africa, Europe and the Middle East spanned the "golden age" that is between the 14th and 17th centuries. This period witnessed trade in mainly gold and slaves (Falola and Heaton 2008: 15-39). Contact with Europeans in its coastal areas from 1450 to 1850, however, brought about radical changes in its political, socio-cultural, economic and demographic trends which eventually led to the redefinition and creation of the State. This period experienced the abolition of slave trade, pursuit of commercial interests and

embarking on missionary activities which brought European influences and the introduction of Western culture (Osuntokun and Olukoju 1977: 169; Falola and Heaton 2008: 61-84).

The Fulani Jihad, fall of the Oyo Empire and the advent of colonialism in the 19th century precipitated the evolution of the Nigerian culture in its pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence eras (Osuntokun and Olukoju 1977: 14). The creation of the Nigerian State began in 1914 with the amalgamation of both Northern and Southern British Protectorates which eventually led to the formation of 36 states and its FCT. The colonial state which emerged in the 20th century facilitated the imposition of the Western culture of the European imperialists. Though there were some initial forms of resistance, the Western influences dominated but did not obliterate existing indigenous cultures which still reflect the customs and tradition of the diverse indigenous groups with similar cultural traits reflected in their language, art, customs and tradition (Ikime 2000: 1 – 615; Osuntokun and Olukoju 1977: 30 – 35).

The British form of governance was based largely on indirect rule where local or traditional chiefs were used to administer the colonial master's policies which were largely based on exploitation of raw materials for foreign industries. This so-called "divide and rule" approach to governance established the culture of top-bottom approaches to government policies, exclusion of the masses from decision-making processes and lack of ownership of policies, programmes and development activities. In the areas of religion and education, the spread of Islam had to contend with the introduction and fast-spreading Christianity, mainly in the southern and middle belt regions, to the detriment of traditional religion. In a similar vein, western education gained grounds but equally provided the opportunity for further interrogation into eschewing negative traditional practices and upholding positive ones (Osuntokun and Olukoju 1977: 36).

Specific cultural traits acquired from colonial rule and domination has influenced Nigeria's post-independence nation-building, growth and development with both positive and negative consequences. The Nigerian Constitution, delimitation of its territory and division into states, the structure of governance, education and several other development processes were initiated in its colonial period, and built upon in the post-independence era just like all its West African and, for that matter, African neighbours.

The gaining of independence in the Cold War era left the destiny of Nigerians in their own hands with the task of nation-building and redefining its development goals. Securing its independence and republican status, and keeping the nation together as one entity, became its immediate challenge given the diverse ethnic groups including the Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, Fulani, Urhobo-Isoko, Efik-Ibibio, Kanuri, Edo, Tiv, Ijaw, Nupe and Bura (Osuntokun and Olukoju 1977: 14-18; Ikime 2000: 14-15; Nwagu 2014). The period to follow was characterised by political instability in the form of military coups, civil wars, economic challenges and the eventual quest for political stability and good governance (Ejiogu 2011:3-181; Dike 2014: 1-8). This political destabilisation came as a result of ethnic differences, greed and corruption of leadership, and the inability to fairly distribute wealth to Nigerians across the country and at grassroots.

Table 6.1

Civilian/Military Governments in Nigeria from 1960-2020

Name of Government	Name of Leader	Year	Duration	Remarks
Her Majesty's Government	Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa	1960 - 1963	3 yrs	Nigeria still under British Colonial Rule
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons	Dr. Benjamin Nnamdi Azikwe	1963 - 1966	2 yrs 3 months	One-party civilian government (overthrown through coup d'état)
Federal Military Government of Nigeria	Maj. Gen. John A. Aguiyi-Ironsi	1966-1966	7 months	Military Government (overthrown through coup d'état)
Supreme Military Council(SMC) I	Gen Yakubu Gowon	1966-1975	9 yrs	Military Government (overthrown through coup d'état)
Supreme Military Council (SMC) II	Gen Murtala Ramat Muhammad	1975-1976	7 months	Military Government (overthrown through coup d'état)
Supreme Military Council (SMC) III	Maj. Gen Olusegun Obasanjo	1976-1979	3 yrs	Military Government handed over power to a civilian government
National Party of Nigeria (NPN)	Alhaji Shehu Shagari	1979-1983	4 yrs 10 months	Civilian government (overthrown through coup d'état)
Supreme Military Council (SMC)	Maj Gen Muhammadu Buhari	1983-1985	1 yr 8 months	Military Government (overthrown through coup d'état)
Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC)	Maj Gen Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida	1985-1993	8 yrs	Military Government
Interim National Government	Chief Ernest Shonekan	1993-1993	3 months	Handed over power to interim government
Provisional Ruling Council of Nigeria	General Sani Abacha	1993-1998	4 yrs 7 months	Military Government took over power from Interim Government
Provisional Ruling Council of Nigeria contd.	Major-General Abdusalami Abubakar	1998-1999	8 months	Military government assumed power after death of military leader
People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Olusegun Obasanjo	1999-2007	8 yrs 3 months	Civilian Government elected through democratic elections

People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Umaru Musa Yar'Adua	2007- 2010	3 yrs	Civilian Government hands over power to another democratically elected government
People's Democratic Party (PDP)	Goodluck Ebele Jonathan	2011-2015	4 yrs	Civilian Government hands over power to another democratically elected government
All Progressives Congress (APC)	General Muhammad Buhari	2015-2020	5 yrs	Civilian Government still in power

Source: Author's 2020, adapted from World Atlas, available at https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/nigerian-presidents-and-military-leaders-since-independence.html.

From the above table, Nigeria experienced a turbulent 33 years of governance characterised by military coups d'état and dictatorships and interspersed with a brief handover of power to civilian governments between 1979 and 1983. This development entrenched authoritarianism and dictatorships with consequent human rights abuses and undemocratic governance practices which posed major challenges to security sector reform in the country (Sanda 1987; Frank & Ukpere 2017; & ICG Report No 237/Africa, 2016). The country has also been confronted with many challenges in the areas of governance, socio-economic ills, ethnic and religious conflicts, environmental problems, terrorism, kidnapping, armed robberies and transnational security challenges including human, drug and small arms and light weapons trafficking among others (Ikejiani-Clark 2009: 1-609; Ellis 2016: 1-230).

Attempts at addressing these challenges in the security sector have not achieved much as efforts have revolved mainly around civil-military relations and control, professionalisation of the military, demilitarisation of society and general restructuring of the security sector (Bryden et al). Efforts towards effective transformation of the sector have been very minimal as issues of good democratic governance of the sector through oversight, transparency and accountability, effective legislations, and inclusive decision-making processes, among others, are yet to be entrenched. Addressing all these issues would possibly require a better understanding and

implementation of the SSR/SSG concept, defining roles of actors or stakeholders, gaining legitimacy based on bottom-up inclusive approaches to governance, and properly integrating indigenous security mechanisms into the country's security architecture.

The chapter therefore interrogated security challenges and security culture influences, through governance, in addressing these challenges. It specifically focused on finding out if understanding the divers security cultures and integrating the indigenous security mechanisms and processes into the Nigerian security architecture could help enhance security sector reform and for that matter, governance in the country. In doing this, the Chapter captures Nigeria's security arrangements, conceptions and perceptions about security culture and security sector governance in Nigeria, efforts undertaken to reform the sector, challenges encountered and options, based on findings, for enhancing security governance of the sector. All these helped answer the question as to why culture matters and the need to minimise complexity to afford acceptability and enhance security sector reform and governance agendas in the country.

6.2 Nigeria's Security Sector and Governance Arrangements

Nigeria's security sector, like many others in West Africa and beyond, is structured to handle internal and external security of the country. The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and accompanying security acts on the Nigeria Armed Forces (NAF), National Police Force (NPF), National Security Agencies (NSA) and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) established and made provision for the management of security institutions and agencies for effective and efficient security service delivery in Nigeria. Provisions are made for security agencies at the federal and state levels of government, with the President of Nigeria and the respective Governors of the various states presiding over these security institutions at appropriate levels. The security agencies comprise the NPF and NAF, with

accompanying paramilitary security agencies such as the immigration service, customs and excise, prisons service, the fire service and the NSCDC.

The efforts of these institutions are complemented by the NSA comprising the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and State Security Services (SSS). The DIA deals with the prevention and detection of crime of a military nature against the security of Nigeria; internal and external protection and preservation of classified military matters concerning the country; and other defence intelligence matters deemed necessary by the President or the Chief of Defence Staff. The NIA deals with the maintenance of security, not of military nature, outside the country and other related matters as the President or the National Defence Council may deem necessary. The SSS on the other hand is responsible for the internal prevention and detection of crime against the security of Nigeria, and the internal protection and preservation of non-military classified matters against the security of the country. It carries out other such responsibilities within the country to be assigned by the President as he may deem necessary (Olakanmi & Co. 2015).

These agencies are managed by various government Federal ministries including those of Defence, the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance. The various security councils and commissions, comprising the Council of State, the National Defence Council, the National Security Council, the Nigerian Police Council and the Police Service Commission, advice the President on security related matters with regard to public safety, appointments, discipline and dismissal of personnel, and internal oversight. They also cover matters in relation to administration and organisation of the agencies. The following diagram gives a vivid picture of Nigeria's security architecture:

Figure 6.1

The Structure of Nigeria's Security Architecture as defined by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the 1986 National Securities Acts of Nigeria



Source: Adapted from the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the 1986 National Security Agencies Act

Other security actors with responsibility and oversight functions for the security sector include Committees in the National Assembly of Nigeria at the Federal level and that of the House of Assembly at the State level. Some of these Committees comprise those of the Air Force, Army, Customs and Excise, Defence, Interior, Maritime Safety, Education and Administration, National Security and Intelligence, Navy, Public Safety and Intelligence, and Public Accounts. These Committees facilitate law-making by the respective Assemblies at Federal and State levels, commission investigations, and exercise oversight functions towards

transparency and accountability of security institutions and agencies. The Judiciary at the Federal and State levels is equally charged with interpretation and enforcement of the law, as well as ensuring the upholding of the rule of law and access to justice.

On the private security and civil society front, we also have different sub-state actors like the private security companies, the militia groups, and the community vigilante groups that provide security for private and public institutions, communities and individuals for that matter. Some of these sub-state actors fill in crucial gaps where the police are unable to deliver the required public safety. Again, civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations, security think-tanks and some academic, religious and traditional bodies also play active roles in ensuring public safety and security in Nigeria. Nigeria also has a National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) which serves as an extra-judicial mechanism for promotion, protection, enhancement, enjoyment and enforcement of human rights. These actors generally complement the Nigerian core security actors at the federal and state levels.

Traditional rulers, in addition to religious leaders, are also known to play major roles in conflict prevention, management and resolution. A traditional ruler is regarded as one in possession of inherent traditional authority and ordained by God, with support of ancestral spirits. He or she enjoys the loyalty and goodwill of his or her people as the embodiment and custodian of societal customs and traditions, but his or her roles, in general, have been modified as a result of colonial influences and imposition of foreign or alien political culture (Ajetunmobi & Osunkoya 2009: 242). These foreign influences have led to some changes in societal values which have, in turn, undermined the power, prestige and privileges of traditional rulers construed as appendages to British colonial rule rather than a repository of tradition and customs of the people. This raises clear questions about the legitimacy of these leaders *vis-a-vis* their formal counterparts in the pro-Western system of governance.

This development has equally resulted in the lack of constitutional provision to institutionalise the roles and functions of traditional leaders. Article 20 of the 1979 Constitution calls on the Nigerian State to protect and enhance the Nigerian culture. The 1963, 1979 and 1989 Constitutions also gave constitutional backing and assigned advisory roles to chiefs on the Federal Council of State (Article 140; Third Schedule Part 1(1J) of the 1979 Constitution) and the State Council of Chiefs (Article 178(b) of the 1979 Constitution) as well as the proposed Traditional Councils and their functions in designated Local Government Areas (Article 8, 1-3). The 1999 Constitution, however, neither gave any constitutional backing for chiefs, their representation on the Council of State, maintained a State Council of Chiefs, nor assigned them functions at the local government areas.

Several factors account for this, including the age-old tension between tradition and modernity, and the negative impact of colonial indirect rule which not only politicised the traditional institutions, but also depicted them as former agents of foreign rule and domination (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013: 133-134; Adesina 2018: 8; Ajetunmobi & Osunkoya 2009: 240). Notwithstanding, traditional leaders are still respected and held in high esteem, enjoying credible levels of legitimacy from their subjects and citizens, as well as government officials who depend on them for guidance and advise. They personify the culture and tradition of their people and ancestors and still play active executive, legislative and judicial roles at grassroots without official recognition (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013: 134).

With this major gap, issues of collective governance of the Nigerian security sector at the Federal and State levels by both formal and indigenous security institutions have remained a topic of major discussion as questions still remain unanswered on issues to do with legitimacy of the state and sub-state actors with or without constitutional backing or status, amidst major issues

of corruption in the sector and increasing security threats, particularly from Boko Haram, armed robbers, kidnappers, farmer-herder conflicts and some vigilante groups or militias.

The diagram below shows the security actors having oversight control and responsibilities within the Nigerian security sector governing system.

Figure 6.2

Security Oversight Control Bodies in Nigeria



Source: Author, August 2019

6.3 Conceptions and Perceptions about Security Culture and Security Sector Governance in Nigeria

Lewis and Bratton (2000:2) in an Afrobarometre survey in Nigeria gave credence to public opinion considering it as an important aspect of democracy. Its importance relates to its ability to endorse official power which tends to strengthen legitimacy of rulers, or hold leaders accountable for actions, inactions and indecisions. Of particular importance, however, is the fact that these opinions "… consist of values, attitudes, evaluations, and preferences of ordinary citizens" (Lewis and Bratton 2000:2). These attributes, together with political behaviours, summarise a country's political culture. Same also apply to its security and security culture.

As a country of a huge population and diverse cultures, Nigeria has struggled to maintain peace and stability in the country owing to the many security challenges confronting it. Attempts to gain insights into the conception of and perception about security and security culture in the country from pre-colonial times to the current dispensation brought up interesting findings. A

typical sense of peace, security and stability is conceived within a village, town or a community setting in which people must live in peace and harmony with each other in going about their political, social, economic, religious, ethnic and cultural activities.

In pre-colonial times, a king or a chief, together with the elders of the community, are tasked with the responsibility of either guaranteeing or ensuring the safety of each individual, families and the community at large through freedom from fear, famine and hunger, wild animals or attacks from enemies from neighbouring villages and towns. As a result, in cases where disputes or conflicts arose among members of the community, a timely and peaceful resolution of the disagreement was sought between and among either individuals, groups or communities as it had the tendency to destabilise the peace and stability of the village or town (Ajayi & Buhari 2014: 138-154). In a worst case scenario, peaceful coexistence is sought. Early warning measures and mechanisms are also put in place to detect and prevent crimes or the outbreak of conflict or war within and between villages and towns.

Notwithstanding, the concept of security means different things to different people and remains a broad subject-matter. In the informal context, within some communities and localities, it is largely perceived as an assurance that anything within the environment is safe, and there is no threat to the safety of the people (interview with Chief Alhaji Abdulfatai A. Adesanya, *Oloritun of Ijada Community*, Ijebu-Ode, Ogun State, 28 March 2018). In the formal context, however, it has both traditional and human security connotations which focuses mainly on state-centric goals or individuals, groups and people's needs. But the common denominator in these contexts is for individuals or a state to feel safe and secure, as having a sense of protection guarantees security (interview with a Rtd. Brig Gen/State Official in the All People's Congress Government, Abuja, 05 January 2018).

In the current Nigerian context, however, focus on security tends to sway more towards the traditional or state-centric approaches to security than that of human security. Notwithstanding, the 2017 Round 7 Afrobarometre survey summary results in Nigeria revealed interesting findings in which a significant percentage of Nigerians living in urban and rural communities, countrywide, felt quite safe in their neighbourhoods despite the increasing reports of crime in the country. When quizzed on safety with regard to walking in the neighbourhoods within the past one year in both urban and rural areas, 67% of respondents and their family members indicated never feeling unsafe; 16% felt unsafe just once or twice; 11% felt unsafe several times; 4% many times; and 2% always.

With regard to fear of crime by respondents or their family members in their own homes, 71% in both rural and urban areas never feared crime; 15% feared crime just once or twice; 8% feared crime several times; 4% feared crime many times; while 2% feared crime always. It is therefore, quite instructive that a significant percentage of the Nigerian populace felt quite safe amidst increased reports of insecurity in the country, though this survey relates to safety and crime only in the community and neighbourhood. Data on theft from the house or being physically attacked countrywide also revealed similar statistics as regards those feeling unsafe while walking in the neighbourhood and crimes at home (Practical Sampling International 2017: 9).

Security culture in Nigeria is construed as very diverse and varied among different groups of people, both in the informal and formal settings, as well as within ethnic, religious, social groups, and organisations. This raises the issue of complexities as there may not be commonalities across these varied and diverse cultures (Interview with Chinedu Nwagu, Project Director, Trust Africa-Nigeria, Abuja, 05 January 2018). The complexity of shared values on safety and freedom from threats among different groups of people and institutions, thus, calls for

dialogue in bridging gaps to arrive at a holistic or national sense of security culture in order to guide security sector reform and governance processes (British High Commission Official, Abuja, 05 January 2018).

Given that culture is not static, but varied and keeps evolving, it is important to contextualise security culture by 'tailoring' foreign but positive security cultures to suit the local context (interview with Rtd. Brig Gen/State Official of the All People's Congress Government, Abuja, 05 January 2018). This is important as accepting external cultures without modification could cause a lot of problems. Again, understanding security cultures can minimize inter-agency or inter-group rivalry as they have their peculiar cultures and needs. Therefore, not having a culture of cooperation remains a major problem (interview with Akingbolahan Adeniran, Rule of Law Advisor, Office of the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 05 January 2018, Abuja). Omatete (1972:291) argues that a high probability exits for the Nigerian State to remain secure as a nation based on the observance of its preferred national values, which depict its holistic national culture. Culture, in turn, is equally seen as central to the solution of social and national problems as it is predicated upon ultimate values which motivate human and national actions (Oladiran and Adadevoh 2008: 97).

Chief Alhaji Adesanya (Ijebu-Ode District, Ogun State, 28 March 2018) considered vigilantism as a security culture, not only in Ijebu-Ode in Ogun State of Nigeria, but as a security culture of the people across Nigeria. This is reflected in the activities of the youth of the communities who go through some form of traditional initiation processes to empower themselves to protect their communities against crimes and all forms of security threats to the people through non-state community policing (Pattern 2008).

In the area of security governance, indigenous governing structures and mechanisms were put in place to ensure safety, peace, stability and development in communities (Olowu & Erero

1997: 106-109). The king or chief, depending on the context, had the general responsibility of ensuring peace and security in the land. He also led his people to war, in the pre-colonial days, to defend his village or town. In a Yoruba community for example, he is referred to as 'Kabiyesi' or he who cannot be questioned as his decision was final (Falola & Genova 2005:299). There were, however, checks or mechanisms in place to guide the king in his decisions, actions and pronouncements despite his combined executive, legislative and judicial powers. The elders, usually sub-chiefs, gave advice and counsel to the paramount chief or king, and in some cases made decisions to abdicate him from the throne or banish him from the community if he is seen to be excessively dictatorial or brutal in his reign (Olowu & Erero 1997: 108; Tonwe & Osemwota 2013: 131; Uweru & Ubrurhe 2000: 6).

The king is availed of able-bodied men who serve as native police to enforce laws and decisions, and as palace guards, undertaking arrests and incarcerating criminals, getting intelligence, and defending the residents against any attacks from outside (Ajetunmobi & Ojo 2015: 7-8). The traditional priest served as the spiritual guide and the eye of the community, working closely with the king and elders in the governance of the village, and in cases where major decisions needed to be made, the consent of the subjects were sought in a community or village durbars etc. Other indigenous systems were also put in place for crime prevention, trials and prosecution of criminals (Tade & Olaitan 2015: 138-150).

In current times, similar arrangements exist within the formal system of governance through colonial influences and arrangements where decisions on security matters are made at three major levels, including the federal, state and local government levels. The President, Governor and the Chairperson preside over these three hierarchical levels of governance. The separation of powers into the executive, legislative and judiciary arms of government facilitates decision-making, adoption of strategies, and the needed checks and balances to address security

challenges to the Nigerian state and its people. Security agencies are also there to enforce the rule of law as well as defend the country from aggressors while maintaining peace and security in the country with its monopoly over the use of force.

Attempts have been made in the past to integrate both traditional and formal systems of security governance towards the peace and stability of the country but this collaboration eventually faltered into practical, needful collaboration rather than a legal, recognised and accepted roles and responsibilities under the Nigerian Constitution. As mentioned, earlier constitutional provisions, including those of 1963, 1979 and 1989, detailing the roles of traditional leaders on the Council of State and as the Council of Chiefs were eventually removed from the revised 1999 Constitution mainly for alleged historical, political and financial reasons. This has generated several debates among traditional rulers, politicians and academics on the need to restore or not to restore and integrate these roles in the Constitution.

With current security challenges confronting the country, including those of terrorism in the north-eastern parts, environmental degradation, high crime rates and massive corruption, an urgent decision ought to be made to address the issue as the formal security architecture or arrangements are unable to address these security challenges alone, given its magnitude and dynamics (Tonwe and Osemwota 2013:128-138).

6.4 Early Attempts at Security Sector Reform in Nigeria in the 1990s

Relics of colonial rule in Nigeria in the forms of indirect rule through primordial traditional institutions, establishment of a police force for exploitation rather than a police service to enforce the rule of law, and an imposed foreign rule complicated democratic governance in the country in the post-independence era. Military dictatorships, civil war, corruption with its attendant political, socio-economic and ethnic problems gained traction, destabilising peace and

democracy in the country. The several years of military rule after independence led to massive abuses of human rights, loss of lives, curtailing freedom of speech and expression, and lack of accountability and transparency among others things (Fasakin 2015: 298 – 317).

These undemocratic practices undermined the principles of good democratic governance in which military dictatorships set the pace by dictating development policies and governance of the country. Over three decades of military rule distorted governance arrangements by usurping the roles and functions of the respective arms of government, including that of the legislature and the judiciary. The brief stint of civilian rule between 1979 and 1983 and the interim government of 1993 under Shehu Shagari and Shoneken could not reverse the autocratic culture until the restoration of a prolonged democracy from 1999.

The economic recession in the late 1970s to early 1980s affected the Nigerian economy based on its major dependency on crude oil with its attendant price fluctuations. This, together with massive corruption in the system, created high levels of unemployment and worsening poverty, necessitating the need for economic reforms based on the Bretton Woods institution's Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). This programme, with its laissez faire approach, required a liberalization of the Nigerian economy by the Federal Government through opening up for investment and putting in measures to curtail excessive spending, while diversifying the economy.

These measures led to the introduction of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) conditionalities which required a devaluation of the Naira to address balance of payment deficits, as well as address high interest rates among other things. These measures were put in place with the intention of fixing Nigeria's ailing economy and possibly restoring good democratic governance through constitutional rule after stabilisation of the economy. These reform measures under the civilian and military governments in the 1980s and early 1990 did not

have much impact as expected (Ikejiaku 2008: 1-6; Biersteker 1993: 133–152). Reasons for the lack of success were attributed to harsh conditionalities, weak implementation strategies, high levels of corruption and lack of fiscal discipline among others. This period was thus characterised by lack of good democratic governance with massive unemployment, low intensity conflicts, energy and environmental challenges, as well as increasing crime rates with little or no attempt to reform the security sector.

The mid-to-late 1990s experienced major changes in terms of political activism and external pressures to address human rights abuses, environmental degradation in the oil producing areas of the country, as well as calls for change in military dictatorships to civilian rule as part of good democratic governance in the country. For instance, civil liberty and human rights groups' activism for change, including the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), Nigeria Bar Association (NBA), Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), and Women in Nigeria (WIN) increased pressure on the Babangida regime to hold elections in June 1993 (Amuwo 1995:1-6). This was preceded by a 168-page White Paper with plans by the Babangida regime to return the country to civilian rule by 1990, acknowledging in the process however that old habits die hard (in *New York Times* by Brooke, July 1987).

The plan entailed having local non-party elections in 1987, forming a constituency assembly in 1988, removal of the ban on party politics in 1989, and holding State elections and a national population census in 1991, while ending with local, State and Federal elections in 1992. All these coupled with efforts by political and environmental activists like Ken Saro Wiwa and Chief Moshood Abiola, presumed winner of the June 1993 elections, eventually prepared the ground from transitional arrangements toward return to civilian rule in the country in 1999 after

the death of General Sani Abacha, the strong Nigerian military ruler (McLuckie and McPhail 000: 1- 291).

6.5 Formalisation of SSR/SSG processes in Nigeria

The assumption of power by the Obasanjo-led government gave a glimmer of hope as citizens and international observers held the view that a disciplined military leader with pro-democratic qualities would be the panacea for restoring Nigeria on its right footing by ensuring a peaceful, stable and democratic country. The stage was set for reforming the security sector after the long years of military rule and entrenchment of autocratic culture within the security agencies. Measures were taken, generally, to restructure and professionalise the security agencies in the country, mainly the armed forces and the police force, while reinforcing civilian control over the sector (Bryden et al 2008: 243-267).

A major indication of formalising security sector reform and governance processes in Nigeria was reflected in former President Obasanjo's address to the National War College graduates in July 1999 where he sought to define the roles, structures and hierarchy in the effective management and operation of the security sector, as well as its delivery on security needs of both the state and its people. The speech which focused mainly on civil-military relations called for civilian control of the armed forces with the President as Commander-in Chief; a civilian head for the Nigerian Ministry of Defence; and subjecting military operations, investigations and trials to civilian authority and principles among other things (Bryden et al 2008: 247). The main focus on the SSR was, thus, on civilian control of the sector and restructuring of the security agencies.

In 2004, however, attempts were made to adopt a broader approach to addressing security needs in the country, given the ever-growing and increasing rates of crime, corruption and the springing up of Boko Haram, the terrorist group in the North-Eastern part of the country. In the

2004 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper where one of the objectives was to improve security and administration of justice in the country, emphasis was placed on increasing the effectiveness of the NPF and access to justice in the country, as well as creating a more effective criminal justice system. Other issues covered reforming the prison service, promoting and protecting human rights, improving the judicial system, and increasing women's rights among other things.

Emphasis thus shifted from a restricted focus on the state and security agencies restructuring or reforms to embracing more of individual and people's security needs (see Nigeria Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper in IMF Country Report No. 05/43, December 2005: 94-97). This was to be done in partnership with civil society actors through imbuing the right values and attitudes towards safeguarding lives and property. It also made provision for providing safety nets for the vulnerable groups, fighting drug abuse and corruption, and equipping and providing training to security agencies for effective and efficient delivery of security services (IMF Country Report No. 05/43, December 2005: 95).

Challenges in the areas of lack of effective transparency and accountability within the respective National and House of Assemblies at the Federal and State levels, high levels of corruption and poor governance over the security sector undermined the realisation of stated goals and objectives. Hence, the hope and aspirations in the Obasanjo administration were short-lived as reforms within the security sector were generally limited to professionalisation of the military, increased numbers of the NPF, and equipping the security agencies to respond to security threats.

Subsequent administrations of the late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua and Goodluck Ebele Jonathan had to contend with major security crisis. These included the Boko Haram terrorist onslaught, the Niger Delta Oil Crisis, Farmer- Herder disputes, and increased crime rates of armed robberies, kidnapping, rape, as well as internet impersonation or 'advanced fee fraud'

also known as ‘419’ – named after section 419 of the Nigerian criminal code. In the midst major concerns and apprehension about the criminal activities of Boko Haram, including bombing of public places, infrastructure and kidnapping of girls from schools, President Muhammadu Buhari resolved in May 2015 to put in measures to eliminate Boko Haram, stem the tide of corruption and promote human rights in an attempt to stabilise and promote peace, security and development in Nigeria.

His campaign promises on security in Nigeria included state and community policing, recruitment of more personnel for the NPF, the establishment of an anti-terrorist agency at the Federal level, as well as the establishment of an anti-crime squad to combat terrorism, kidnapping and armed robbery among others. Other promises also included the establishment of a Conflict Resolution Commission to mitigate and resolve conflict within Nigeria, and reforming the justice system for rapid hearing and dispensation of cases including those of corruption and terrorism (SBM Intelligence Report 2016: 1-48).

In all these efforts, no structured attempt has been made to draft a national security policy for Nigeria until recently, and undertake a comprehensive reform strategy in clearly defining roles and responsibility of all actors, particularly the indigenous ones, to engage in an effective security governance process in the country. Less is heard of structured and effective civil society partnerships with government agencies to fight crime, as these institutions are seen working within their own remits of providing security for individuals and communities. The security agencies lack the numbers and the resources to cover the entire country and communities amidst insecurities, leading to traditional rulers presiding over various local militias and vigilante groups to maintain safety in their communities. In certain cases, the NPF and local government authorities are compelled to depend on these traditional security actors to effectively function in

their areas of jurisdiction (interview with Chief Alhaji Abdulfatai A. Adesanya, Ijebu-Ode, Ogun State, 28 March 2018).

6.6 Nigeria's Security Challenges and Responses: Whither Security Culture in Security Sector Governance?

6.6.1 *Summary of Nigeria's Security Challenges*

Nigeria is well known for many security challenges confronting the country, and fears have been expressed severally about the major negative consequences to West Africa and the continent at large, should a major conflict or crisis breakout in the country. Reasons for this are based on its huge population with attendant challenges in an event of internal displacement or refugees spilling over across the borders; its big economy and contribution to economic development in the region; as well as possibilities of increased transnational or cross-border criminal activities among others (Obi 2008: 183-196).

This notwithstanding, the country has remained generally stable since the Biafran civil war between 1967- 1970 (Heerten and Moses: 2014: 169-203), but facing both internal and external security threats. These threats are similar to those in other West African countries and beyond, but differ in dynamics, intensity and scale. They include armed robberies, human, drug and small arms and light weapons trafficking, kidnapping and rape, cyber-crime and its related advanced fee fraud, herder-settler disputes, and ritual murders and occultism (Marenin and Reisig 1995: 501-518; and Ellis 2016). In addition to all these, however, terrorism in the north-eastern part of the country has become a major threat to the lives of citizens up north, claiming many lives, displacing the population and leading to destruction of properties.

The security situation in Nigeria has deteriorated over the years to the extent that the Federal and State governments have struggled to maintain the safety of citizens and residents in communities, villages, towns, cities and the country at large. This has resulted in the springing up

of vigilante groups and people's militia across the country to fill the gap left by the inability of security agencies to cover the entire country. The NPF has a force strength of 371,800 with police to people ratio of 1:600 persons compared with the UN standard ratio of 1:400 persons, while the force strength of the armed forces is around 200,000 (see ISSAT, February 2018, *Premium Times* Newspaper, 22 September 2017). All these have implications for the peace and stability of the country. It raises issues about security responses, partnerships and putting in adequate and appropriate measures to govern the security sector towards effective responses to these threats.

6.6.2 *Nigeria's Security Complexes cum Security Culture Influences in Response to Security Challenges*

In the area of partnerships, informal or indigenous security arrangements under the leadership of traditional leaders, together with external support and assistance to government efforts in addressing internal and external security threats to Nigeria, has remained quite weak and needs further interrogation to remedy the situation. In doing this, however, three of the above-mentioned security challenges would be used to assess the nature of challenges being encountered in the governance of the security sector, and explore which direction governance of the sector should head to improve upon the security situation in the country. The three security issues to consider are terrorism, the Niger Delta oil crisis and the herder-settler farmer disputes.

6.6.2.1 *Responses to Terrorism*

Terrorism in Nigeria gained momentum following the establishment of the Islamist Jihadist Boko Haram Group, also known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidha'Awati Wal-Jihad – People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad – in 2001 by Mohammed Yusuf, inspired by the al-Qaeda 9/11 terrorist attack in the New York (Davieson 2014:27; Akinbi 2015: 34; Maiangwa & Uzodike 2012: 2; Adesoji 2010: 96-98). Its terrorist activities began mainly in 2009 and got intensified in 2011 during the tenure of former Presidents Yar'Adua and Goodluck

Jonathan under its new leader Abubakar Shekau after the death of Mohammed Yusuf in prison in July 2009. The group like other Islamic terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shaabab in Somalia, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the Levant (ISIS/L), was established to fight against western interest, mainly western education, exploitation and discrimination.

The Boko Haram movement despises western education as bringing little benefit to human kind, only abject poverty. It is considered abominable and therefore a sin or taboo, translated locally as 'haram'. (Akinbi 2015: 35; Adesoji 2010: 100). This terrorist group operates as a fierce, vicious and barbaric group, with a secular motive of establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria under the strict Islamic law known as the Sharia. Hence, all those who fail to observe the Sharia or are non-Muslims become an object of attack as they are considered infidels and sinful. With this religious and ideological conviction, Boko Haram has carried out several terrorist attacks on innocent individuals, Muslim and Christian worshipers, foreigners or expatriates, in communities, villages, towns and cities of various states in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. Some of these states include Adamawa, Abuja – FCT, Bauchi, Borno, Jos, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau and Yobe (Akinbi 2015: 36-40; Simonelli *et al* 2014). The calamities resulting from these attacks include killing by use of explosives as well as crude implements and weapons, kidnapping, rape and other related acts which amount to gross violation of human rights. These barbaric acts have also led to displacement of large populations internally and across the borders.

The Federal Government of Nigeria initiated attempts at combating these atrocities meted out by the Islamic Jihadist group under the Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari administration without much success as the activities of these terrorists still continue, though on a limited scale under the Buhari-led government. In 2011, a special Joint Task Force (JTF) was set up to fight Boko Haram. This JTF included the Army, Navy, Air Force, the police and state

security services. This Task Force has conducted several raids on Boko Haram resulting in killing some of their members, but a comparatively larger number of innocent civilians leading to significant human rights abuses (Mbah & Nwangwu 2014: 67-68). This only served to increase the spate of attacks from the terrorist group, creating more havoc and fears based on which the Nigerian Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, acknowledged Nigeria's "dismal watershed" in its nation's history (*New African* Newspaper, 1 April 2012 Edition).

These attacks were also directed at traditional leaders who condemned Boko Haram's onslaught and horrific acts, as some were killed and others escaped by a hair's breadth (Davieson 2014: 155). The 2014 raid by the Islamic militants on the government secondary school in Chibok, kidnapping over 200 girls, brought international attention to the crisis, necessitating a concerted effort to address the problem (see *BBC News* Report, Nigeria Chibok abductions: What we know, 8 May 2017). In the process, President Goodluck Jonathan acknowledged the ineffective responses based on military hostilities, and rather called on Boko Haram for a dialogue (*New African* Newspaper, 1 April 2012 Edition).

Reasons for the inability to effectively combat terrorism in the country include failure to address its root causes. Some of these root causes entail issues of poverty and discrimination, lack of knowledge about the terrorist group and its structure, negative influences of politicians both within and outside of government, unconventional nature of warfare, unrealistic demands from the group, as well as issues of corruption and lack of adequate resources by security agencies (Eji 2016: 198-220; Solomon 2012: 8-10; Adesoji 2010: 103). International responses in support of Nigeria's effort, including the establishment of the Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (Assavano *et al* 2016), the provision of intelligence and other forms of support from the United State, Britain and Israel, among others, have not helped in solving the problem.

Aghedo and Osumah (2012: 856 -869) have called for adopting a human security approach rather than state security approach to the issue, while Akinbi (2015: 43) and Abimbola and Adesote (2012: 16-28) have requested adequate collaboration and partnerships between the Nigerian Government, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations in curbing the menace. What should however be explored in much detail remains effective partnerships between the government authorities and the traditional rulers or leaders, as well as their followers who dwell in various communities that have suffered such attacks in exploring options to address the menace.

6.6.2.2 *Effort to Resolve the Niger Delta Oil Crisis*

The Niger Delta Crisis in Nigeria has been in existence for over five decades and only subsided after putting in place a Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) in October 2009 under the Yar'Adua Administration, but still continues to pose challenges to peace, security, stability and development in that region of the country. The crisis remains a very complex one underpinned by issues of perceived neo-colonialism, corruption, legitimacy concerns and issues of marginalization in addition to environmental pollution (Nwosu 2009: 543-562).

Since the beginning of the exploration and exploitation of crude oil in commercial quantities in the Niger Delta area in 1958, the various oil companies, seen to be agents of imperialism, together with the federal and state government officials, are believed to be the sole beneficiaries of the 'black gold' to the detriment of citizens in the area (Nwosu 2009: 545-547). The Niger Delta region comprises nine states including Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers, and these states host different ethnic groups including Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhoba, Ikwere, Andoni, Efik, Ibibio, Kalabari, Ogoni and Okrika. Yorubas and Igbos are also found among these other ethnic groups.

The Niger Delta contributes to over 80% of the country's GDP based on earnings generated from the sale of crude oil (Afinotan and Ojakorotu 2009: 191). Expectations, therefore, are that this would be one of the most developed areas of the country as revenues from fuel production and sale, royalties and corporate social responsibilities are expected to create job opportunities, develop physical infrastructure and social amenities, build the human capital and generally develop the region. But unfortunately, these expectations have not been met. The region has suffered pollution of the environment as a result of the exploration and exploitation of the crude oil, as well as oil spillage from oil pipelines caused by prospecting multinational oil companies, attacks by militant groups in the region, and oil theft among others.

Shell, which is one of the major oil companies in the area, is believed to have about 40% of its oil spills worldwide concentrated in the Niger Delta (Umukoro 2012: 914, in Rowell 1994). Also, in River State for instance, about 3,000 oil spills incidents occur annually thereby discharging about 2300m3 oil into farmlands, creeks and waterways, while the noise levels from all these activities and fumes from the gas flaring has contributed to making the Niger Delta region the most polluted area in the world (Nwosu 2009: 549-550;Ake 1985). All these activities have led to pollution and deprivation of various water bodies, wetlands and farms which serve as sources of livelihood through communal farming and fishing among other things.

Frustrations from domestic imperialism, marginalisation, inequality, unequal distribution of wealth, pollution, unemployment, lack of social amenities and general development in the region has resulted in grievances induced by perceived greed from the prospecting oil companies and alleged 'co-conspirator' government officials (Nwosu 2009: 557; Umukoro 2012: 916). This has led to genuine or not so genuine agitations but also militarisation of the region as various ethnic militias have resorted to the use of arms to demand their share of the oil wealth and equally seek redress in the management of the environment. These militias, including the Niger

Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF) and Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), have fought along ethnic lines and also engaged in acts of illegal oil bunkering, kidnapping for ransom, assassination of political opponents, armed robberies etc (Nwosu 2009: 543-560; Umukoro 2012: 916; Osaghae *et al* 2011: 19-28).

The theft of crude oil from pipelines for bunkering, insurgencies, inter-ethnic fighting and crimes within the region have not only proved profitable to these groups but also drawn attention to issues and challenges confronting the region and the need to make amends (Osaghae *et al* 2011; Umukoro 2012: 916). Some of these militia groups, including NDPVF and MEND, eventually got amnesty from the Federal Government to lay down their weapons at great recompense, thereby inducing the formation of other ethnic militias and existing ones to continue with similar activities in expectation of similar rewards (Odisu 2017: 1-4).

The Niger Delta crisis has generated a lot of debate in the country with blames, accusations and counter-accusations. The indigenes, comprising the various ethnic groups with the Ijaws in the majority, blamed the lack of development in the Niger Delta on State Governors, Commissioners and other officials, together with Federal Government authorities as being responsible for the under-development of the region. In doing this, they have laid the blame at the footsteps of these government officials for developing policies and passing legislations that favour oil companies in terms of granting them access to land, generating huge revenues that go to them and the government, and polluting and degrading the environment without redress or fulfilling their corporate social responsibilities (Nwosu 2009: 543-560; Umukoro 2012: 913920).

These officials are also seen to be highly corrupt by initiating state policies and legislation in favour of oil companies and government, and stealing state funds from the oil revenues meant for development of the region. This perceived domestic imperialist strategy

perpetuates neo-colonialism and in turn undermines legitimacy of these government officials who are seen as collaborators with imperial agents. On the other hand, some analysts share the view that the blame for under-development in the region rests squarely on the people's representatives at the state level who hail from the various regions from many of these ethnic groups. Odisu (2017: 1-4) has argued that the Federal Government has contributed a lot of money to the development commissions, as well as state and local government authorities to develop the region, but such funds have either been diverted or misappropriated.

Amidst all these accusations, the Federal Government made several efforts to address the Niger Delta crisis but without significant success of managing the pollution levels, engendering development in the region and maintaining peace and stability. Efforts at developing the region began in 1958 with the recommendation from the Sir Henry Willink Commission to develop the Niger Delta as it found it to be "poor, backward and neglected region" while advocating for it to be made a special territory with special developmental strategies to address its problems (*The Willink Commission Report*: 96; Umukoro 2012: 917). This was followed by the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1962 to advice on infrastructural development of the Niger Delta region guided by the 1961 Development Act.

General Babangida, also in response to agitations for autonomy and development, established the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1989 to, among other things, receive and administer monthly sums from Federal accounts towards rehabilitation and development of oil producing areas, tackle ecological problems arising from the oil production, and embark on major development projects agreed upon with local communities in the oil producing areas (OMPADEC Decree No. 23, 1992). It, however, failed in its objectives despite 3% of federal allocations earmarked for the states in the Niger Delta, owing

to corrupt practices, waste and profligacy of officials at the Commission (Odisu 2017: 2; Nwosu 2009: 549; Umukoro 2012: 917).

The major development intervention came in 2000 when former President Obasanjo established the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and also created the Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs. A 13% derivative component from the oil revenue approved by the General Sani Abacha regime for oil producing states in the region was also implemented towards development of these areas but without much success (Odisu 2017: 1-2). An amnesty programme put in place to cater for 30,000 ex-militants on or before 4 October 2009 deadline in exchange for surrendering their small arms and light weapons during late President Yar'Adua and later President Goodluck Jonathan's terms of office, only succeeded temporarily in ending the disputes and attacks on oil installations as other militias demanded similar packages, thereby reinforcing their criminal activities in the region (*The Vanguard News,* 2 February 2018; Ojo 2015: 919-939).

Multiple suggestions have been made to address the crisis in the Niger Delta in areas which include addressing issues of corruption, cleaning the environment, channeling revenues from allocations into development programmes and projects, creating jobs for the youths and implementing corporate social responsibilities towards community development. In all these proposals, however, the alternative option of consolidating efforts towards hybrid security governance, reflected in close collaboration with traditional authorities, and the adoption of a bottom-up approach as mentioned in the 1958 Sir Henry Willink Commission Report, has not been given much consideration. Efforts to engage traditional and civil society actors in a sustained dialogue towards identifying specific needs in the communities, states and the region at large could prove useful and sustainable.

6.6.2.3 *The Farmer-Herder Disputes and Responses*

Conflicts between sedentary indigenous farmers from the south and nomadic Fulani herdsmen from the northern parts of Nigeria have become a source of great concern in recent times as these conflicts have intensified with disastrous consequences. A policy brief produced by the Forum on Farmer and Herder Relations in Nigeria (FFARN), has estimated more than 6000 deaths and over 62,000 displaced persons as a result of disputes between farmers and herders in the middle belt states of Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, and Plateau (Kwaja and Ademola Adelehin 2018: 6). In another report, incidents involving herders accounted for 44% of all fatalities recorded in the country in 2016 (ICG 2017: 2). Other states including Enugu, Kaduna, Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Ondo and Rivers have equally experienced this crisis. The farmer-herder perennial conflict is not only restricted to Nigeria but occurs in other West Africa and African countries mostly in the middle belt regions of the continent.

The crises stem from the destruction of food crops of farmers by grazing cattle under the watch of armed herdsmen without compensation, which results in confrontations and subsequent attacks mainly on the indigenous farmers who lose their lives, get their properties destroyed or are displaced from their settlement areas (Ikueze and Ezeah 2017: 154-156). In some cases, cattle rustlers also steal cattle from the herds of the Fulani herdsmen who also occasionally come under attack from peasant farmers as revenge to the harm caused them or loss of their food crops and property.

The environmental, ethno-religious and economic dimensions of this conflict make it rather complex and difficult to address, given differences in the sedentary and nomadic lifestyles of farmers and Fulani herdsmen. Other challenges to addressing the conflict also include cultural differences, increased scarcity of grazing land for cattle owing to desertification in the middle belt areas of Nigeria, intensity of land use in the south for food and cash crops, and the lack of

understanding of the nature of the crisis for adequate intervention by relevant authorities (Mortiz 2010: 139; Bassett 1988: 453-472; Noorduyn 2006: 83-84; and ICG 2017: 3-6).

Responses from the Federal and State governments to the crises has not been very effective, leading to calls from victims, traditional authorities and various citizens in affected states and all over the country for a more effective and robust responses to the crisis. Successive governments at the Federal level have attempted over the years to designate or create grazing reserves to restrict cattle to these zones and avoid going on farmlands. In 1965 for instance, the *Northern Region Grazing Reserves Law* made provision for corridors for migrating livestock and grazing reserves throughout the country (Kwaja and Ademola-Adelehin 2018: 7).

Subsequent legislations for national grazing reserves have not proved successful. The 2016 National Grazing Reserve Bill, which did not pass as the *Land Use Act* of 1978, vests all powers on regulation of ownership, acquisition, administration, and management of Nigerian land with Governors of the States (Nigerian Land Use Decree No. 6, Cap 202; Kwaja and Ademola-Adelehin 2018:8). Passing the bill into an act would, therefore be unconstitutional. Alternative legislations prohibiting open grazing and establishment of ranches for the cattle have also escalated the conflict as it is perceived by the herders not to be in their interest (*This Day* Newspaper, 5 January 2018, 1&10; Kwaja and Ademola-Adelehin 2018: 7). Several peace commissions and committees established to promote dialogue and resolve differences have also not worked, while deployment of security task force on operations to contain conflicts and quell disputes have not facilitated the resolution of the conflicts (ICG 2017: 10-11).

An amount of N100 billion approved by the National Executive Council (NEC) and released by the Central Bank of Nigeria under the Goodluck Jonathan administration to all the 36 States to recover and improve all grazing lands encroached upon by farmers as well as build ranches for cattle could not be accounted for while the project was not implemented. The House

of Representative in January 2017 established a Committee to investigate alleged misappropriation of funds and report within a month for necessary action, but the report was not still published at the time of conducting this study (ICG 2017: 10).

Civil society groups and several NGOs had varied responses to this conflict. Communities affected by attacks have made several calls for protection against armed Fulani herdsmen and bandits, while the herders have also made calls for legislations to be reviewed to favour their interest as they also remain citizens of the country (ICG 2017: 13). CSOs and NGOs have also organized sensitization seminars and workshops for peaceful dialogue, mediation, as well as management and resolution of the crisis with support from international partners, including the British Council, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the German Embassy (ICG 2017: 14). Despite all these, the conflict still continues to claims lots of lives and property in the country without much redress.

6.6.2.4 *The Security Culture Deficit and Absence of other Related Factors in Responses to Security Challenges in Nigeria*

The inability to effectively address the conflicts in Nigeria has been attributed to many factors. Some include lack of proper understanding of the dynamics of the conflict by government officials, corruption, inadequate or discriminatory laws, resource scarcity and lack of proper planning, neglect of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, low newspaper coverage of disputes, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country (Kwaja and Ademola-Adelehin 2018: 7-13; Godwin 2018; ICG 2017: 10; and Mortiz 2010: 145).

Mortiz (2010: 139) calls for the urgent need to understand the dynamics of the farmer-herder conflicts in West Africa, laying particular emphasis on understanding the relationships between structural variables which explain causes of conflicts from the institutional dimension, and the processual variables which explain outcomes of conflicts focusing mainly on behavioural

patterns. The processual "involves a holistic approach to an event [which entails] interpreting events, actions, and actors within their particular local context, considering socio-cultural, historical, ecological, economic, political or institutional factors" (Mortiz 2010: 142).

With this approach, behavioural patterns with the tendency to escalate conflicts are properly analysed with options for redress. More importantly, Mortiz (2010:145) and Pelican (2006: 237) singles out the issue of culture as a central but missing element in conflict theory. He relates culture to the herder-farmer crisis in West Africa, seeing both groups as belonging to two different ethnic groups, who may not necessarily share beliefs and practices on how to manage and resolve conflicts, and which serves as a recipe for escalation of the crisis.

Brockhaus (2005) on his part also sees institutional failure on the part of traditional and formal authorities in addressing the conflict as a result of inertia, incompetence and corruption, while the situation may be the reverse in other contexts where these officials collaborate effectively in conflict resolution (in Mortiz 2010: 145). Ragin (1987), acknowledging the underlying complexity of the herder-farmer conflict, calls for an integration of both structural and processual variables for understanding the current escalation of the herder-farmer conflicts in West Africa, as a single factor may not suffice in addressing the conflict (in Mortiz 2010: 145). It is therefore obvious from the above herder-farmer conflict that security governance in Nigeria lacks a comprehensive approach to addressing such conflicts, and where measures are taken, collaboration between the various security actors is weak, lacks legitimacy and undermined by corrupt practices. In a nutshell, responses to security challenges in Nigeria have been fraught with challenges at the institutional, leadership, cultural, legitimacy, transparency and accountability and, overall, security governance levels. Formal governing structures, with its security arrangements, have not been capable of handling the task of safety, peace and security

all by itself, nor with support from external actors or partners as in the case of the Boko Haram crises.

In situations where the indigenous or informal governing and security structures have made attempts at complementing the efforts of the formal structures, it has largely gone unrecognised, though it may prove effective within certain communities. This has been as a result of lack of proper recognition under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution for traditional rulers and their roles in the governance of the security sector, or addressing security matters they are confronted with.

In interviews with some traditional rulers and opinion leaders in the Ijebu-Ode locality of Ogun State in Nigeria (28-30 March 2018), the removal of the roles of traditional leaders from the constitution as pertained in the past has been mainly political and has largely undermined security governance efforts in the country. Interestingly, these same politicians who advocate for non-recognition of these traditional leaders under the Constitution consult these traditional leaders on regular basis in decision-making processes and seek their consent and support in contesting political office or addressing crime and other security-related issues in their respective communities.

In these communities, the kindred tend to follow and respect their traditional leaders more than government authorities. And in cases where the communities are doing well in the areas of fighting crimes and development, the traditional authorities are seen to have very good communal relations between them and the local government authorities who respect and recognise the roles of these traditional institutions and its leadership.

Hence, in other to effectively address the above-mentioned security challenges of terrorism, oil crisis and herder-farmer dispute for instance, the formal and traditional institutions

must be seen to be tapping into shared security cultures in various localities, communities, states and the country as a whole going forward.

6.6.2.5 *International Partnerships and Skewed Support to Formal Institutions towards Security Responses*

On the international front, Nigeria's foreign policy guides its security engagements in its interaction with bilateral and multilateral partners. Its foreign policy objectives include the promotion and protection of its national interest; promotion of African integration and support for African unity; promotion of international cooperation, consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations, the elimination of discrimination in all its forms; respect for international law and treaty obligations; and the promotion of a just world economic order (Article 19(a-e) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria). These foreign policy objectives have been driven by the principles of African unity and solidarity, nonalignment, legal equality of states, non-interference in the domestic affairs of states and multilateralism among others (Obi 2008: 188; Olusanya & Akindele 1986: 4).

Nigeria's responses to external threats or transnational criminal activities are undertaken within bilateral and multilateral frameworks (mainly within ECOWAS, African Union, United Nations and the European Union) in which it signs on to various protocols and conventions. As a regional hegemon and central player in African affairs on the continent, the country has remained active through its participation in multilateral security initiatives in maintaining peace and stability in West Africa, Africa and the world at large. Within the ECOWAS security arrangements, it has played active roles, in terms of security culture, in the construct of what constitutes a security threat to the ECOWAS region and responses to such threats. These activities are underpinned by the regional body's beliefs and norms (Williams 2007a: 253-279, 2007b: 2; Obi 2008: 186). Its intervention efforts in the Liberian civil war spanning over a

decade together with other West Africa States, including Ghana, The Gambia, Sierra Leone and Togo, through the ECOMOG arrangement, remain quite instructive (Tuck 2000: 1-12).

Despite this, its efforts in addressing transnational crimes, including terrorism, the trafficking of arms, human beings and drugs, internet fraud or cyber-crimes, money laundering, and smuggling of goods, have however been limited. This has been attributed to the fact that Nigeria has been an 'incubator' for some of these crimes and has also been unable to address most of these crimes owing to corruption, lack political will and resources, as well as weak capacities (Obi 2008: 184,193). This, questions the reflexive capacity of the country and its leadership in upholding and implementing security cultures adopted and signed on to at the regional level through the various legislations or legal instruments. This development is not, however, only limited to Nigeria but most if not all the ECOWAS Member States.

Specific assistance was given by the UK government through its Ministry of Defence training teams within the ACPP programme towards SSR and development of armed forces and the security sector in general. The support was equally aimed at strengthening Nigeria's capacity to contribute to the establishment of the ECOWAS Standby Force Brigade towards peace and stability in the ECOWAS region (DFID 2004: 12). In 2004 for instance, the running costs of the Nigerian peacekeeping troop deployment to then ECOMIL was funded out of an amount of GBP£400,000 made available through the ACPP Fund (DFID 2004: 10).

An ISSAT Report on mapping ongoing or planned development partner support to justice and security sector reform in Nigeria from 2014 - 2016, commissioned by the German Federal Foreign Office, focused on four main categories. These included management reform, accountability reforms, capacity-building/training reform and equipment/infrastructure support (ISSAT-DCAF 2016: 5-75). The nature of support provided covered financial grants, advisory inputs, technical assistance, provision of equipment, as well as training and mentoring, with

difficulties being encountered to move support to broader areas of reform. (ISSAT-DCAF 2016: 6). Notwithstanding, there has been noticeable change in priorities and funding support for SSR mainly towards Nigerian counter-terrorism capacity given challenges in the North-Eastern part of the country, managing migration issues, countering violent extremism and addressing issues of organised crime (ISSAT-DCAF 2016: 6).

Interestingly, donor funding in the security sector accounts for roughly between 1% to 3% of the total spending and 7% to 12% of capital expenditure based on the 2016 national budget estimates and incomplete financial information received from donors, but commitment to financial and technical support has grown significantly since 2014 and will follow similar trends over the coming years (ISSAT-DCAF 2016: 6).

Of particular interest, however, is the heavy support by donors to the formal sector, compared to that of the informal sector. Findings from surveys conducted in the area of the justice and security sector revealed over 80% of Nigeria's population accessing justice and security services through the informal sector (HiiL 2018: 20). Though there has been indirect support, the only donor programme reported to have systematically engage with the informal sector has been the UK-funded Justice for All (J4A) programme. This programme was, however, transformed into separate funding streams and projects led by different donor partners, including the EU, but with no clear focus on informal actors' engagement.

Also, the focus for these support and activities have been mainly around the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja, where most of the headquarters of the national security, defence and justice institutions are located, the north-eastern portions of the country where the fighting of terrorism and violent extremism is ongoing, and the Niger Delta region with the oil crisis.

Assistance to SSR has therefore been mainly on the 'hardware' institutional and capacity support in the formal sector to the neglect of that of the 'software' cultural and informal issues

which, as observed above, contribute largely to security and justice service delivery, and as a result peace and stability in the country.

6.7 Options for Enhancing Security Sector Governance in Nigeria

Security governance in Nigeria has taken place, legally, within the formal security institutions but rather ceremoniously within the traditional security system. The approach over the years has focused largely on the traditional or regime security arrangements rather than that of human security considerations, but recent security threats to communities and individuals residing therein have led to concerns regarding the effectiveness of security governance in Nigeria and which way to go.

No clear definition of security has been established as a country or polity, except that the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vests the security and welfare of the people in the government as its primary purpose (Article 12(2b)). Obi (2008: 185) however underscores specific factors that inform security to include values, norms, interests, contexts and relations of power. This brings with it different security cultures within different ethnic and religious groups, as well as formal and traditional governance systems. This has made it necessary, going forward, for some level of dialogue and cooperation in defining security concepts and partnerships between security actors, clarify and recognise respective roles, draft appropriate security legislations and policies, and map out strategies for effective implementation.

That said, security challenges reviewed above on issues relating to terrorism, the Niger Delta oil and the farmer-herder crises demonstrate a clear gap in terms of collaboration between formal and informal security systems in security governance and responses to these crises. This has further blurred perceptions regarding which way security governance is headed as both internal and external security threats still remain a challenge in the country without any clear coordinated approach or strategy to resolving the problem. As observed earlier, traditional

governance systems existed in pre-colonial times and played very active roles in ensuring the safety, protection and general security of the people and their respective communities they resided.

The advent of colonialism and introduction of a western system of governance with its cultural influences eventually undermined the legally recognised roles and functions of these institutions which were hitherto spelt out in earlier constitutions of the country. This came about as a result of the adoption of the 'indirect rule' governance system which subjected the chieftaincy institution to manipulation and, in the process, severed the 'umbilical cord' which existed in pre-colonial times between the traditional leaders and their subjects. The bottom-up approach to governance, based on consultations and consensus-building among kindred, elders and their chiefs gave way to mistrust and politicisation of this age-old indigenous governance system (Logan 2008: 3; Tonwe & Osemwota: 131).

Notwithstanding, these traditional institutions have proved resilient and maintained their legitimacy and influence, particularly between the people and their traditional leaders, compared to the formal governance arrangements and structures (Olowu and Erero 1997: 1). Reasons for such development are attributed mainly to leadership challenges within the formal governance system, including corruption and the complicit roles of politicians perceived as agents of neocolonialism as demonstrated in the case of the Niger Oil Delta crisis. Formal governance arrangements have also tended to adopt the top-bottom approach in responding to security challenges as in the cases of the Boko-Haram crisis and the farmer-herder conflicts where the use of force, through deployment of security agencies to contain the crises, has been the major form of security response, rather than adopting complementary responses with CSOs, NGOs, academics, policy think-tanks and traditional institutions to find solutions to these issues.

In one such interviews with His Royal Highness Alaiyeluwa Oba Dr. (engr.) M.A. Kasali, the Moyegeso of Ijebu-Itele Kingdom in his royal palace in Ogun State (30 March 2018), the astute traditional ruler intimated that the non-recognition of the roles and functions of chiefs or traditional rulers in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has remained the bane of security problems in the country. He opined that if previous roles and functions stated in the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions were left in the 1999 Constitution, issues like the Boko Haram crisis and the farmer-herder disputes would not have occurred or worsened to their current state before being dealt with.

At the traditional governance level for instance, an effective early warning system has been in existence over the years in which community dwellers and the vigilante groups know the terrain, the culture of the people and the tradition and customs that guide activities and behavioural conduct. This makes it easy to identify culprits and suspects in crime, as well as resolve conflicts without it reaching the State and Federal Government levels. In one such case in the Ijebu-Itele district, the Moyegeso had to personally intervene in a farmer-herder dispute upon getting information about a potential ensuing conflict. He mediated and got the defaulting herders whose cattle grazed on the food crops of farmers in the community to pay for the damage to the satisfaction of the farmers. The herders then subsequently requested for the cattle to graze on the remaining crops, having already paid for the damage caused, and later resettled to a different location. The Moyegeso attributed his success in mediating this dispute to knowing the people in the community, their tradition, customs and culture, as well as his acceptance by his subjects as their leader. He did this without the intervention of the local government authorities. In certain cases, the NPF also sought his assistance in collaborating with the local security actors to arrest criminals for prosecution.

In another interview with a leader of a community vigilante group in the Ijebu-Ode locality (29 March 2018), the gentleman who claimed anonymity stated that his vigilante group operates under the guidance and direction of traditional rulers. Their conception of vigilantism is based on 'black power' which entailed the use of roots of trees, herbs and plants for protection and prevention of crime. This aided them in confronting and arresting criminals who are unable to harm them as compared to their police counterparts and all their activities are communicated to the traditional leader of the area.

The group has sworn an oath not to be corrupt and going against that oath attracts severe punishment which serves as a deterrent and check against any illegal acts by its members. It perceives their culture, tradition and custom as central to their operations, and helps them in effective maintenance of peace and security in the area. His vigilante group has cordial relations with the NPF and has collaborated with them on several occasions to maintain security in the area, arrest criminals for prosecution and maintain surveillance in the community. He explained that this has contributed immensely in minimising crime in the area as they know the terrain, know the residents, understand their language and have established networks to facilitate their activities.

In their relations with the police, sophisticated cases of crimes are passed on to the NPF with the consent of their chiefs, while cases of spiritual nature are handled at the traditional level. The group has also established a training academy where recruits are trained on issues of public relations, upholding and respecting human rights, handling of arms and apprehension of suspects among other things.

The services rendered by these vigilante groups are voluntary in nature and therefore depend on contributions from business men and women, as well as community residents for payment for their services. Their role in securing lives and property have, as a result, been

recognised by the Ogun State Government under whose jurisdiction they fall leading to a formal communication from the State Government to the Council of Chiefs to recognise vigilantes in the communities. The State Government has also submitted a bill to the House of Assembly for the official recognition of registered vigilante groups in the State.

The proposed interaction for enhancing governance of the security sector among various actors could be summarised in the diagram below:

Figure 6.3

Diagram Depicting Proposed Interaction among Security Actors towards Good Democratic Governance in Nigeria



Source: Author, 2019

6.7.1 *Recognition, Acceptance and Legitimisation of the Roles and Functions of Traditional Institutions in Security Sector Governance in Nigeria*

The horizontal base of the triangle in the diagram above captures a hybrid security system of interaction where both state and sub-state actors engage and interact legally and informally, or rather ceremoniously, in attempts to define their understanding of security. In doing this, security

cultures manifest in these interactions or engagement in exploring ways of responding to identified security threats. The lack of constitutional roles or functions of traditional institutions has, however, undermined this interaction as contributions from these indigenous institutions in the security sector are considered informal rather than legal. A decision of a chief may only be recognised to the extent that the indigenes accept to go by it. It may not, therefore, be legally binding on elected local government councilors for example (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013: 133).

The formal governance arrangements are, therefore, construed as the legal entities with the mandate to deliver on security needs. This situation, in effect, appears flawed given the immense contribution that traditional rulers and their followers offer in conflict resolution and the provision of community policing in various communities across the country. All these efforts are complemented by other civil society groups and non-governmental organisations in the country.

In the 2017 Afrobarometre Round 7 Survey in Nigeria, findings revealed the willingness or likelihood of respondents from urban and rural areas to contact traditional leaders more than that of a local government councilor, parliamentarians in the National Assembly, an official of government, or a party political official about some important problems or share their views with them. This is reflected in the statistics where above 80% never contacted a local government councilor (81%), members of the National Assembly (88%) or an official of government (84%). Fewer than 10% of these respondents only contacted these officials once, a few times or often. The case of political party officials had a slightly better statistics registering 76% who never contacted them, 11% contacting only once, 9% a few times, and 4% often.

In the case of traditional leaders, it had comparatively more favourable interactions with respondents from urban and rural areas, recording a total of 63% for those who never contacted them; 12% only once; 18% a few times; and 7% often. Religious leaders in this context, however, had much more impressive statistics of 44% never contacting them; 13% only once;

25% a few times; and 18% often. This, obviously, demonstrates to an extent, the recognition of traditional and religious leaders by respondents interviewed and their belief in finding solutions to their problems or listening to their views as compared to their government officials or political actors (Practical Sampling International 2017: 14-15). It is, therefore, essential to recognise by legitimising or restoring the roles and functions of these traditional institutions in conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts under the Nigerian Constitution for the needed impact in effective security sector governance in the country.

6.7.2 *International Partnerships and the Need for Contextual Hybridism and Transformative Approaches to SSR/SSG Efforts*

The two sides of the triangle reflect the hierarchical levels of interaction between state, sub-state and international partners in addressing identified security threats confronting both state and sub-state actors. In these levels of interaction, conceptions and perceptions of security in the Nigerian case vary based on different security cultures, internal and external, and what forms of responses would be suitable in addressing security needs in the country. As Akingbolahan Adeniran (Rule of Law Advisor, Office of the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 05 January 2018, Abuja, Nigeria) argued, the Nigeria Government has faced difficult decisions on proposed offers of support from foreign partners which sometimes go contrary to the government's stated aspirations, goals and objectives.

In one such instance, the Nigerian Government had to refuse support from a donor as conditionalities were difficult to meet, and proposed needs to be addressed differed. The donor, however, came later on to offer its support based on further dialogue and government's demonstration of commitment and assurance in this regard. But in other respects, like in the Niger Delta Crisis scenario, state actors were seen as agents of imperialists by conniving and colluding with foreign oil companies and magnates to deprive the country of appropriate

revenues and distribution of oil wealth, while contributing to the pollution of the environment without any redress (Nwosu 2009: 543-560).

Going forward, donor support and assistance through direct contribution to SSR/SSG activities must evolve to embrace a broader objective on transformation rather than reform of the Nigerian Justice and Security Sector. These efforts must relook the geographic space with proportional support and assistance to the hot spot areas of the 36 states, while involving the informal justice and security sector in its programme, and taking into consideration the security culture influences of the various actors in the sector.

6.7.3 *The Need to Imbibe Positive or Progressive Hybrid Security Cultures towards Eliminating the Culture of Corruption*

The issue of corruption, among other ills, has also served as a 'canker' which undermines efforts in these levels of interaction to effectively and objectively respond to state and human security concerns. Olaleye-Oruene (1998: 232-240) perceive corruption, not only as a cultural phenomenon but also, as a vestige of colonial legacy and must be looked at from this historical context in attempts to eradicate or minimise it. The myriad of anti-corruption measures can only succeed through the change in mindset and giving up the protection of vested interests within the state machinery.

6.7.4 *Leadership in Promoting Cultural Awareness and Sensitivity towards Clarity of Roles and Simplification and Acceptance of Security Reform and Governance Concepts*

The inner part of the triangle depicts the various actors within Nigeria with different security cultures, local and foreign, and perceived security threats, as well as varied security needs and different response mechanisms to real or perceived threats. This space also presents a complex security sector and context within which traditional and human security concerns interlock and as a result, require leadership from both the formal and traditional governance settings, and the needed legitimacy, in order to bring about the desired change.

Governance within this sector must embrace, at the barest minimum, a careful balance between traditional and human security approaches, bottom-up consultation, and consensus-building and decision-making process, guided by shared values, norms and standards. Principles of transparency and accountability, oversight and anti-corruption measures, among others, would equally facilitate the process.

At the bases of all these lie the extent to which a shared sense of what constitute a threat to Nigeria and Nigerians has been established, collaborative forms of responses to these threats, a legitimate leadership in both the formal and informal sectors to lead the process, the ownership of these approaches and appropriate support from donors to respond to these threats.

6.8 Conclusion

This case study sought to interrogate the security challenges and find out if understanding the divers security cultures and integrating the indigenous security mechanisms and processes into the Nigerian security architecture could help enhance security sector reform and for that matter, governance in the country. In doing this, it reviewed the security arrangements, conceptions and perceptions about security culture from the formal and indigenous security sector actors, Nigeria's security sector governance arrangements or structures, existing security establishments to deliver on security needs, reform efforts undertaken to restructure the security sector, challenges encountered, and options, based on findings, for enhancing security governance of the sector. This approach to the study was meant to explore the importance of culture in enhancing governance and effective delivery of security needs to Nigeria and Nigerians.

Findings from the study have revealed a diverse and complex security sector in which the state acquires its legitimacy from the electorate, and is mandated by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to make security and welfare its primary purpose. Despite these

provisions, respective governments have struggled to stay the course all by themselves as they have, to a large extent, lost trust and credibility from their citizens for lack of effective security responses to various security needs. On the other hand, traditional or indigenous security actors who lack the legal mandate, owing to the removal of its previous roles and functions in previous constitutions, have gained some level of trust and recognition from citizens given their perceived ceremonial but effective roles and leadership in complementing functions of formal security arrangements.

This, however, in no way projects indigenous security institutions as having the capacity to do it all alone. As was established, certain security responses require the intervention of traditional rulers as they understand the culture of the actors involved with the requisite knowledge, experience and skill to guide appropriate responses and intervention. The complex nature of crime and the involvement of well-informed syndicates with high-level technological acumen equally require a well-equipped state machinery to combat such crimes. The nature of crime and warfare has equally evolved and in certain cases, like the Boko Haram terrorist Group operations, adopt unconventional means of attack on victims. Such crimes require a holistic and integrated approach to containing and addressing them.

The Nigerian security scenario therefore reflects a typical transitional and complex security system where various actors with diverse security cultures perceive security differently. Donors or international partners have introduced or rather seek to support the implementation of a concept which seems quite foreign but could be applicable to the Nigerian context with some adjustments. This will require a basic understanding and contextualisation of the concept which provides the option for its recognition, acceptance and adoption. Doing this, however, would necessitate an integration of both formal and informal positive security cultural traits which may or may not necessarily be sufficient, but necessary for transforming the governance of the

security sector. As Ajetunmobi & Ojo (2015:14) stated, "… the political elite should stop humiliating the traditional rulers and usurp [sic] the traditional functions of the kings". That hybrid context which is already in existence but not formalised thus needs reconsideration. Achieving desired results through changes in mindset and embracing positive formal and indigenous behavioural traits based on agreed values, norms and standards would be required.

In sum, culture as shared beliefs and norms not only vary but presents a complex scenario of multiples of actors that need to have or perhaps not have a common understanding of security objectives, but require some level of change in mindset and from negative behavioural conduct in order to enhance governance of the security sector towards meeting security needs. To guarantee this change through discarding certain negative cultural traits acquired over centuries and embracing other positive ones may not necessarily be guaranteed. What is nevertheless obvious is that changes in some shared values and norms remain pertinent on all sides to guarantee a transformation of security governance in the security sector. This, no doubt, demonstrates the centrality of culture in demystifying a complex concept and sector, which affords the opportunity for acceptance to enhance governance towards provision of security needs.

CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF GHANA AND NIGERIA's SECURITY CULTURE INFLUENCES ON GOVERNANCE OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

7.1 Introduction

In the quest to contribute to peace, security and development in West Africa and beyond, mainly in transitional societies, issues of statebuilding remain paramount. Statebuilding, as defined in chapter 2 of this study, entails the creation of new governmental institutions while strengthening the existing ones (Fukuyama 2004: 17) towards peace and stability. It also entails "an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations" (OECD 2008d cited in OECD 2011: 20). It is generally aimed at addressing threats posed by weak states, including issues of terrorism, drug trafficking, crime and international criminal networks, and refugees (Chandler 2010: 4) Similarly, solutions to problems of insecurity, poverty and the general lack of progress are also pursued through statebuilding processes (Ghani and Lockhart 2008: 4 cited in Chandler 2010: 5).

This field research on Ghana and Nigeria was, thus, undertaken with this broader objective in mind, but with specific emphasis on finding out the centrality or otherwise of security culture influences in the improvement of the governance of the security sector towards meeting stated goals and objectives. This was done within the framework of critical theory where data gathered in the field were subjected to detailed analysis and critique, raising the relevant questions and exploring the 'how' towards change and transformation of the status quo. This was largely guided by the social democracy ideology of focusing on both state and people's needs, particularly civil society and the citizens in general. This is meant to reinforce the people's power

to decide within the confines and sovereignty of the state, and to facilitate an egalitarian society towards peaceful growth and development.

This comparative analysis chapter, thus, established the causal link between security culture influences and security sector governance in Ghana and Nigeria by identifying several intervening factors that facilitate this linkage. They include people-centred approach to security, knowledge of the SSR/SSG concept, the need for adequate leadership and legitimacy, recognition of actors and their respective cultures, clearly defined roles and functions, circumventing hybrid cultural challenges, and mainstreaming positive or progressive values in security sector reforms, governance and responses to security challenges. Observing these propositions lead to the needed transformation required in the sector and answers the question why culture matters.

The analysis, thus, established the validity of the proposed grounded theory based on general trends and patterns observed in the two countries that *shared norms and values on safety, protection and freedom from fear, influence the acceptance and commitment towards security sector reform and governance efforts. Hence imbibing the appropriate security values, norms, principles and practices by both state and sub-state actor groups, would ensure the needed change and transformation* towards successful statebuilding processes in West Africa.

The chapter begins by briefly recapping the contextual background of challenges confronting security sector reform and governance in West Africa and why SSR/SSG efforts have not had the desired change and transformation in the security sector in the region. It then highlights the findings and observations made in the field in relation to security culture influences, based on key cultural factors that enhanced security sector governance in both countries. Findings are then compared for both countries in the areas of complexity, acceptance and an enhanced security sector governance towards revealing similarities and differences in

terms of what worked and what did not work which essentially helped to triangulate findings of the research and established why culture matters in demystifying the complexity of the security concept and its reform prerogatives, as well as facilitating its acceptance towards improving governance of the sector.

7.2 The Quest for Good Democratic Governance of the Security Sector in Societies in Transition in West Africa

Security sector reform and governance processes in West Africa have been ongoing for close to two decades, following the quest for good democratic governance in the region after several years of one party system, authoritarian rule and conflicts in the region. Security reforms and governance of the sector have taken place at varied levels within the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone states (Bryden et al 2008: 1-341). Notwithstanding, security challenges in the region still remain, including transnational or cross-border crimes, terrorism, kidnapping, cyber-crimes, piracy and terrorism. Civil wars which were very much in vogue between the 1990s and 2000s, like coups d'état which predates them, are however almost a thing of the past now. Security sector reform and governance efforts have laid much emphasis on the 'hardware' reforms with regard to capacity-building of security personnel, providing resources and equipment, and restructuring within relevant security institution. On the other hand, 'soft' reforms which entail reorientation of actors on agreed values, norms, principles and practices, as well as accommodating or effectively integrating endogenous security arrangements within the sector have been totally neglected. Hence, SSR/SSG efforts have not achieved a genuine and intrinsic change or transformation required to make the sector more vibrant and responsive to both state and human security needs.

In drawing lessons for the future, specifically in societies in transition in West Africa, security sector reform and governance approaches to statebuilding require a rethink, and the need

to adopt and mainstream transformative approaches based on appropriate security cultures in response to evolving security challenges and needs. Doing this will require circumventing challenges posed by complex hybrid security cultures and dynamics by exploring and promoting progressive traditional and modern values and security practices which must inform theories and policies going forward (Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163; and Podder 2013: 353-380).

7.3 Findings of Security Culture Influences on Security Sector Governance in Ghana and Nigeria

The data gathered in the field was mainly in response to the research question "how has security culture affected the complexity of, and facilitated the acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in the comparative cases of Ghana and Nigeria?" This was done through reviewing major security challenges faced by both countries with specific consideration of security decision-making processes and the contribution of different actors – state, sub-state and international partners – in resolving identified security challenges. The security contexts and shared beliefs in this area informed responses, performances and outcomes of interventions.

7.3.1 *Security Definitions in Ghana and Nigeria*

Responses from interviews and focus group discussions in the field on definition of security have been quite varied and sometimes reflective of all endeavours that human beings engage in. While there is no denying the fact that security means different things to different people, it is however construed as easy to explain. In essence, it relates mostly to human beings, institutions and the state (interviews with a Rtd. Brig Gen of the Nigerian Armed Forces, 05 January 2018 and Mr. K. Bentum Quantson, retired Director of the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) and the Criminal Investigations Divisions (CID) of the Ghana Police Service, Accra, Ghana, 18 April 2019). It entails notions of safety, stability, well-being, protection, survival, endurance, anti-corruption, inclusivity in governance, self-preservation and satisfaction among others.

It equally has narrow, broad or holistic definitions where it focuses on individuals or groups, given its human dimension, as well as that of institutions and the state given its traditional or regime dimension. In all field interviews conducted, it was generally agreed that security must be contextualised within the environment under consideration, draw linkages to development as it may not necessarily be an end in itself but a means to an end, and finally that the human aspect or dimension of security predominates in all security considerations.

In both countries, there was no consensus established on a particular definition of security, except in their respective constitutions. In Ghana, for example, the preamble of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana placed emphasis on the protection and preservation of the fundamental human rights and freedoms, unity and stability of the nation whereas the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Article 14(2b) declares that the security and welfare of the Nigerian people shall be the primary purpose of the government.

7.3.2 *Security Types/Concept*

Regime security traits manifest all over the continent of Africa, and West Africa has been noted for its rampant coups d'état, military rule and dictatorships or authoritarianism, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s (Decalo 1973: 105-127; Mwakikagile 2002; 124-125; Hendricks and Keita 2017: 1-12). This entails the concentration of power mainly in an individual or a few in leadership positions with a major interest of keeping them in power. Some have argued that the "Colonial Police Model", designed to advance and protect the colonial interest as against the rights of those colonised have largely influenced this system of governance on the continent (CHRI 2007: 10; Appiagyei-Atua 2006: 8). This Model entailed the prioritisation of the needs of the imperial powers through subjugation of the colony in order to exploit, control and profit from resources on the continent and this, largely, gave rise to dictatorial governance trends in Africa (Alemazung 2010). Ghana and Nigeria, as discussed in earlier chapters of this study, have

witnessed regime security trends since achieving their independence from one-party rule to military governments where decisions were only made by the military executives in the absence of a national legislature and a legitimate judiciary.

Changes overtime, particularly after the end of the Cold War, ushered in democracy with its accompanying principles, standards and demands. This led to a gradual evolution from the traditional or regime security to that of human security which shifted emphasis from preserving the security needs of only the state to also that of the people, but with more emphasis on freedom from fear, want and freedom to inherit a healthy natural environment (Buzan, B 1991; Booth 1999; Annan 2000). Interviews and data gathered from the field in Ghana and Nigeria revealed a significant level of human security trends in these countries, demonstrated by the existence of separate arms of government comprising the executive, legislature and the judiciary and a vibrant civil society enjoying freedom of speech and expression, but varying levels of good democratic governance.

The frequency in change of government from one democratically elected one to another may not be necessarily termed as very free and fair but remains quite credible, which speaks volume of democratic advancement in these countries. This does not, however, detract from the fact that semblance of regime security traits still exist in diverse forms, exhibited in the weak systems of transparency and accountability, weak oversight functions, human rights abuses, as well as corruption and neo-patrimonial tendencies among other things.

7.3.3 *Security Threats and Challenges*

The variations in terms of security challenges and threats for both countries manifest in the population size and intensity of crime, of which Nigeria appears to bear the greater burden for obvious reasons. A population of 197 million people, and years of terrorist activities in the country and higher crime rate define the degree of challenges confronting the country, but the

nature of security threats are quite similar except for terrorist activities in north-eastern Nigeria and the environmental pollution crisis in the Niger Delta area.

7.3.4 *Security Systems and Security Culture Dynamics*

In undertaking this research, it was observed as indicated in Chapters 5 and 6 that Ghana and Nigeria have common security systems with that of the formal security system structured after the British system and with similar security institutions and agencies derived from colonial legacies. The same also applies to the informal security sectors and arrangements based on its pre-colonial historical traditions and customs, and derived from resurgent heritage. The respective security sectors comprise the core security agencies and paramilitary forces, management and oversight bodies, those within the Justice and Rule of Law sector, as well as the external security actors representing the donor community and other international partners. This is illustrated in the table below:

Table 7.1
General Categorisation of Security Actors in Ghana and Nigeria

Actors in the Security Sector	
Core Security Actors	Armed Forces, Police Service, Paramilitary Forces, Presidential Guards, Customs Authorities, and reserve or local security units (including Civil Defence Forces, National Guards etc.)
Management and Oversight Bodies	The Executive, National Security Advisory Bodies, Legislative and Legislative Select Committees, Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Customary and Traditional Authorities, Financial Management Bodies (Finance
	Ministries, Budget Officers, Financial Audit and Planning Units), and Civil Society Organisations (Civilian Review Boards and Public Complaints Commissions)
Justice and Rule of Law	Judiciary and Justice Ministries, Prisons, Criminal Investigation and Prosecution Services, Human Rights Commissions and Ombudsmen, and Customary and Traditional Justice Systems, Traditional/Sharia Courts
Non-Statutory Security Forces	Private Security Companies, Political Party Militias, Vigilante Groups
External Security Actors	Development Partners - DFID, SIDA, CIDA, USAID, UNDP, GTZ, DANIDA etc Military Experts – IMET, MPRI, BMAT, BDAT Regional Bodies - Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African Union, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), WACSOF, ECOSSOC, ASSN, WANEP etc. Global - United Nations, Global Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST)

Source: Adapted from OECD DAC Handbook, 2007 p.22, and author's own research.

These actors possess their respective security cultures expressed in "particular ways of thinking that are shared locally and across the sub-region" in response to transnational security challenges (Williams and Haacke 2008: 128-129). They interpret the meaning of symbols, artifacts, and behaviours in the same or in similar ways within their respective groups and subgroups (Banks, Banks and McGee 2010: 8). This interpretation however differ, in some

instances, between and across the different security groups who are guided mainly by their respective constitutions, code of conduct, common and customary laws based on either western values, norms and customs or indigenous traditions and cultures, and which guide the formulation of policies and strategies for responses to security threats or needs. The values, norms and principles, among others, underscore the "soft" part of culture, which is more or less invisible, but which influences behavioural patterns or the way of life of the security actors in the security system (Murray 2009).

Engagement with most of these actors during the field research revealed that cultural differences manifest in the different understanding of roles and responsibilities which result in turf battles and serve as a hindrance to good governance practices. Those with similar security cultures or within same cultural groups usually understand each other and agree on expectations while those with different cultural leanings disagree in decision-making or responses to security challenges. As witnessed in the Nigerian case study, for example, despite prominent roles played by chiefs and other traditional leaders, their functions are still perceived as unconstitutional and only given recognition and legitimacy by the people or even officials of government in an informal setting (Tonwe & Osemwota 2013:133-137; *Vanguard Newspaper* 2012: 13). This differs from the situation in Ghana where comprehensive constitutional provisions have been made with regard to structure, hierarchy, functions and responsibilities among others (Article 270-277 of the 1992 *Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*). This is not to depict a perfect relationship between formal and informal actors in Ghana, but to indicate minimal standards required as basis for recognition, collaboration and partnerships. It also gave the chance for understanding and imbibing both formal and informal progressive security cultures and traditions as these actors meet and learn about each other's cultures thereby discarding obsolete or regressive stereotypes or cultures towards effective governance.

Similarly at the regional level, mainly within ECOWAS, distinct security cultures, as observed in Chapter 4 of this study, informed the establishment of the regional security frameworks for security responses based on norms and values of equality, territorial integrity, solidarity and collective self-reliance, non-aggression and good neighbourliness, and peaceful settlement of disputes in respective member states. Though these values are generally acknowledged and recognised, behavioural patterns differ through different interpretations of regional and international norms. Member States would, therefore, interpret transnational security threats or humanitarian challenges, for example, differently and adopt different interventions measures to these challenges (Acharya 2004; and Ladnier 2003 cited in Williams and Haacke 2008: 129).

It becomes clear from the above illustrations that cultural norms and values are brought to bear in the performance of roles, functions or responsibilities of the numerous actors in the SSG process. Thus, the fusion of different cultures of security actors, both external and internal, and even among core security sector actors and their counterparts in the civilian management and oversight bodies, makes it rather complex and difficult in the oversight, management and governance of the security sector. This reinforces the need for demystifying and minimising the complexities for effective governance towards required change and transformation needed.

Based on these general observations and findings in both countries, a comparison is undertaken to highlight specific areas of influences in order to guide common, standard and holistic practice of SSR/SSG agenda going forward.

7.4 Security Culture Influences on Security Sector Governance: Ghana and Nigeria Compared

Three major categories of security actors engage in securitisation of threats and devise strategies to respond or intervene in the prevention, management and resolution of these security challenges. These are the state, sub-state and international (governmental and non-governmental)

actors. These actors are aligned with both western/colonial and indigenous forms of security culture and tradition. Their relations or interactions are sometimes characterised by cases of contention, disagreements, misunderstandings, manipulations and corruption based, especially, on cultural differences, while there are equally opportunities, despite differences in cultures, for working together (Gusfiled 1968: 1-8; Chinsinga 2006: 255-274; Galland & Lemel 2008: 153-186). Indeed, there were also instances where some who possessed similar security cultures still differed in opinions and actions as a result of issues of corruption which remained one of the major challenges in attempts at addressing security threats in both countries.

In undertaking the comparisons between the two countries, the identified issues of complexity, acceptance and enhanced security sector governance are used as indicators to help identify progressive security culture influences in governance of the security sector as a basis for change and transformation.

7.4.1 *Complexity*

Given varied security cultures of numerous state and sub-state actors as well as international partners in the security sector, achieving successful SSG continues to remain complex. The complexity stems basically from the colonial influences within a post-colonial African context, through the imposition of 'liberal' or 'western' peace tendencies within a traditional or informal setting of Africa (Aning et al 2018: 121). This concept of SSG, despite its positive attributes, is sometimes perceived as facilitating 'neo-imperialist tendencies', thereby minimising the space or opportunity for traditional and indigenous approaches to peacebuilding or statebuilding processes (Mac Ginty 2008: 140). The confluence or congruence of modernity and tradition perceived by some scholars as antithetical in approach would thus require prudent calibration for successful implementation of a concept considered largely as foreign with varied

forms of legitimacy and acceptability (Hoehne 2011:29; Molutsi 2004; Mattes 1997; Logan 2008: 1-23).

These cultural differences emanate from a hybrid and multi-layered group of actors working in different institutions with their own cultural dynamics, vision, mission and mandate on issues of security. They relate at horizontal and vertical levels, while equally traversing in partnerships on issues of common interest. While the general assumption is made that people within similar cultures easily find areas of commonality and acceptability in handling security-related issues, it also not usually the case as issues of legitimacy, loyalty and alliances, in addition to corrupt ideals, affect these efforts. Thus the introduction of security sector reform and governance as a concept linked to western ideology and foreign within the African setting require some level of understanding and clarity amidst all the security complexes for acceptance.

This takes us to the findings in the field in Ghana and Nigeria with regard to the existing hybridism outlined above in the security sector of both countries, and with its underlying complexities based on which options were identified to circumvent challenges posed, while strengthening prospects within this setting.

The complexity of SSG in Ghana stems from actors and their different cultures, including ministries, the House of Parliament, intelligence and security agencies, and CSOs. The issue is further complicated by issues of confidentiality and secrecy as against subjecting security agencies to oversight and control within the sector. This is not, however, peculiar to Ghana but generally reflective of security sectors in the region and beyond. A clear example has to do with the vital importance of policing in the maintenance of law and order in Ghana but to which "…society has often not looked upon the policeman with the expected admiration and reverence" (Mr. Sam Awortwi, ASDR Roundtable on Police and Policing 2001: 2). This is partly attributable to the "…instinctive desire of human beings to be free while the maintenance of law

and order entails curtailing certain action[s] of members of society… [while on the contrary] the manner in which some policemen carry out their work could evoke resentment from society" (Mr. Sam Awortwi, ASDR Roundtable on Police and Policing 2001: 2).

Another example relates to the specific requirement spelt out in the 1996 Security and Intelligence Agencies Act of Parliament (Act 526) for the Minister of National Security, who is assigned ministerial responsibility by the President for intelligence agencies, to annually submit a report to parliament on activities of the ministry. This is hardly done as part of transparency and accountability requirements, and parliamentarians, until recently, were either unaware of this requirement or never really bothered to demand that it is done given the culture of confidentiality and the waving of the band of 'state secret' by security institutions and agencies.

The security systems and different cultures, therefore, make the governance of the sector rather complex. But though complex, there must be a conscious effort to ensure that the oversight bodies are working. Hence in the case of parliament, for instance, because of the high turnover of parliamentarians, training has to be always provided to facilitate effectiveness in terms of knowing the issues given that after every four years, some parliamentarians are replaced (Thomas Jaye, KAIPTC, 09 May 2015). Also, any complex concept must be clearly explained and placed in its proper context for acceptance and effectiveness.

Endogenous security culture is not too different from that of the western world when it comes to ensuring security of the state and its people. Notions of transparency, accountability and upholding human rights and the rule of law, however, become an issue given the status of a chief or a king and his discretionary powers usually based on the traditions of a people rather than western conceptions of human rights. A new concept, therefore, requires time to be properly understood and implemented, and change is also sometimes difficult and does take time. Hence some level of education is required to make a difference. In a similar vein, government and the

people also need to determine the kind of security they need, its affordability, and if the country still requires donor support to afford it. (Ernest Lartey, KAIPTC, Accra, 08 May 2015).

Minimising complexity within security institutions in the country would thus require partnerships between government and its civil society counterparts in terms of understanding the concept of SSR/SSG, the security culture of the actors and clarification of roles. This must, however, be done by being cognizant of the fact that people have played various roles in their institutions for a long time and are, therefore, accustomed to these roles or cultures, and, thus, the required change cannot take place overnight but must be seen as a process that will take time. This is because these institutions have emerged over the years and have become laws onto themselves, and to say they need oversight would not be accepted easily. Hence there is the need to dialogue with them in order to provide prudent alternatives (Thomas Jaye, KAIPTC, Accra, 09 May 2015).

Clarification of roles will require clearly defined security legislations to spell them out so as to avoid, for instance, turf battles between the police and the customs and excise services which occur very often, though they are part of the core professional security agencies. We also need a policy dialogue forum for all these actors to meet and dialogue as some actors do not know the security sector properly; e.g. civilians cannot provide adequate oversight without adequate knowledge of security referents and their roles. With this knowledge, actors could operate, optimally, within their boundaries. The parliament should have a right to demand accountability from an intelligence agency, for example, and the refusal of this request from the intelligence agency must be an issue that borders on undermining state interest or security with an option, in certain cases, for the matter to be determined by the Supreme Court. These are ways of resolving institutional culture clashes etc. (Thomas Jaye, Deputy Director FAAR, KAIPTC, Accra, 09 May 2015). Demystification of the security sector is equally necessary to make

everyone conscious of the sector and afford them the opportunity to understand it beyond the traditional or regime type of security (Mr. Justice Agbezuge, Peace Analyst, UNDP, 19 May 2015).

Taking a look at the Dagbon and Hohoe conflict case studies, as well as the electoral disputes reviewed in chapter 5 on Ghana, the laudable partnerships between the state and sub-state actor groups in the resolution of the crises gained a lot of recognition and commendation from Ghanaians and other international observers, given the lax in responses and the potential spill-over effects of some of the crises at their initial stages. Progress, however, only came amidst the complexities when the actors agreed to work together. This partnership underscores the essential attributes of knowledge of the actors and familiarity with their cultures, in addition to the recognition of both state and sub-state actors and the resultant positive impact of their intervention in the resolution of conflict. The clarity of roles and the collective interests of both state and sub-state actors involved, their acceptance in the mediation processes based on the trust and confidence reposed in them as neutral actors of integrity, and the willingness of the community residents and disputing factions to submit to their intervention equally facilitated the peace process (Aning et al 2018: 125-128; Zounmenou 2009:1-7). This holds the potential for efficiency and effectiveness in the governance of the security sector. These positive interventions reflect the 'bottom-up' rather than the 'top-bottom' approach to security governance in which both state and sub-state actors are inclusive in decision-making and interventions towards the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and mitigation of security threats when they happen.

In the case of Nigeria, the complexities are made manifest in the very diverse and varied formal and informal settings, reflected in the federal and state governance arrangements and architecture, many ethnic and religious groups, social groups, and local and international

organisations. In this scenario, commonalities and decision-making becomes very difficult (interview with Chinedu Nwagu, Project Director, Trust Africa-Nigeria, Abuja, 05 January 2018). This calls for dialogue in bridging gaps to arrive at a holistic or national sense of security culture in order to guide security sector reform and governance processes (British High Commission Official, Abuja, 05 January 2018).

Donors or international partners have introduced or rather seek to support the implementation of a concept which seems quite foreign but could be applicable to the Nigerian context with some adjustments. This will require a basic understanding and contextualisation of the concept which provides the option for its recognition, acceptance and adoption. Doing this, however, would necessitate an integration of both formal and informal positive security cultural traits as the basis for transforming the governance of the security sector. As Ajetunmobi & Ojo (2015: 14) stated, "… the political elite should stop humiliating the traditional rulers and usurp [sic] the traditional functions of the kings". That hybrid context which is already in existence but not formalised thus needs reconsideration. Achieving desired results through changes in mindset and embracing positive formal and indigenous behavioral traits based on agreed values, norms and practices would be required.

Major security challenges still confront the country in areas of terrorism, the Niger Delta Oil Crisis and farmer-herder disputes, reviewed in chapter 6, and which continue to claim thousands of lives and property. This reflects an intricate set of challenges within the security sector or governance system with multiple security actors who perform different roles and functions, and require 'software' changes as a result of entrenched negative behaviours, attitudes, norms, values and principles, in order to complement that of the 'hardware' changes related to security institutions and agencies, capacity-building and resources for enhanced and effective security service delivery. Responses to these crises have focused largely on 'top-bottom'

approaches which, in many cases, are non-inclusive and have ignored the essential role of traditional leaders and cultural considerations. Civil society actors have called for the adoption of the human security approach which is more inclusive and consultative rather than the regime security approach to issues, as well as the need for collaboration and partnerships between the Nigerian Government, non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations (Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 856 -869; Akinbi 2015: 43; Abimbola and Adesote 2012: 16-28).

Involvement of traditional actors has, thus, been on their own initiative and ceremonial basis rather than on any legal basis as compared to local government structures which also depend on partnerships with these leaders for success. This obviously substantiates Englebert's (2000: 97-98; also in Logan 2011:2) assertion of African States being historically in competition with traditional authorities for popular legitimacy, but more importantly that the authority of traditional leaders is not only independent of the state but also resilient and rooted in the historical continuity of the traditional institutions and having a moral claim to rule.

Revisiting Mortiz (2010:145) and Pelican's (2006: 237) argument that culture serves as the central but missing element in the resolution of farmer-herder and, by extension, other conflicts in West Africa resonates with the attempts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Nigeria. This hinges on having adequate knowledge of history, customs and tradition of actors, while exploring partnerships between formal and informal institutions in the management and resolution of disputes. The prevention of farmer-herder crisis in the Ijebu-Itele district of Ogun State by His Royal Highness Dr. (engr.) M.A. Kasali, the Moyegeso of Ijebu-Itele Kingdom, speaks volumes in this regard as he was able to peacefully settle the dispute and get reparation for affected farmers as detailed in chapter 6 of the study.

The above scenarios in Ghana and Nigeria clearly indicate security challenges in both countries characterised by security complexes. However, the challenges that were addressed

effectively in both countries were based mainly on a good comprehension of security culture considerations. Hence, what remains significant from these findings relates to mapping or knowing the actors; ensuring clarity and recognition of their roles and functions, particularly of traditional actors, in the legislative frameworks as pertains in Ghana compared to Nigeria; good knowledge and understanding of the security dynamics; circumventing the hybrid security culture differences through dialogue, consultation and inclusivity; as well as adopting inclusive bottom-up approaches in responses to security challenges.

7.4.2 *Acceptance*

The issue of acceptance came up very strongly in the discussions, interviews and desk research in the security sector reform and governance process. It came up at two basic levels which are accepting the SSR/SSG concept, and the leadership to the process. There is the basic assumption in the SSR/SSG discourse that it is the standard way of ensuring sanitising the security sector towards peace, stability and sustainable development in the West African region and the continent at large. Be that as it may, the SSR process has evolved through many stages for over two decades, and the process was largely guided by security experts, professionals, technocrats and international partners. All these actors shaped the conception, design, development and implementation of the programme, but those at the grassroots hardly ever know of the existence of this concept or what it entails.

Traditional leaders, based on interviews in Ghana and Nigeria, have their own systems and conceptions about security and the need to discard obsolete traditional practices and imbibe new values as their indigenous ways of reform and vice versa, but an introduction of an alternate concept perceived as foreign and a western agenda in a translational manner makes it difficult to accept and implement. This is where the essence of culture or security culture becomes prominent in contextualising this concept as cultural awareness and sensitivity becomes very

crucial, especially as shared beliefs, values, norms, customs and tradition vary and differ within and outside of both countries.

On the issue of leadership to the process, issues of power and authority must be expressed based on legitimate governance as this becomes crucial in ensuring appropriate guidance and success of the programme. Recognition also underpins the issue of legitimacy which hinges mainly on formal and informal recognition of leaders in the security sector governance process. Effective leadership as observed in the field goes with trust in addition to other equally important values such as courage, service, respect, recognition, honesty, integrity and truth. These values were highlighted in specific details by traditional leaders in focus group discussions conducted during the field research in Abutia Kloe and Sunyani in Ghana (September 2015), as well as in interviews with chiefs in Ogun State in Nigeria, (March 2018).

Similar views were equally expressed by security experts in both countries. For example, leadership is construed as servitude and if understood properly, responsibility would be assumed to address the needs of the people and that of the state (interview with a Rtd. Brig Gen/State Official in the All People's Congress Government, Abuja, 05 January 2018). Again, the notion of legitimacy and for that matter 'acceptance' was considered as dependent on the contextualisation and understanding of the SSR/SSG concept and the belief in leadership's capabilities to implement the concept based on above-mentioned values. That said, acceptance of the SSR/SSG concept did not come up during the regime or traditional security era marked by military dictatorships, but within the democratic dispensation with emphasis on human security. The issue of acceptance, therefore, remained mainly in the domain of the security agencies under authoritarianism rather than within civil society. But given the highly political nature of SSR, the required change and transformation only hold a great potential in this current dispensation of democracy and good governance (Ernest Lartey, Research Fellow, KAIPTC, Accra, 8 May 2015)

It also came to light that leaders with close affinity to their people were easily trusted, recognised and given the needed support towards the successful implementation of programmes, while those not in close contact were either perceived as not accountable, corrupt or agents of imperialists. Leaders who were recognised to have close affinity with their people were mainly religious, traditional and charismatic leaders. There are, however, exceptions to the rule in which some of these leaders, for example traditional and religious leaders, who resided with people in communities and had close affinity were found to be corrupt and were either removed or lost the trust, recognition and legitimacy of the people. These progressive, invincible and 'soft' traits manifest in cultural values, and any security reform or governance initiative must mainstream them in its processes as it facilitates (re)orientation towards eliminating negative and obsolete attitudes and behaviours, not only for the leadership but also for all actors engaged in the process, be it state, sub-state or international partners.

The Yendi Chieftaincy dispute reviewed in chapter 5 of this study unveils a classic contention between formal and traditional governance systems, reflected in the European intrusion into the traditional political system of the Dagbon Kingdom which has been in existence for five decades, and the partitioning and subsequent replacement of the traditional rotational system with that of a modern Selection Committee. As Hoehne (2011: 7) and others would argue, "…traditional authority usually features gerontocracy, patriarchy and undemocratic procedures (e.g. consensus instead of vote) and therefore interferes with modern democracy" (Fanthorpe 2005: 27-49; Ntsebetza 2005: 71-89), hence the interference, by colonialists, in the established traditional system of selection of chiefs.

Notwithstanding, the new Selection Committee was allegedly introduced during the 1948 Conference of Dagbon Chiefs which was later perceived by some indigenes as an illegal and unjustifiable conference as records of the conference could not be traced and the day of the

meeting, 12 May 1948, remained questionable given ongoing funeral rites of a royal of the kingdom which outlawed such meetings at the time (Mahama and Noble 2005). This development had negative influence on the subsequent post-independence selection of chiefs in the kingdom as the chieftaincy institution became politicised, leading to the murder of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II in March 2002. All these raised issues of suspicion and lack of recognition which eventually led to the non-acceptance of the Ya Na and the major differences between the gates of the same family.

In a related development, again captured in chapter 5, it took eminent chiefs, led by Asantehene Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, the Ashanti King, to resolve the longstanding Yendi dispute which successive governments of the NDC and NPP failed to do. The revered, recognised and respected chiefs succeeded in brokering peace between the two gates after a lost decade of intervention. The acceptance of the leadership of the Asantehene as a credible mediator, together with other eminent chiefs, did not only attest to his legitimacy as a traditional leader, but his knowledge of the values, norms, customs and tradition of the people, to a large extent, facilitated the successful resolution of the dispute (*Ghanaweb.com*, Thursday, 13 December 2018).

In his response to finding a solution to the farmer-herder dispute in his community, His Royal Highness Alaiyeluwa Oba Dr. (engr.) M.A. Kasali, the Moyegeso of Ijebu-Itele Kingdom in Ogun State, Nigeria, (30 March 2018) emphasised the need for recognition and involvement of traditional leaders in addressing security problems in the country. He called for the bottom-up approach in which he emphasised the importance of the knowledge of the terrain and the identification of non-residents or foreigners by the indigenes who are better placed in gathering intelligence and working with the traditional leaders and local government authorities. This he considered as the most effective means of partnership with security agencies in fighting crime. His success in mediating the dispute was attributable to knowing the people in the community,

their tradition, customs and culture, as well as his acceptance by his subjects as their leader. He did this without the intervention of the local government authorities. The Nigeria Police Force, recognising these attributes, have consistently collaborated with the local security actors, particularly registered vigilante groups to arrest criminals for prosecution.

This brings to the fore the urgent need to restore the roles and functions of traditional leaders left out of the 1999 Constitution of the Republic of Nigeria in order to accord them appropriate recognition and effectiveness of decision-making in the peace and development of the country as in the case of Ghana. And as reflected in previous chapters and this current one, a section of the current Ghanaian Constitution detailed the institutional structure, roles – including security and non-political activities – to engage in, as well as functions and adjudication processes of chieftaincy institutions. It also protected the institution from political interferences in order to avoid the age-old misunderstanding between tradition and modernity. This gives legitimacy and recognition to traditional leaders in addition to their complementary role in governance and development of the country.

To conclude, therefore, on the findings and analysis undertaken on security culture influences on effective governance of the security sector, the two case studies revealed some interesting findings with respect to enhancing security sector governance in both countries based on integrated or hybrid progressive security culture practices. The focus was not on which scenario is better than the other but which practices worked in both countries to serves as useful lessons in seeking the adoption of progressive security cultures in security governance. Indeed there were many cases of similarities in terms of values, tradition and culture; colonial lineage reflected in the formal institutions, structures and organisations; political systems; security culture; and common security challenges in both countries and across the region. Both countries have also

experienced stable democracies, economic growth and development over the years and have attained middle income status.

There are, however, differences with regard to issues of recognition and legitimacy of traditional institutions and the roles expected of them in the security sector governance in both countries. While Ghana accords status, recognition as well as roles and responsibilities to traditional leaders in the Ghanaian constitution, that of Nigeria did not do that in its 1999 Constitution. Hence despite the existence of hybrid formal and informal institutions, only the formal is recognised and with the requisite legitimacy to respond to security challenges in the country, leading mainly to top-bottom approaches to issues. Notwithstanding, the indigenes accord the needed legitimacy to their traditional leaders and institutions, including those within the formal sectors, based on common heritage and resilience of these traditional institutions and, thus, security interventions undertaken by these traditional institutions are usually ceremonial though effective. This situation needs to be rectified.

The governance arrangements, though republican in nature, differ in terms of Nigeria's federal system of governance. Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis also remains a major challenge to the security sector, compared to Ghana, as well as its Niger Delta oil crisis. Issues of the farmer-herder disputes are, nevertheless, common in both countries though the rate of mortality is far higher in Nigeria to that of Ghana.

This comparative analysis, thus, highlights security cultural influences, in terms of shared values, norms and practices, that helps to minimise or demystify the complexity of security sector reform and governance processes, based on cultural awareness, sensitivities and imbibing progressive security culture traits in the bid to address security challenges and provide security needs of the state and the people. This offers the opportunity for the acceptance of the SSR/SSG concept and leadership to the process towards effective governance of the sector.

7.4.3 *Effective/Enhanced Security Sector Governance*

The main objective of this study is to meet the security needs of both the state and its people as a way of facilitating statebuilding processes particularly in states in transition. Meeting the desired security needs will, however, be achieved if or when there is an optimal sense of freedom from fear and meeting basic needs within the context of human security. Leadership must guide the process and define roles, strategies and mobilise resources to address security challenges. Leadership, as already mentioned in chapter 2 of this study and previous sections above, remains crucial to the success of SSG as effective governance of the security sector requires effective organisation and management of the structures, processes and actors in the sector. It also requires drafting and implementing laws, policies and strategies towards meeting needs of the state and its people, as well as facilitating dialogue through consultation and encouraging freedom of expression. Above all, leaders in this sector must promote enhanced governance through the transformation of behaviour and attitudes, which must be based on imbibing or observing specific principles, standards or norms and values.

The sector must be properly streamlined with actors performing the functions within agreed formal and informal hybrid context. Security agencies must be well equipped to deliver on core security needs of the people, which include prevention of crime, ensuring public safety and observation of human rights, enforcing the rule of law, and generally ensuring adequate defence of the territory of the state, its sovereignty and integrity among other things. The missing element, however, is the softer part of security sector reform and governance initiative which embraces security culture. This must be considered in all the activities mentioned above and its deficits addressed to ensure the right security culture considerations in the areas of cultural awareness and sensitivities, and adopting the right values, norms and customs for effective and efficient governance. These will enhance SSG in West Africa and beyond, and in doing that the following

intervening factors inferred from the findings above must be observed: people-centred security; knowledge of the concepts; leadership and legitimacy; recognition of actors; defined roles and functions; circumventing hybrid security culture challenges; and the adoption and mainstreaming of positive or progressive security culture values for the desired impact.

7.5 Triangulation of Findings

Findings from Ghana and Nigeria in the comparative analysis undertaken above, present data on established patterns, uniformities and variations on security culture influences on governance of the security sector in both countries (Daly 2007: 212; Crotty, 1998). This, in essence, provided the option for making inferences and inductions based on discourse and ideation, which helped to provide the needed answer to the research question of this study on why culture matters, and how security culture has affected the complexity of, and facilitated the acceptance and effectiveness of security sector governance in the comparative cases of Ghana and Nigeria.

In effect, cultural differences or lack of cultural awareness and sensitivity makes it difficult to accept the SSR/SSG concept or promote effective governance in the sector, while respect for values, norms and practices, be it formal or informal, facilitates positive security culture influences in accepting or implementing these concepts. This was evident in solutions found to long-standing disputes in Ghana and Nigeria based on partnerships between formal and informal security arrangements with regard to the Dagbon Chieftaincy disputes, Hohoe ethnic crisis, electoral disputes, resolution of the farmer-herder dispute in Ijebu-Itele district of Ogun State, and the effective collaboration between the Nigeria Police Force and the Vigilante Groups in fighting crimes in the communities. Those of the Boko Haram terrorist attacks in North-Eastern part of Nigeria and the lingering farmer-herder crises in both countries still linger on without solutions.

This observation is reinforced in Chapter 2 of this study on SSR in Afghanistan where obvious cultural differences and loyalty to tribe and village proved much stronger than that of national government, as security personnel identified more with local social structures, customs and loyalties than national laws and institutions despite proposed reforms (Murray 2009: 188). Hence the superimposition of new ideas on what is still a tribal society was only temporal and was reversed with the withdrawal of international support from the country (Murray 2009:193). Similar dispositions are highlighted by Wood (2004) and Hills (2012) on taking sensibilities of other nodes (actors and processes) towards cultural transformation within institutions and delivering effective security needs by imbibing a globalised security culture.

A globalised security culture entails the adoption of positive norms and values, and the inclusion of both formal and informal security institutions in the governance of the security sector. This hybrid context with mixed cultures would require credible leadership to ensure the change and transformation needed in the sector. This will, however, necessitate prudent calibration for successful implementation of a concept perceived largely as foreign with varied forms of legitimacy and acceptability. Contextual hybridism must therefore take pre-eminence over translational hybridism. This would require significant levels of security culture influences which must be genuine enough and based on positive values, standards and norms, for intrinsic rather than instrumental or cosmetic change, as great possibilities exist for discarding or rejecting such values based on differences, ignorance, inexperience or corrupt morals and values (Wood 2004:31–48). And in cases where cultural differences prevail, respect, co-existence and dialogue must be employed to facilitate the process rather than an event.

The complexity of the security terrain, therefore, requires the adoption of the basic intervening factors, identified above, to facilitate the needed change or transformation in the

sector towards its minimisation and promoting acceptability of the SSR/SSG concept and its effectiveness.

7.5.1 *People-Centred Security*

An effective security system, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, would require the various components of the entire security system working together to deliver security needs of the state and its people. In this regard, the data gathered from the field in Ghana and Nigeria attests to the fact that effective governance of the security sector would essentially depend on a government-people partnership within a multi-party democracy, rather than a dictatorial or authoritarian regime setting, where human security preferences remain the most credible alternative compared to traditional, regime or governmental security preferences.

A security system focused more on individual, community or national security preferences would afford the opportunity for all actors to contribute towards the identification of security threats to both the state and its people, with accompanying security policies and strategies to address these threats (interview with retired Snr. Military Officer in Abuja, FCT, Nigeria, 5 January 2018; Aghedo and Osumah 2012: 856 -869; Akinbi 2015: 43; Abimbola and Adesote 2012: 16-28). This will facilitate a "[shift] from state-centred to a plural or nodal conception[s] of governance" as well as “pay[ing] more attention to the opportunities for transformation within the broader field of security governance" (Wood 2004: 32).

Thus in essence, human beings must be at the centre of security considerations which affords collective identification and securitisation of issues based on either similar or diverse positive security cultural traits. This is reflected in the Ghana case where national security apparatus watches citizen’s dissatisfaction above anything else, as any citizen dissatisfaction becomes a national security concern (interview with Raymond Atuguba, Executive Secretary of former President John Mahama and Law Lecturer, University of Ghana, Legon, Monrovia, 15

September 2015). This is predicated on citizen's dissatisfaction posing real threats to losing legitimacy and for that matter elections in future polls. This reinforces the initial assertion in chapter 2 that the security of the state and the human being is of prime importance by way of ensuring not only the absence of violence, but upholding human rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare, and making opportunities and choices available for the individual to fulfill his or her potential (UNDP Human Development Report 1994: 3, 22-40; Annan 2000; and Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).

Notwithstanding, cultural differences, sub-cultures, counter-cultures, and dominant cultures in the security sector make governance of the security sector complex and challenging, and thus necessitates dialogue, coexistence, mediation and other related roles by security actors in the field in order to facilitate national dispute resolution, peace, security and stability in the country (interview with Ernest Lartey, Researcher, KAIPTC, 8 May 2015).

With these basic arrangements in place, the needed transformation within the sector would, thus, require essential elements of changing negative behavioural or attitudinal practices through dropping the negative security cultural traits and adopting positive ones in both the formal and informal security terrain. This will require a basic mapping and recognition of the actors, respect for their mandates, roles and functions, security dialogue towards coordination and informing policy decisions and strategies, as well as promoting a hybrid engagement of issues within the formal and informal settings towards acceptance and transformation.

7.5.2 *Knowledge of Concept*

SSR/SSG concept emerged from the security-development nexus in which policy-makers saw security and development as linked and mutually reinforcing of each other (Schievels 2019). Hence one needs a secure and stable environment for development t to take place, while development also consolidates peace, security and stability. The evolution and implementation of

the concept was mainly undertaken within the epistemic community comprising academics, policy-makers and security professionals or securocrats among others. Hence to introduce and implement a concept that impacts grassroots, partnerships between both formal and informal sectors would be of utmost importance and this must be based on a major sensitisation programme as part of the SSR/SSG agenda for success and sustainability. The assumption, therefore, held that a prescriptive approach based on top-bottom efforts would facilitate the successful implementation of this concept has and continues to be erroneous.

Any SSR/SSG agenda must incorporate a strong element of sensitisation and massive outreach within grassroots in order to complement training and capacity-building within and among security professionals and policy-makers for the needed impact. This initiates the buy-in and also creates the opportunity for those supporting and implementing the programme to learn more about the culture, opportunities and concerns of the masses in order to help in effective programme implementation. Popularisation of the concept would improve and enhance knowledge about content and how to contexualise the SSR problematique and engagement among both formal and informal security actors. This will aid the acceptance and involvement of actors in rolling out the SSR/SSG agenda, as it creates the opportunity for local ownership, resilience and sustainability of projects (Donais 2008; Schirch and Mancini-Griffoli 2015).

7.5.3 *Recognised Security Actors*

The broad range of security actors within the formal and informal sectors, undoubtedly, have varied and distinct roles to play in the governance of the security sector. Their actions and inactions are informed mainly by their respective security cultures which are expressed either in similar or diverse ways between their various groups or sub-groups in the country, as well as across the region and beyond, in response to both domestic and transnational security challenges. An interpretation of meanings of symbols, artifacts, and behaviours in the same or in similar

ways within respective groups and sub-groups facilitate easy decision-making and implementation of strategies, while differences in this regard complicate same (Banks, Banks and McGee 2010: 8). Cultural differences exhibit complexities of relations between individuals or groups thereby hindering effective relations or governance, as the higher the differences, the more complex the relationship and reaching common goals (House *et al* 2002: 1).

This necessitates recognition or acceptance of actors, even with different cultures, in order to facilitate easy decision-making, oversight responsibilities, upholding the rule of law and engendering the potential of hybrid cultures for the collective good. And this can only stem from subjecting one's views or perspectives to positive or progressive cultural attributes based on traditional, national and universal standards. One area to find commonality in the face of complex and diverse security cultures is the organic law of the country, that is the Constitution of the Republic, which serves as the principal guiding standard for regulating policies, behaviour and best practices (Frank Oduro, CDD, Ghana, May 2015).

Hence influences of culture and the need for cultural change within the broad field of security governance, must be expressed through the enhancement of democratic values within, across and outside of the state sphere, rather than limiting the discourse to an institutional context (Wood 2004:31–48). But this must equally be contextualised to the extent that notions of tradition and modernity must gain traction and acceptable balance where indigenous security actors are not only involved in security reforms but made to comprehend positive foreign concepts and cultural values, while equally adopting the positive indigenous cultural values to facilitate the desired change and transformation in the sector. An understanding and recognition of respective cultures of the actors in the sector, including the leaders and their followers, have proven to be the determining factor in successfully governing the sector and this holds true even for international partners in the implementation of programmes and agendas.

7.5.4 Leadership and Legitimacy

Leadership within the security sector remains crucial in steering security sector reforms and transformation. Max Weber's classification of authority, legitimacy or leadership into the three categories of formal or rational-bureaucratic, traditional or informal and charismatic or personal provides a generic framework for assessing relationships between leadership of the sector and beneficiaries, as well as leadership styles required to facilitate transformation or change in the security sector (Weber 1958: 1-11; Burns 1978; Hoehne 2011: 6-7; Keulder 2010: 150-154). Leadership is, however, most effective when accorded the needed legitimacy to function. Legitimacy in this context connotes "voluntary compliance of subjects to the authority of the ruler(s)" (Hoehne 2011: 6; Weber 1956:157; Oomen 2005b: 82). These dynamics are influenced by cultures or security culture traits, though sometimes paradoxically, as dictatorships within a seemingly democratic setting lack the needed legitimacy, while a so-called benevolent dictator who is pro-human security gains legitimacy.

Be that as it may, credible elections facilitate legitimacy and are determined by the people within the formal settings, but in the case of the informal system, traditional legitimacy is accorded based on issues of hereditary, traditions and customs, as well as critical roles and functions played in communities by chiefs and other traditional or opinion leaders. Hence if traditional leaders are not consulted by their formal counterparts, their opinions may not count, particularly in the case of Nigeria (interview with British High Commission Official, Abuja, 05 January 2018). Additionally, opposition political parties are always known to question legitimacy within formal governance settings, while within the traditional indigenous settings, ethnic differences, for example, undermine legitimacy of traditional leaders. However a blend of both formal and informal legitimacies, as observed in the case studies in both countries, is needed for effective and efficient pursuit of functions in the security sector (Akingbolahan Adeniran, 05

January 2018, Abuja). Legitimacy is equally considered as legal and is conferred in the formal system or attracted by personalities, while corruption on the other hand undermines the legitimacy of actors involved in it (interview with Chinedu Nwagu, Project Director, Trust Africa-Nigeria, Abuja, 05 January 2018).

These dynamics, however, raise issues of "mixed or multiple legitimacies" which gives authority to both formal and traditional rulers in their leadership roles and functions in hybrid contexts (William 2010: 26 in Logan 2011: 2). In the case of traditional leaders, indirect rule through colonialism have in certain respects undermined the authority of traditional institutions in fundamental ways (Mamdani 1996). Interestingly, however, the authority of traditional leaders is not only independent of the state but also resilient and rooted in the historical continuity of the traditional institutions with a moral claim to rule (Englebert 2000: 97-98; also in Logan 2011:2). This has facilitated continuous connection between chiefs and their communities or subjects. These historical, moral and performance legitimacies grant chiefs the authority to adjudicate and resolve disputes, promote development in the communities, oversee the maintenance of law and order, allocate land and above all bring discipline, dignity and respect to the institution which make his subjects dwell in communal harmony and unity (William 2010: 26).

Mixed legitimacies, based on hybridity, further complicate allegiance and acceptance of leadership in which ethnic differences undermine loyalty to traditional leaders, as well as politicisation of the institution. This has brought about lots of chieftaincy disputes in Ghana and Nigeria. This, in turn, affects credible governance, particularly, within the security sector as was clearly manifested in the Yendi conflict where the politicisation of the selection of chiefs in the kingdom, based on colonial influences, brought about differences between same families belonging to different gates which subsequently led to the murder of the Ya Na Yakubu Andani II. Similarly, the Regional Minister who represented the President in that region but also a subject of

the Ya Na, heeded the request or directive from his traditional leader, his royal, by lifting a ban and curfew imposed by the regional security council over which he presided and which cost the life of the Ya Na. This perhaps substantiates Englebert's (2000: 97-98; also in Logan 2011:2) assertion of African States being historically in competition with traditional authorities for popular legitimacy, but more importantly that the authority of traditional leaders is not only independent of the state but also resilient and rooted in the historical continuity of the traditional institutions and having a moral claim to rule.

Hence relations between formal, informal and charismatic leaders, as well as their followers, hinge not only on integrity or upright moral standards like trust, respect and loyalty, but equally on legitimacy which facilitates the readiness to accept proposals for change and transformation. These attributes or qualities are value-laden and endear followers to their leaders. It facilitates the readiness to listen to such leaders as well as trust their decisions and judgment in embracing progressive foreign cultures, while dropping the obsolete or outmoded indigenous ones. This is in major contrast to self-centred, corrupt, exclusive and neo-patrimonial tendencies among other things.

Leaders' actions or inactions are partly informed by their personal, societal or organisational cultural traits which they bring to bear on the position they occupy and their influence on their followers and vice versa. Additionally, direct relations or interactions between leaders and their followers reinforce their recognition, acceptance, authority and legitimacy, based mainly on the positive cultural dimensions and universally-accepted leadership styles which, in turn, facilitate governance in the quest to deliver security needs. This is clearly evident in the informal governance sectors, while an alternative 'indirect' relations project the leader as an agent of imperial powers or the self-serving and self-seeking type, thereby complicating attempts at desired change and transformation of the sector.

The acceptance of the leadership of the Asantehene as a credible mediator, together with other eminent chiefs, did not only attest to his legitimacy as a traditional leader, but his knowledge of the values, norms, customs and tradition of the people which, to a large extent, facilitated the successful resolution of the dispute in the Dagbon crisis in northern Ghana (*Ghanaweb.com*, Thursday, 13 December 2018). The same also apply to the roles of formal and informal leaders in dispute or conflict resolution in the Hohoe and Ijebu-Itele districts of the Volta Region of Ghana and Ogun State in Nigeria respectively. Therefore, the dynamics of hybridism of the formal and informal contexts contribute largely to the successful governance of this sector based on altruistic and legitimate leadership qualities exhibited.

7.5.5 *Circumventing Complex Hybrid Security Challenges and Structures*

In the context of security sector reform and governance, particularly in Africa, colonial influences permeate all aspects of life including the existing security institutions, actors, practices and strategies adopted in response to security challenges. In many respects, however, this approach to security is considered by some scholars and indigenes as imposition of 'liberal' or 'western' peace tendencies within a traditional or informal African setting (Fukuyama 2004: 17). This, to a large extent, minimises the space or opportunity for traditional and indigenous approaches to peacebuilding or statebuilding processes (Mac Ginty 2008: 140). Hence, the tendency of a clash of two or more cultures, which either lean towards modernity or tradition, calls for prudent calibrations for successful implementation of a concept perceived largely as foreign with varied forms of legitimacies and acceptability (Hoehne 2011:29; Molutsi 2004; Mattes 1997; Logan 2008: 1-23).

This hybrid context is characterised by diverse and competing modern and traditional authorities, where power co-exist, overlap, interact and intertwine. In reality, the state's privileged monopoly over power in minimised, while authority, legitimacy and capacities are

shared in the governance of the security sector (Boege et al 2009: 13-21, Ekeh 1975: 91- 112). Reforms would, therefore, not imply the transfer of resources, people, technology and strong institutions from the western world to developing countries, but shifting emphasis towards the endogenous context with focus on positive or progressive attributes of social order and resilience within communities and complementary institutions on the ground (Boege et al 2009: 14; Podder 2013: 353-380). In this regard, the need would arise for the adoption and mainstreaming of transformative approaches in which hybrid forms of progressive traditional and modern practices would inform theories and policies (Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163; and Podder 2013: 353-380), while eschewing the negatives of gerontocracy, authoritarianism, chauvinism and obsolete traditional practices (Bagayoko et al 2016: 7; Meagher 2012: 1073-1101; Logan 2008:1).

Country case studies in Ghana and Nigeria revealed the importance and influence of culture in addressing conflicts, crime and disputes within a hybrid context, while the non-recognition of same have undermined conflict prevention and resolution efforts. The intensity and complexity of crimes in contemporary times such as rape, abortion, armed robbery and murder require important partnerships between the indigenous and modern security arrangements to combat them (Focus Group Discussion, 18 September 2015, BA/R). Similarly, traditional councils have the skill and know-how to deal effectively with spiritual issues in the communities as compared to the law courts that have absolutely no jurisdiction or physical means of adjudication. Also, in their relations with the police, vigilante groups pass on sophisticated cases of crimes to the police with the consent of their chiefs, while cases of spiritual nature are handled at the traditional level. The group, as indicated in chapter 6, also gains expertise in the training academy where recruits are trained on issues of public relations, upholding and respecting human rights, handling of arms, and apprehension of suspects among other things (interview with a leader of a community Vigilante Group, 28 March 2018).

7.5.6 *Acceptable Values as Cross-Cutting Issues*

In the governance of the security sector, good values and morals serve as enablers or attributes of good leadership which remains essential for effective governance. Accepting or imbibing these values promote integrity, honesty, trustworthiness and anti-corruption among others. Some of these values mentioned and discussed by interviewees and within focus group discussions include moral uprightness, servitude, trust, togetherness or unity, truth and courage captured in sections above. These values promote recognition and inclusivity, and enhance leadership qualities which remain central to achieving security goals and objectives.

Hence, in the bid to establish the influence of security culture on governance of the security sector, these values must be assessed as they enhance performance and facilitate acceptance and collaboration in security reform and effective governance, while undermining same if ignored. These issues featured prominently in the findings in Ghana and Nigeria in either promoting or undermining the prevention, management or resolution of conflicts, crimes and terrorist activities. In the case of Nigeria for instance, perceived imperialist strategies to exploit and keep the Niger Delta polluted and underdeveloped led to resistance of any government intervention as state and government officials in general were seen as collaborating with oil companies to exploit the residents of Niger Delta. Similarly in the Yendi crisis in the Dagbon traditional area of Ghana, trust and confidence issues came up between and among traditional leaders and their followers, as well as government officials, given the politicisation of the conflict. It took integrity, trust and confidence reposed in the Ashanti king and his colleagues, as mentioned above, to get the issue eventually resolved, though with the support of government.

That said, trust-related issues are not necessarily definite but remain quite mixed and complex between formal and informal institutions. A classic example relates to the Afrobarometre round two Studies conducted on people's trust in traditional leaders, the

President, parliament, local government, the army, police and the courts in 2008 for selected African countries. Interestingly in that report, Ghana, which recognised its traditional leaders by making provision for them in the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution, had more trust for the President (65%) than their traditional leaders (54%), and the same level of trust for army (54%) and a little less for the police (51%). On the other hand, Nigeria which made no provision for their traditional leaders in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution had more trust for their traditional leaders (31%) than the President (18%) and the other formal institutions including the army (21%) and police (11%) (Logan 2008: 20).

This brings up the issue of corruption that undermines the level of trust and confidence of the populace about formal and informal institutions, and for that matter security culture practices. Thus an institution, be it formal or informal, will only gain the required credibility, acceptance and legitimacy when seen to be less corrupt. This feeds into the leadership qualities of these institutions and their readiness and willingness to work with the people particularly at the grassroots.

Thus, an inclusive, 'bottom-up' approach to issues endear the leadership and institution to the people and their reciprocate readiness and willingness to follow their leaders in reforms and implementation of decisions in the governance process. All these, as observed and analysed, are largely based on positive security culture influences in which people share in and identify with. In all these, however, change and transformation in relation to culture remains a process rather than an event and may take time for a successful outcome.

The diagram below captures the triangulated findings on a complex security sector having several security actors with varied security cultures, and with the goal of enhancing reform and governance of the security sector. To achieve this objective, which would require changes in certain security cultures and adopting new ones towards the transformation of the sector, the key

intervening factors reviewed above must be taken into consideration as labelled below. In doing this also, uniqueness and variability of individual behaviour counts (Daly 2007:212).

Figure 7.1
Conceptual Framework Depicting Security Culture Influences towards the Enhancement of SSG in Transitional Societies in West Africa



Source: Author, 2019

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter sought to establish the centrality of security culture influences in the improvement of the governance of the security sector in countries in transition in West Africa and beyond. Two country case studies, specifically of Ghana and Nigeria, were used to indicate the significance of security culture in security sector reform efforts and governance of the sector

and why culture matters, rather than a demonstration of which country is better than the other. The approach was to embark on field research to collect data through primary and secondary sources, while also conducting interviews and focus group discussions. Based on data gathered, a comparative analysis was made between the two countries on the influences of their security culture on governance of their respective security sectors, which revealed similarities, differences and, to an extent, paradoxes.

The findings in this chapter revealed a basic contention, competition and complementarity between issues of modernity and tradition brought about by colonialism and its influences on the security culture in the security sector. These varied and equally complex security cultures influence decision-making processes within the West African region and its member states. Actors within the sector, ranging from state to sub-state actors and international or external partners, bring their different cultures to bear in facilitating responses to security threats, while seeking to maintain peace and stability in the region and in ECOWAS member states.

Within Ghana and Nigeria, we have a mixture of regime and human security in which the state occasionally, if not often, focuses more on maintaining the regime in power with less consideration on the security of individuals in the areas of food, health, education, environment and upholding human rights. Both countries have, however, improved quite significantly based on the human security demands as a result of a vibrant and vigilant media and vociferous civil society. Notwithstanding, security complexes and challenges still exist, and reforms and governance within the sector require improvement in order to enhance effective and efficient governance and delivery of security goods in these countries.

In achieving this, changes would not only require structural and organisational reforms (hard changes) but complementary changes in behaviour and attitudes (soft changes). This will

entail dropping negative security practices or customs while adopting positive ones from within the formal and informal security sectors to facilitate the 'soft' changes required for effectiveness. The changes therefore must stem from the 'human beings' or security actors, taking on positive security culture practices. For this to succeed, some key intervening factors would have to be taken into consideration.

These include knowledge of the SSR/SSG concept and embracing the people-centred security approach; a recognition of the different security actors in both the formal and informal security sectors and their complementary roles; ensure high quality leadership and legitimacy of actors in order to facilitate the understanding and acceptance of the security concepts and the needed changes required to embrace them; circumventing the challenges posed by the complex hybrid security terrain within which these changes must occur and the need for complementarity; and imbibing the needed and necessary positive and cross-cutting cultural values to ensure appropriate changes and sustainability. An attempt to fulfill these requirements would, largely, minimize complexities, induce acceptance and enhance effective governance of the security sector. These essential or influential security culture factors align with the social democracy ideology in which people are not only recognised in decision-making processes but also considered as those with whom power resides, and with oversight responsibilities for ensuring transparency and accountability towards meeting their security needs in addition to that of the state.

As reflected in the Ghana and Nigeria case studies, both countries have fared either positively or negatively against these intervening factors in responses to similar or different security challenges confronting them in their respective countries. But success within their respective sectors and in the ECOWAS region at large would require adopting proposed progressive security cultures for impact. This will require encouraging contextual hybridism in

policy implementation in which case the local content is not glossed over for resilience and sustainability, rather than the translational hybrid approach of transferring or insisting only on western or foreign approach to issues even when they do not fit. Additionally, direct relations or interactions between leaders and their followers reinforce their recognition, acceptance, authority and legitimacy. This, in turn, facilitates governance in the quest to deliver community needs. Thus, inclusivity and 'bottom-up' approaches, endear leadership and institutions to citizens or community residents with effective collaboration and partnerships. Again, despite the existence of similarities and differences in security cultures in the formal and informal security sectors of both countries, the adoption and practice of similar security cultures minimise complexity based on an acceptance of positive values, customs and tradition, while different security culture practices undermine security governance efforts to a large extent.

All these findings culminate in response to the central question as to why culture matters in demystifying the complexities within the security sector, which then makes it possible for the needed recognition and acceptance for change or transformation through security sector reform and enhanced governance of the sector. This observed fact, therefore, reinforces the theoretical proposition at the beginning of the study in chapter 3 that shared norms and values on safety, protection and freedom from fear, influence the acceptance and commitment towards security sector reform and governance efforts. Hence imbibing the appropriate security cultural values, norms and practices by both state and sub-state actor groups, would ensure the needed change and transformation towards successful statebuilding processes in West Africa.

7. 6.1 *Summary*

Security sector reform and governance initiatives have contributed to statebuilding processes in periods of transition and post-conflict situations. This is necessitated by long periods of authoritarianism and conflicts which are reflected in dictatorships and destabilisation of

political and socio-economic activities in countries under consideration. To correct these security and governance deficits, reforms and governance processes are undertaken in accordance with democratic norms, good governance, and the call for civilian control of the sector, accountability, transparency and observance of the rule of law (Schroeder et al 2013: 382).

Transformation of the security sector does not only require structural or institutional changes in terms of capacity-building, provision of adequate equipment, resources and logistics or materiel, but also requires complementary changes in attitudes and behavioural norms and practices reflected in "cultural change in terms of how people relate to [the] state as well as how people conduct everyday business" (Jackson 2009: 4). All these changes would help facilitate effective and enhanced security sector, made possible by an appropriate governance mechanism or system.

It is, therefore, in response to the needed transformation of the sector that this study explored the research question as to why culture matters in demystifying the complexity of the sector, facilitating an understanding and acceptance of security sector reform and governance concepts, and their effectiveness in ensuring enhanced governance, peace, stability and development in the case study countries considered and beyond. The thesis focused on SSG in transitional societies that are post-authoritarian in nature, and that are working towards embracing and consolidating democratic tenets, though it could equally provide useful lessons for post-conflict peacebuilding context of reconstruction and recovery.

The thesis looked at possible ways of engendering an appropriate mix of indigenous and acquired security cultures in security sector governance in Ghana and Nigeria, and by extension the ECOWAS region. This needs a radical shift in both structural conditions and behaviours or security cultures as it makes security governance largely irrelevant in some African societies (Nathan, 2004: 2; Bryden and Olonisakin 2010: 4).

The thesis, therefore, advocated for more cultural-related practices that effectively combine African traditional security cultural practices with that of the Western-acquired or accommodated ones rather than the "cosmetic" or “instrumental” security culture-related practices in order to enhance transformation in security governance in West Africa and elsewhere (Hill 2012: 93). This suggestion was arrived at based on the major influence of colonialism in political, economic, social and security systems of governance in these countries (Ajayi 1968:196-197; Adu Boahene 1985: 44). Colonial practices and culture handed over or transmitted to the post-colonial era created major security culture differences between modern (formal) and traditional (informal) approaches to security governance in the continent. This made it difficult in accepting security sector reforms considered largely as a foreign dominated and imposed concept in the region, given its multiplicity of actors with varied security cultures and complex security governance arrangements.

The hybridity generated from these complex arrays of security actors with different security culture beliefs, customs, norms and values posed challenges which required appropriate responses in ensuring the safety of the state and its people. Some of the challenges included gerontocracy, authoritarianism, chauvinism, obsolete, dated or unacceptable traditional beliefs and practices with human rights implications, imposition of foreign concepts and values which are unacceptable within the endogenous context, and corruption among others which have undermined security reform efforts and governance processes (Bagayoko et al 2016: 7; Meagher 2012: 1073-1101; Logan 2008:1; Scott 2007: 6; Ake 2012: 3; Fukuyama 2004: 17). An interrogation of the ‘software’ aspects of behavioural and attitudinal changes which are less tangible and difficult to achieve was thus embarked upon, which required more imagination, patience and sensitivity (Murray 2009: 205). To achieve this, a qualitative approach to the research was adopted, given the social dimensions of issues to be explored with major tendencies

for bias, as well as the need for inductive reasoning to arrive at a triangulated conclusion summarised in the 7 chapters of this thesis as presented below.

Chapter 1 of this study introduced the subject matter of the research on the need to focus on security culture and its influences on security governance which was captured in the background to the study, the aims and scope of the research, overall objectives and rationale of the study. This provided the basis for understanding the background issues and why this research was undertaken. Chapter 2 on literature review and analytical framework delved into the analysis and synthesis of the existing literature on security culture and its influences on governance of the security sector. It did this with the view to identifying existing gaps for the research, while framing an appropriate research question and enabling objectives to guide the proposed research towards making an original contribution to knowledge in the selected field of study.

The literature review and analytical framework considered the broader context of statebuilding within which security sector reforms take place, but in this instance, going beyond the creation and strengthening of required structures and institutions to looking at complementary cultural changes which facilitate the effective functioning of these structures and institutions within the state (Fukuyama 2004: 17; Chandler 2010: 6; Jackson 2009: 4). This provided opportunities for Ghana and Nigeria to make use of their potential resources and human capital in the context of security reforms for improved governance and development in their state building processes.

The human security concept was highlighted as the prudent security model to embrace in security sector governance, given that it caters for both the freedom from fear and want, as well as threat to the state and its people, compared to that of traditional/regime security ((Buzan 1991; Booth 1999; UNDP Human Development Report 1994: 3, 22-40; Annan 2000; and Tadjbakhsh

and Chenoy 2007). This should be complemented by good democratic governance informed by the contribution of all stakeholders, including both state and sub-state actors.

The differences observed between the modern and indigenous systems of governance are the common standards for governance in a modern globalised world as against a more localised one in the indigenous context that is only expanded where issues of commonality exist (Hlawnching 2006: 4). Notwithstanding, both systems adopt a participatory and inclusive decision-making process based on consensus-building, except that the indigenous approach opts mainly for bottom-up approaches rather than the top-bottom.

These findings revealed, therefrom, that in drawing lessons for the future, statebuilding, security and governance arrangements require not only a rethink, but the need to adopt and mainstream transformative approaches in which hybrid forms of progressive traditional and modern practices would inform theories and policies (Mac Ginty 2008: 139 -163; and Podder 2013: 353-380). The element of transformation brought out the issue of culture, but more specifically security culture as the "soft" part of the reform which is more or less invisible, but which influences behavioural patterns or the way of life of a group of people (Murray 2009).

The literature review finally explored security culture and the notion of complexity, acceptance and effectiveness in enhancing SSR/SSG in both countries of Ghana and Nigeria. In this context, it came to light that cultural differences exhibit complexities of relations between individuals or groups, as the higher the differences, the more complex the relationship. Cultural similarities, however, helped to understand the evolutionary process of cultural development (House *et al* 2002: 1). This review set the stage for the subsequent identification and exploration of the research question "*Why culture matters? An Analysis of Complexity, Acceptance and Effectiveness in Security Sector Governance in Ghana and Nigeria*",

Chapter 3 of the study catered for the research design and methodology which provided the philosophical framework for undertaking the research through the adoption of the right research methodology, the collection and analysis of relevant data, and the justification of the research methodology. Chapter 4 on security culture and security governance in West Africa provided the regional frameworks for undertaking the two-country case studies in Ghana and Nigeria. Its focus was mainly on tracing the evolution of security culture in West Africa by looking at the changing regional context of security culture based on colonial influences. The argument focused specifically on the non-static nature of traditional societies which have evolved over time from its pre-colonial through colonial to post-colonial times (Afigbo 1985: 487).

The demographic and evolutionary processes indicate a dynamic and changing cultural values and norms as these changes have either been voluntary or forcefully imbibed. These voluntary or imbibed modern cultural values have their positive and negative attributes in addition to the already existing indigenous ones, but equally present hybrid cultures experienced currently in African societies across the continent. This indicates the potential for acculturation, while equally maintaining indigenous traditional norms and values. Challenges, progress and prospects are then explored towards facilitating effective changes in the transformation of the security sector and its governance in West Africa.

Chapters 5 and 6 of the study reviewed cultural influences on security practices in both Ghana and Nigeria by looking at actors within both formal and informal security sectors, as well as cumulative effects of their practices in the effective and efficient governance towards responses to threats and ensuring freedom from fear in communities, regions and the countries at large. In these countries, it was discovered that security cultures existed in both the formal and informal sectors, though some considered it as emerging in specific contexts. Actors in the sector, nevertheless, had their varied forms of security cultures with some aligned to the western

realist and idealist conceptions of security while others conform to the traditional pre-colonial ones or both. These cultures have their similarities, usually influenced by altruistic values, as well as major differences which makes it difficult and complex in decision-making, prioritisation of threats, and whose security to cater for among other things.

In taking the issue forward, the research revealed contentious modern and traditional security cultures with both positive and negative attributes that required some harmonization in order to facilitate a successful transformation of the sector and effective governance in both countries. It did this within the social democracy ideology of preserving the security of both the state and the individual, but with major emphasis on integrating progressive informal and formal cultures and tradition in the security governance process. This, as a result, led to the proposition for a rethink of the SSR concept in both approach and delivery, taking issues of its complexity and acceptance into consideration for required changes. This must equally be complemented by a basic reorientation of attitudes or behavioural changes for prudent outcomes through the grasping of security objectives and dividends.

In Ghana, security sector reform has taken place with emphasis on restructuring of security institutions and agencies towards effective and efficient security service delivery. This was done with the view to subject security agencies to proper governance through civilian control of the armed forces and the police by ensuring the upholding of the rule of law and observing human rights standards, as a result of past abuses of people's rights under successive authoritarian regimes. Transparency and accountability was equally given emphasis in parliament, while judicial reforms were undertaken to enforce the laws. Capacities of civil society or sub-state actors were equally built to facilitate effective oversight and governance of the sector.

The country also presents an ideational hybrid context in which security culture preferences in both the formal and informal contexts have been established. There is also a legitimate recognition of informal security actors in the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution. It was equally observed that security culture in Ghana has had and could have more influences on security sector governance in Ghana which has brought about some level of changes which appear a bit more 'intrinsic' than cosmetic or 'instrumental' in security governance and responses to security threats and needs (Hill 2012: 93).

Be that as it may, challenges also continue to exist as security reforms were not undertaken necessarily in a holistic manner. It focused more on the institutions and equipping the security agencies without complementary reforms with regard to change and transformation based on shared behavioural norms, values and practices. The country also has no national security policy to guide its national security goals, objectives, interests and reform agenda, though it has a national defence policy and other security legislations to guide its roles and functions.

In the Nigeria case, the 1999 Constitution mandates the Federal and State Governments to make security and welfare their primary purpose. Its security reform efforts focused largely on the professionalisation of the military from 1999 and subjecting the armed forces to civilian control, as in the case of Ghana, by adjusting from military rule and supremacy to observing democratic tenets. Hence issues of civil-military relations have been a major focus. Police reform efforts have focused on reversals of questionable promotions, training and increase in numbers of policemen in response to high levels of crime. Ongoing reform and restructuring efforts are currently underway under the Nigerian Police Reform and Restructuring Plan 2015-2020, and support by donors towards management reform, accountability reforms, capacity-building/training reform and equipment/infrastructure support (ISSAT-DCAF 2016: 5-75).

The huge Nigerian population with multiple and diverse security actors, compared to Ghana, further complicates its security challenges amidst complexities and legitimacy issues. Its traditional leaders are not recognised by their political counterparts as major or legitimate security actors in the pursuit of security and its related development activities in the country. Rather, these indigenous actors derive their legitimacy directly from the people in the communities they reside in. The country equally continues to struggle with trust and credibility issues owing to high levels of corruption. Nigeria, however, came up recently in 2019 with a reviewed national security strategy, reviewed every five years, that encapsulates the security aspirations of its citizens, thus presenting a holistic and bottom-up strategy to address the ongoing security challenges, including terrorism, in the country.

The hybrid governance and security sector arrangements thus bring both formal and informal security actors together in their pursuit of governance and policy decisions but without the necessary recognition in the case of traditional leaders. This requires immediate redress to give more leverage and enhance coordination and collaboration towards security, peace and stability in Nigeria. Security sector reform efforts are equally more 'hardware' oriented rather than focusing on the total transformation of the sector.

So based on the observations made, it is inferred that security culture influences exist but also require significant levels of legitimacy for the needed impact to be felt. The mixed legitimacies observed within the formal and informal security sector arrangements reinforce the need for inclusivity and collaboration in the effective and successful governance of the sector.

Chapter 7 did a comparative case study analysis of security culture influences on effective security sector governance in Ghana and Nigeria by seeking to establish the centrality of security culture influences in the improvement of the governance of the security sector in countries in transition in West Africa and beyond. Findings revealed a basic contention, competition and

complementarity between issues of modernity and tradition brought about by colonialism and its influences on the security culture in the security sector. These varied and equally complex security cultures influence decision-making processes within the West African region and beyond.

These security culture influences are however based on certain key factors derived from previous sections above, including people-centred security; knowledge of the SSR/SSG concept; recognised security actors; acceptable or legitimate leadership; circumventing the complex hybrid security cultures or dynamism; and imbibing acceptable cultural values that could enhance security sector governance if observed properly, and which led to triangulate observations made. This helped to establish the importance of security culture in demystifying the complexity of the security concept and its reform prerogatives, as well as facilitating its acceptance towards improving governance in the sector. A directly proportionate relationship was also observed between similar security cultures facilitating easy collaboration and cooperation in governance of the security sector, while different security cultures make collaboration and cooperation difficult. This speaks to using bottom-up approaches through consultation and dialogue to facilitate imbibing or adopting acceptable cultural values, norms and practices towards effective governance in the sector.

All these, inductively, informed the theoretical proposition that shared norms and values on safety, protection and freedom from fear, influence the acceptance and commitment towards security sector reform and governance efforts, hence imbibing the appropriate security cultural values, norms and practices by both state and sub-state actor groups, would ensure the needed change and transformation towards successful SSR/SSG processes in West Africa.

This study, thus, helped in confirming why culture matters in SSR/SSG efforts in societies in transition in West Africa and beyond. It also indicates the novelty of the research

undertaken in two prospective transitional societies in West Africa with their respective successes and challenges. It makes a significant contribution to enhancing governance of the security sector in West Africa and beyond, and provides options for transformation within the sector. It further provides options for undertaking further academic and policy research in related areas to consolidate these findings as the research could not exhaustively cover the entire countries in which research was undertaken as a result of minimal resources, limited duration of the research and security risks in some parts of the countries under consideration.

7.6.2 *Meeting Enabling and Overall Objectives of the Study*

The enabling objectives for undertaking this research were met in the course of the study. These include promoting the recognition, appreciation and respect for the cultural context based on existing norms and values, as these have the tendency to facilitate the acceptance and commitment towards sustainable democratic governance of the security sector. It also helped to establish the inter-connectedness as well as clarify the dynamics between the major concepts of culture, security and governance, and contextualise the interplay of these concepts in security reform efforts towards eventual resilience and sustainability in the statebuilding process.

In both security sector reform contexts of Ghana and Nigeria, it was realised that the interplay of security cultures – specifically between the formal and informal sectors, and at the local, national and international levels – brought about major diversities, complexities, and differences which further complicated effective implementation of the concept and governance of the sector. A case in point in Nigeria is the traditional expertise at the community levels in resolving farmer-herder crisis or disputes in the Ijebu-Itele District of Ogun State, while the Federal and State Governments struggle to contain the crises at the middle belt and other areas across the country for the lack of recognition of indigenous capacities and collaboration with traditional authorities, as well as the top-bottom approach to the crises. A recognition and

involvement of these traditional actors, with the requisite cultural sensitivities in mind, would go a long way to facilitate appropriate intervention and responses.

A similar example can also be cited of the effective collaboration between the Government of Ghana and traditional leaders in the amicable resolution of the long-standing Dagbon Crisis, the 2012 conflict at Hohoe in the Volta Region between the indigenous Ewes and the settler Zongo (Muslim) community, and that of the 2008 electoral dispute between the two major parties of NDC and NPP. The hybrid context, thus, requires recognition, appreciation and cultural awareness and sensitivities based on existing norms and values in order to facilitate the acceptance of foreign or different but positive cultural practices while eschewing native harmful ones towards sustainable democratic governance of the security sector.

With regard to the clarification, contexualisation and establishment of interconnectedness and dynamics between the three major concepts of culture, security and governance in security reform efforts, it revealed the imposition of colonial and imperialist policies and influences aligned with Western liberal peace approach to development in both countries and developing countries at large. This, as a result, calls for the need to overcome its detriment by focusing on positive or progressive endogenous security cultures which have sustained development activities over centuries towards eventual resilience and sustainability in the statebuilding process.

This reinforces another objective of highlighting appropriate security cultural practices that promote good governance practices in undertaking SSG in societies in transition. In this regard, research findings in both countries revealed some positive and negative, complex or unfamiliar behavioural practices, as well as differences in norms, values and cultures. A transformation would, however, take place depending on the promotion of identified intervening factors or the adoption of positive cultural values mentioned above.

Governance and leadership must be people-centred or aligned with pro-human security ideals which in the long run translate into the protection of the state rather than the regime in power; mapping of actors in the formal and informal security sectors and the recognition of their complementary roles in the sector in crucial; and ensuring a credible leadership that is legitimate enough to facilitate the understanding and acceptance of the security concepts and the needed changes required to embrace them. Others also include an acknowledgment and understanding of the hybrid security context within which these changes must occur and the need for complementarity and imbibing the needed and necessary positive and cross-cutting cultural values to ensure appropriate changes and sustainability.

Above all, the critical role of dialogue among local/national actors and partners in undertaking SSR and SSG as a way of promoting synergy, and enhancing coordination and coherence between indigenous forms of security cultural practices and the modern liberal peace approach towards development came to light. This underscores the positive correlation or a directly proportionate relationship between adopting similar or standard security cultures and effective governance of the security sector. In all the case studies undertaken in Ghana and Nigeria, success in prevention, management and resolution of conflicts or disputes had to do with adopting 'bottom up' approaches based on inclusive dialogue and shared values. This promotes cooperation, ownership and commitment to guaranteed peace and security in the respective countries and the region at large.

Finally, change and transformation remains an ongoing process as a means to an end and not an end in itself, and does take time. Hence this will require patience, diligence, commitment and dedication to achieve the desired change and transformation towards peace and stability in transitional societies in West Africa and beyond.

These enabling objectives derive from the overall objectives of exploring ways to enhance SSG for effective SSR processes in transitional societies in West Africa; identify ways of promoting effective and efficient security institutions and agencies in delivering services that meet the needs of the people; promoting collective decision-making processes by recognising inclusive identification of threats to state and sub-state actor groups; highlighting the importance of addressing the needs of both state and sub-state actors as a conflict prevention measure towards consolidation of peace and security; and contextualising the SSR concept within transitional societies.

7.6.3 *Recommendations*

From the case studies undertaken in Ghana and Nigeria, it becomes very clear that some measures need to be considered, going forward, in addressing lingering security challenges; among them, the exploration of oil in the Niger Delta. In responding to this conflict, the plight of the people in the area must be of major concern to decision-makers, especially with regard to their health and the environment. The actors at local, national and international levels must reach basic understanding on key challenges and responses in this regard. Same goes for issues of terrorism and farmer-herder disputes in communities across the country. An understanding of the different cultures of actors in the sector provides an added opportunity to respond appropriately and adequately to the challenges.

Similarly in Ghana, ways must be explored to consolidate security sector reform and governance efforts through the drafting of a national security policy to guide security reforms and intervention in a holistic and focused manner, having in mind the need to balance traditional and human security considerations. A careful and proper understanding of the security reform and governance concepts, and a good knowledge of actors involved and their security cultures

would facilitate inclusive dialogue and mitigation efforts in order to enhance governance of the sector and provision of security needs of both the state and its people.

There is also the need to revisit and find common grounds for complementing or integrating external SSR/SSG support with internally driven reforms in both formal and informal security sectors of Ghana and Nigeria. This is important given the immense contribution from the informal security sector to peace and stability of both countries, demonstrated in chapters 5 and 6 in the country case studies. People generally identify with the informal sector, despite its peculiar challenges, respect and recognise traditional leaders, and accept as well as patronise its services. Hence any SSR or SSG programmes implemented in these and other countries without security culture considerations, influences and focus on transformation of the sector would be an effort in futility as observed elsewhere.

In all these scenarios, however, principles, norms and values must be inculcated and respected to facilitate peace, security and stability in the region and beyond.

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Appendix I

Interview Questions for Field Work

- **How would you define security, security culture and governance?**
- **Do you know about SSR and SSG programmes and what it entails?**
- **What is (are) your notion(s) about complexity of the concepts and the security sector?**
- **Do you consider the existence of security culture in this country, and if so what is it?**
- **What is the nature of crime or security threats and challenges in the country?**
- **Does the community work with local government, officials of government and security agencies in addressing security challenges, and if so, how?**
- **What security challenges are faced in the community level and how are they addressed?**
- **What roles do traditional leaders play in their communities or constituents to improve security governance?**
- **Are traditional leaders considered as legitimate security actors and why?**
- **What tensions exist between the traditional and modern or formal security and governance arrangements? Any possibilities of addressing them?**
- **Are there any negative attributes or values that undermine the effective functioning of the security sector?**
- **Are there ongoing efforts to address the issue of corruption and other negative security culture values and practices in the system?**
- **General thoughts, comments, questions and recommendations if any**

Appendix II

List and Dates of Interviews Conducted in the Field (Ghana &Nigeria)

No.	Name	Status	Date	Institution/Location
1	Adeniran, Akingbolahan	Civilian	05 January 2018	Govt. – Abuja
2	Agbezuge, Justice	Civilian	19 May 2015	Int. Org. – Accra
3	Agbodza, Kwame	Civilian	18 May 2015	Govt. – Accra
4	Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi	Expert	11 May 2015	Academic – Accra
5	Amankwah, Samuel	Civilian	10 May 2015	Govt. - Accra
6	Atuguba, Raymond	Expert	15 September 2015	Academic - Accra
7	Baffour, Fritz	Civilian	18 May 2015	Govt. – Accra
8	Chief Alhaji Abdulfatai A. Adesanya	Civilian	28 March 2018	Traditional – Ogun State
9	Coleman, Nii Carl	Military, Expert	20 April 20-19	NGO - Accra
10	His Royal Highness Alaiyeluwa Oba Dr. (engr.) M.A. Kasali	Civilian	30 March 2018	Traditional – Ogun State
11	Jaye, Thomas	Expert	08 May 2015	Academic - Accra
12	Kanyog, Jerome	Police	19 May 2015	Govt. - Accra
13	Lartey, Ernest	Expert	08 May 2015	Academic - Accra
14	Nwangu, Chinedu	Civilian	05 January	INGO - Abuja

			2018	
15	Oduro, Franklin	Civilian	09 May 2015	NGO - Accra
16	Quantson, Kofi Bentum	Police, Expert	18 April 2019	Private Capacity - Accra

Appendix III

Focus Group Discussion (1)

List of Traditional Leaders of Abutia Kloe, Volta Region, Ghana

No.	Name	Title	Date	Location
1	Togbe Nelson Klu	Stool Father	15 September 2015	Abutia Kloe, V/R
2	Togbe Daniel Gotu	Zikpuitor (Stool Owner)	"	"
3	Rtd. Police Inspector Newton K. Nyanyo	Togbe Dzatse Anyormi	"	"
4	Togbe Emmanuel Dornyo	Zikpuitor, Mankraa	"	"
5	Mama Rejoice Darke	Mama Ayipe III, Queen Mother	"	"
6	Mama Atikudofe	Dome Queen Mother	"	"
7	Mama Enyonam Gu	(Gblevi Rep)	"	"
8	Togbe Kwami Ayi	Linguist		"

9	Mr. Albert Nukpeta	(Secretary of the Traditional Council)	"	"
10	Madam Grace Kpe	Resident	"	"
11	Lance Corporal Richard Osei	Ghana Police Service, Abutia Kloe	"	"

Focus Group Discussions (2)

Members of the Traditional Council (Regional House of Chiefs) of Brong Ahafo Region

No.	**Name**	**Title**	**Date**	**Location**
1	Nana Bofotia Boa Amponsem	Krontihene, (Chair)	18 September 2015	Sunyani Traditional Area
2	Nana Osei Kyeretwie Duako	Adomakohene	"	"
3	Nana Fosu Gyeabour	Domserehene	"	"
4	Nana Kusi Boadum	Penkwasehene	"	"
5	Nana Kofi Poku	Opinion Leader	"	"
6	Nana Abena Boaboahemaa	Dwantoahemaa	"	"
7	Madam Akua Manu	Sunyanima Maahemaa	"	"

8	Stephen Owusu (SO)	Sunyani Regional House of Chiefs	“	“

Appendix IV

Old Political Map of Ghana



Source: https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/ghana_map.htmMap based on a UN map from UN Cartographic Section.